

GUYANA



REPORT
on
**PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
IN GUYANA**

Prepared for the Government of Guyana
by
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PREFACE

This report deals with the machinery of Government and Public Service personnel administration in Guyana. It was made at the request of the Government of Guyana by two United Nations advisers, Geoffrey Burgess and Jack Kent Hunn, who visited Georgetown from 2nd October to 16th November, 1966.

Each adviser was given separate Terms of Reference as it seemed likely they would arrive in tandem, but when, in fact, they arrived together their Terms of Reference were unified, as follows, in the original form drafted by the Government:

- (a) "to make a general survey of the structure, organisation and administration of the Public Services (excluding the Police, Security and Armed Services);
- (b) to recommend any changes in the structure, organisation and administration of those Public Services it may consider desirable;
- (c) to recommend any changes it may consider necessary in the Government's personnel, recruitment, promotion and training policies, including the powers, duties and functions of the relevant Service Commissions;
- (d) to recommend any changes it may consider advisable in the Government's relationships with the public corporations and in regard to the means of bringing about the proper and efficient discharge of the functions entrusted to such corporations;
- (e) to advise the Government on any other matter it may consider relevant to its organisation and functioning."

Operating as one mission instead of two, the advisers not only avoided covering the same ground twice but also derived the benefit of collaboration. These advantages were reinforced by the fact that their Counterpart was Mr. E.D. Ford, Permanent Secretary, Office of the Prime Minister, whose exceptional knowledge of Government organisation and operations, and whose access to all in authority, were of inestimable value. The advisers were greatly indebted to the Prime Minister for detaching Mr. Ford to serve continuously as Chairman of the team.

The Mission paid calls on the Governor-General (Sir Richard Luyt), the Prime Minister (Hon. Forbes Burnham), all other Ministers, the Leader of the Opposition (Dr. Cheddi Jagan), the Chairman and Permanent Member of the Public Service Commission and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance. They heard evidence from the other Permanent Secretaries collectively and in some cases individually and invited them to submit written statements and suggestions. Visits were paid to several Ministries and Departments (Finance, P.S.C. Secretariat, Education, Works, Health, Agriculture, Government Printery) for discussions with senior officers. Testimony was also taken orally and in writing from the Civil Service Association, the Federation of Unions of Government Employees, and representatives of senior professional and technical officers and of women employees. Public Corporations were consulted, among them being the Bank of Guyana, the Guyana Development Corporation, the Guyana Marketing Corporation, the Guyana Electricity Corporation and the University of Guyana. The Consultative Associa-

tion of Guyanese Industries was also invited to offer its views and gladly accepted.

The Mission travelled to Lethem on the Guyana-Brazil border, to Fort Wellington in West Berbice and to New Amsterdam and Springlands in East Berbice in order to see the District Commissioners and district officers of other Departments at those centres and discuss their problems. In the course of these visits opportunity was taken to see Government activities in the field, notably the 27,000 acre land development project at Black Bush Polder. A visit was also made to the Demerara Bauxite Company's installations at Mackenzie where discussions were held with Personnel Administration and Finance officials.

From all these sources and from its own staff the Mission received the most willing and helpful co-operation, for which it was extremely grateful. To Mr. Ford himself no acknowledgement of debt would be adequate. Although the task was perceived to be a diagnostic survey rather than a remedial undertaking it could not have been carried out in the time except for Mr. Ford's constructive advice and guidance.

INTRODUCTION

THE DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

1. It is of course a truism that Public Services, Public Corporations and the like exist in an environment and are largely coloured by that environment. Nevertheless, it is a truism that bears repetition when persons used to one environment are required to comment on organisations created for and developed in another. The environmental influence operates through economic and demographic factors and perhaps even more strongly through sociological factors, particularly the community values and attitudes which may control the acceptance or rejection of the bases on which modifications are suggested.

2. The statistics at Annex A set out in facts or estimates the G.N.P., the population, the urban price index, the non-development budget, the total of personal emoluments, that is the public service payroll, in the budget and the number of public servants (in the sense of those working in the general administration on posts regarded as permanent) in 1953, 1959, 1965 and 1966. The six years intervals were accepted partly as it was felt undesirable to burden the report with annual figures and partly because the political and economic vicissitudes of the last 13 years have made annual figures less directly useful. The years chosen have, in any case, individual significance. 1953 saw the introduction of what was essentially the first non-colonial Government; 1959 was half-way to independence and near the 1961 Constitution which gave internal self-government, and 1965 may be regarded as the first really normal year after intervening law and order troubles which had threatened the stability and certainly affected the development of the state. The figures provide an overall picture of the last 13 years of Guyana's economic and demographic listing without overburdening this report with statistics.

3. Population is now believed to be rising at the rate of 3 per cent per annum. The G.N.P. is rising faster than the population, but because of the facts -

- (a) that the economy depends heavily on exports and foreign remittances,
- (b) that the demographic pattern is changing to decrease the proportion actually in the working group,

the per capita income and particularly the average household net income have not increased materially and particularly not at a rate comparable with the neighbouring economies. Against this picture of an economy rising only slowly must be set the rapidly rising expectations inevitably associated with independence.

4. The current (non capital) budget was running in 1965 at 25 per cent of the G.N.P., a high proportion for any but a rich country, and of the budget 40 per cent is devoted to personal emoluments. The advisers thus operated in an atmosphere where there were rising expectations from Government, where the Government hoped to satisfy these expectations through a Development Programme which must inevitably involve expansion of activity, but where the cost of Government was already disquieting, rising faster than the resources available to meet it, and where increases in taxation did not disclose an acceptable path out. There is only one possible solution to this type of situation; to take strong action to hold down the rate of increase in costs, and to insist on

better value in work done per dollar paid out, in other words to discourage numerical and cost expansion and to meet added duties by increased productivity. This is the aim that had prominently to be borne in mind.

5. This has been reinforced by the fact that Guyana follows British practice in dealing with the effects on salaries of inflation, evidenced in the urban price index, not by a process of continuous adjustment, but by periodic Pay Commissions. The last Commission under Professor Guillebaud is now some years old, and pressure is mounting for a new Commission. Even so the pay increases accepted following the Guillebaud Commission were based on a presumed capacity to hold the rate of expansion of the Service at an annual 4 per cent which has not been found to exist in practice. The advisers, although rates of pay were outside their terms of reference, have had to bear in mind both past experience of expansion and the probable further rise in rates and costs when considering solutions.

6. Community values and attitudes (to material rewards, to discipline, to politics, to institutions) affect the determination of the administrative pattern that would best suit a community. In so brief a visit it is impossible even to attempt to have final views, but some aspects of what appear to be community attitudes are mentioned later and have materially affected the line of thought adopted. Fortunately the time appears to be ripe for securing acceptance of change, and the opportunity may not occur again. It is essential that it be not missed.

The Public Administration Background

7. Public Administration in Guyana has evolved in fairly well defined stages in the post-War years. Before 1953 policy and other matters were referred by functional departments to the Colonial (later Chief) Secretary and by him to the Governor, advised by Executive Council as necessary. The central Colonial Secretariat was arranged in the classic colonial pattern of groupings of related departments each dealt with by a responsible "charge officer". The Secretariat's Establishment Division handled not only Establishment policy but also the greater part of personnel administration relating to the public service.

8. In May 1953 responsible Government was introduced and the Governor was thenceforth advised by an Executive Council comprising three Ex Officio members (Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Attorney General) and six Ministers. Corresponding Ministerial Secretariats, set over but apart from the relevant groups of Departments, were created and staffed largely by the officers who had previously dealt with the groupings in the Central Secretariat. The principal administrative officer in each Ministry was designated "Principal Assistant Secretary". The personnel administration functions (appointment, removal and discipline) of the Chief Secretary's Office (exercised on the advice of Appointments and Promotions Boards for the Classified Clerical Service and the Junior Professional and Technical Service) were assigned to a newly established Public Service Commission which functioned in an advisory capacity to the Governor. The Establishment functions (fixing staff complements, classification, grading posts for pay scales, fixing or modifying conditions of service etc.) continued to be a part of the Chief Secretary's portfolio.

9. This Ministry + Departments organisation continued up to 1957 in which year the Heads of Ministerial Secretariats were first designated Permanent Secretaries.

10. In the partially elected government of September 1957 (which succeeded the wholly nominated Government appointed after the withdrawal of the May 1953 constitution later that year) the Executive Council included five Ministers and the practice was gradually adopted of attaching the Ministerial Secretariats, which had hitherto nearly all been grouped together and located away from the Departments for which the Ministers were responsible, to the principal Department with which they were concerned. This resulted in Ministers and their Permanent Secretaries and other lay advisers being in closer contact with the Ministries' heads of departments and principal professional advisers. Establishment functions continued to be the responsibility of the Chief Secretary.

11. The grade of Principal Assistant Secretary, as the Permanent Secretary's principal assistant, was restored during 1960 when one such post was created. The number of Principal Assistant Secretaries has gradually increased to the point where, setting aside the Ministry of External Affairs whose eight such posts carry peculiar connotations, there are 18 in the 1966 Estimates.

12. With the 1961 Constitution internal self-government came into effect, the Governor being obliged to act in accordance with the advice of a Council of Ministers, except in regard to Defence and External Affairs including certain aspects of External Trade. The Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary were replaced by elected Ministers of Home Affairs and Finance respectively, there was an elected Attorney General and, including these three, the Council consisted of 10 Ministers, the Premier presiding over its deliberations. The Establishment and Personnel functions which the Chief Secretary had up to this point retained passed to the Ministry of Finance on the one hand and the Secretary of the Public Service Commission on the other. The Public Service Commission continued to be advisory to the Governor.

13. The process of bringing the Ministers' policy-making staffs into closer association with their executive departments continued and, facilitated by the fact that the Government that took office in December 1964 established 15 Ministries, has reached the stage where it may be said that four or five Ministries (Works and Hydraulics, Agriculture, Education, Local Government and possibly Health) are fully integrated and that their departments have ceased to exist as separate entities. This is perhaps as far as this process can go, given the present organisation of the functions of government in Guyana.

14. Fundamentally the only changes that Independence (May 1966) has introduced have been to make the Public Service Commission constitutionally independent in its responsibility for the appointment, removal and discipline of public officers and to transfer responsibility for Defence and External Affairs to the elected Government. A new Ministry of External Affairs handles the latter subject.

15. Guyana has thus inherited a good Public Service system on the British pattern. But it would be paradoxical if the replica remained in the same mould after the master pattern had changed with the times, as is not unlikely. The House of Commons Estimates Committee said only this year of the U.K. Civil Service that whilst "its fine tradition is still very much alive today both its structure and its public image need to be reviewed in the light of modern needs". The same could be said à fortiori in Guyana.

I. ORGANISATION

MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

A. The Cabinet and Ministries

16. Under the Constitution, the executive authority of Guyana, save in so far as it is otherwise allotted by the Constitution, is to be exercised by the Governor-General with the assistance of a Cabinet consisting of the Prime Minister and other Ministers, to whom responsibility is jointly ascribed but who are individually responsible for specific blocks of government business. There are 15 Ministers in all including the Attorney General who is a Minister, by virtue of Article 42 of the Constitution, responsible for the affairs of his Ministry and a Minister of State acting to the Prime Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

17. The bulk of Government business is handled by administrative units, usually known as Departments, but without complete uniformity of nomenclature. These Departments are grouped together and placed under Ministers. The remainder of Government business is handled by a small number of Public Corporations and, at present to a very limited extent, by a much larger number (nearly 100) of Local Government units.

18. The existing number of Ministries is only a few months old. In 1953 when some measure of self-government was introduced there were nine Ministries (three headed by official Ministers - the Chief Secretary, the Finance Secretary and the Attorney General). Subsequently, numbers have varied before settling down at the present fifteen.

19. In deciding the number of Ministries the best policy is usually described as the organisation of Government activities according to major purposes in a minimum number of agencies, and the aim should be to create units, charged with a reasonably cohesive group of related functions capable of being controlled and supervised to the appropriate extent by a single Minister, yet not so numerous as to create unmanageable problems of inter-Ministerial coordination and of utilisation of available staff. This is the administrative criterion. On the other hand administrative considerations are not exclusive or necessarily paramount. Political considerations have their part to play; it might well be that there is advantage in a greater division of responsibility than would otherwise be appropriate in order to give administrative experience to as many as possible in the shortest time. It is not therefore the intention to do more than to draw attention to the administrative criterion mentioned above as being relevant whenever a decision on the number of Ministries is taken, while adding, however, that to give it too little weight or to subordinate it completely to other criteria can create insuperable obstacles to efficient management.

RECOMMENDATION 1.

THAT the administrative principle that Government business should be organised by major purposes into the minimum number of units should be borne

in mind in view -

- (a) of the risk of spreading limited trained and experienced personnel too thinly among the units,
- (b) of the additional demands on such personnel for consequential co-ordinating units,
- (c) of the additional demands made on and for district staff.

20. The Constitution makes the total group of Ministers, the Cabinet, jointly responsible for the conduct of business. The allocation of primary responsibility for separate blocks to separate Ministries is by executive order. It is necessary that that order should specify these separate blocks in sufficient detail -

- (a) to leave no room for overlapping jurisdiction,
- (b) to indicate with sufficient clarity where to go for particular action.

When there are substantial amendments, the whole should be reissued rather than leaving the matter covered by a collection of original orders and piecemeal amendments. Later recommendations will stress the need for using documentation more freely and consistently than hitherto as an aid to public servants in their work and this is the first example of the need.

RECOMMENDATION 2,

THAT the functions of units (ministries and departments) should be specified with care and precision; excessive compression in the pursuit of tidiness is self defeating and does not give the Public Service the knowledge on which to base action.

21. The Organisation Chart attached as Annex B gives an up-to-date indication of the position. It includes each individual Public Corporation in the Ministry responsible for it.

22. There are a number of conventions governing the matters which ought to be brought before the Cabinet rather than decided by a single Minister. It is usually clear, by custom or by tradition or by "case law" in the Cabinet Office, what cases are inter-Ministerial in nature and what should be done if Ministers disagree. Such conventions and procedures ought to be compiled into a set of rules, which might be described as "Rules of Business of the Government of Guyana". From a strictly constitutional point of view they might be regarded as the first item of the Delegation Code (delegation by the Cabinet from the joint responsibility of the Cabinet) to the need for which throughout the administrative structure reference is later made. The Rules would also indicate the scope of any Cabinet Committee (another type of delegate), and the type of case which may not be decided by individual Ministers without reference to and the concurrence of others.

RECOMMENDATION 3.

THAT Rules of Business of the Government of Guyana including the delegation of powers to ministers, procedures to be followed on differences between ministers, requirements of concurrence of control ministers when proposals involve planning, financial or establishment considerations, should be framed. These

would, in fact, be the first chapters of the Delegation Code separately recommended later.

23. When the creation of Ministries results in some division of a major purpose among a number of Ministries there will inevitably be need for coordination. Even when a major purpose as such is not divided, but different purposes are involved as, for example, provision of transport facilities on the one hand and the industrial utilisation of the facilities on the other, coordination will be required. For many purposes this can be at official level and it can be ensured through inter-Ministerial committees or consultation. In others, coordination is required at Ministerial level and must be arranged through Cabinet Committees. There is a Cabinet Economic Committee, not, however, restricted to Ministers. It may be that others will be needed. In general it is doubtful if the arrangements for coordination match the need, especially in the areas of development.

RECOMMENDATION 4

THAT when a number of units deal with a major purpose e.g. Transport, coordinating arrangements are essential and specification of their functions and power is as important as of the functions and powers of the units to be coordinated.

RECOMMENDATION 5

THAT informal coordination (of the type of the weekly meetings between the Permanent Secretaries of Economic Development and Finance) has a valuable part to play and should be extended wherever possible.

RECOMMENDATION 6

THAT wherever possible coordinating bodies should be authoritative; that is, units should be represented by persons able to commit their units.

RECOMMENDATION 7

THAT coordinating bodies seldom function sufficiently well to cure completely the adverse effects on decision making of too many cooks stirring the same broth and are not a substitute for organisation by major purpose.

24. It should be added that the number of Ministries has repercussions in the district (decentralised) administration. The majority of Ministries have decentralised operations to a greater or less degree. The problem of coordination between Ministries in Georgetown thus becomes paralleled by a problem of coordination between Ministries' representatives. At district level officers work in much more direct contact with the people and a suggestion of haphazard organisation or excessive fragmentation of responsibility and lack of coordination etc. is quickly disseminated. It can have a very unfortunate result on the public image of Government which is so important a thing in a democratic system.

B. Allotment of Functions to Ministers

25. This, like the number of Ministries, is a matter where purely administrative considerations must be tempered by political and personal ones. The

administrative principle already quoted speaks of organising according to major purposes. It may, however, be that a particular Minister has a particular interest in some part of a major purpose and it would be foolish to deny anything which might promote interest or contribute to progress in a particular area. As in so much of administration, decision depends on a nice balancing of advantage; the disadvantage of added need for coordination through involving more units in decision than necessary, against the loss of personal Ministerial interest in a matter. All that can be said is that a considerable degree of departure from the principle of organising by major purpose will require a degree of compensation unlikely to be secured, if only for the reason that organisation is more durable than Ministers. It is not proposed, therefore, to make detailed comments on the present division of functions or to try to set out a "model" scheme. A later recommendation provides for the creation of a Ministry of The Public Service, with functions partly drawn from existing units but considerably extended in scope and depth. This will necessarily require some reallocation of functions and advantage may be taken of this to introduce changes where existing arrangements suggest it. Further opportunities will occur if substantial areas of interest of existing Ministries are hived off by the creation of new Public Corporations, as is understood to be contemplated. A continuation of such a process can leave some existing Ministries as empty shells, and should lead to reconsideration both of numbers and of the division of functions. It should be added, however, that once a satisfactory balance is reached it should be retained. Frequent transfers of functions from one Ministry to another add further to vagueness in the location of authority, to delay in its exercise, to discontinuity in policy and to a loss of morale in staff.

26. There are certain functions of Government which are in the nature of controls over the whole field of Government and the Ministries which exercise them tend to be Ministries exercising controls over the operations of others. The fact of this is usually recorded in the Rules of Business which require, for example, that a Ministry secure the assent of the Ministry of Finance (unless already delegated) before taking any step which involves a financial commitment. There are three main areas of such control -

- (a) Finance
- (b) Establishments
- (c) Planning

Inevitably other Ministries are apt to resent such control and it has widely been found advantageous to place the Ministries exercising them in places where they can be assured of substantial political authority, in an executive President's Secretariat or in a Prime Minister's Office. This applies particularly and most desirably to Establishments and Planning, less frequently to Finance, because the technical operations of that Ministry would impose too heavy a burden on a President or Prime Minister already committed to political as well as administrative coordination. It is not, however, without interest that historically the official office held by the Prime Minister of Great Britain is First Lord of the Treasury.

RECOMMENDATION 8.

THAT the three main control functions, Establishments, Finance and Planning and Development should be separate, and each should form a separate portfolio. They need to be adequately staffed as delays in them affect all ministries in a snowballing way.

RECOMMENDATION 9.

THAT both Establishments and Planning by their nature require the support of, and to be located close to, effective political authority, if they are to be successful. They frequently are located in the Prime Minister's (or President's) Office. In the existing circumstances of Guyana this is particularly necessary.

27. There are other functions of Government which fall so naturally into a cohesive grouping that there should be more than average reluctance to break them up. One such is Communications in its various forms; another such is Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, covering the use of land for these purposes and including research, development and what are usually called "extension services"; a third such is Education and Youth; a fourth is what might be called Social Development. Such groupings do not eliminate the need for coordination across the groups; the point of needing to consider the anticipated uses (commercial and agricultural) of roads as well as their location has been mentioned; they do, however, reduce the need.

28. Finally there are a group of subjects which tend to be isolated and which can be juggled about much more readily. Clearly if a Prime Minister or executive President takes over responsibility for the control functions (Development and Public Service) then there is less room for him to handle miscellaneous subjects.

29. As in the question of the number of units (Ministries and Corporations) created, the division of functions among them has repercussions at district level, where an illogical division of functions or an overlapping of functions quickly becomes apparent and affects the public image of the administration.

C. Ministers and Permanent Secretaries.

30. Article 45 of the Constitution provides that in respect of the functions entrusted to a Department, the Minister shall exercise general direction and control over the Department and subject to such direction and control the Department shall be under the supervision of a Permanent Secretary, the senior official or civil servant of the Ministry.

31. This is an attempt, relatively infrequently met in Constitutions, to cover a relationship of considerable inherent difficulty. It is almost an in-built risk of a system of Parliamentary democracy that the Public Service is subject to pressures to turn it into a "spoils system"; the fact that many of the Parliamentary democracies have thought fit to create executive type Public Service Commissions is clear evidence both of awareness of the risk and of a determination, at some considerable cost, to combat it. It should be added that the risk is by no means restricted to the newer countries. It must be faced that Ministers, dependent on the popular vote, may be subjected to pressures from supporters less appreciative of the constitutional position in this respect than the Ministers themselves, and these may be difficult to resist. The first check on any tendency to use the Public Service as a part of a spoils system must be the good sense of Ministers themselves, who must realise that acceptance of any tendency in this connection will diminish the efficiency and career attractiveness of the Service, and thus deprive themselves of their main assistance. It will also create a Frankenstein of increasing demand which will direct their attention from their primary function of governing and may eventually monopolise

it. The spoils system postulates that there is an ample reservoir of new talent available to any incoming administration. The increasing professionalisation of Government makes this most unlikely anywhere, and almost certainly inoperative in a country like Guyana where trained talent is scarce.

32. Nevertheless this may be something of a counsel of perfection and, on a number of occasions, witnesses expressed disquiet that, with the passage of time, tendencies towards intervention by Ministers in the detail, and particularly the personnel details, of Departmental administration will increase and will be difficult for Permanent Secretaries to resist. Both the risk and the fear of any such development will be increased by the political and racial polarisation that has occurred over the last few years.

33. A major contributory to misunderstanding between Ministers and Permanent Secretaries is the former's understandable desire to "get things done" and their resentment of what appears to them time consuming "red tape" procedures. It is of course not correct that all procedures are time wasting; an organisation as big as Government needs control, procedures and rules. In particular, a state like Guyana, where expenditure on the Public Service, already heavy, is rising faster than the national product from which it must be covered, must have fairly rigid establishment and financial controls; and in his financial and accounting duties, and in exercising functions delegated by the Public Service Commission and the Establishment Division, the Permanent Secretary is the agent, not of his Minister, but of the delegator. Nevertheless, the feeling of Ministers cannot be ignored nor some basis for it denied. Subsequent recommendations deal with the need for a crash programme to excise ossified rules and regulations and thereafter to provide for a policy of continuous review and modernisation, and it is to be hoped that a growing efficiency and speed in processing will contribute to diminishing the impatience which at present Ministers freely express. It must be realised, however, from earlier comments that some of the delays proceed from political and personal considerations as much as from administrative.

34. The fear of Permanent Secretaries that impatience with accepted procedures and interventions in personal matters may jeopardise their position is perhaps excessive but cannot be ignored. Permanent Secretaries may be transferred on the advice of the Prime Minister and it is of course necessary that, at times, they should be transferred, both to arrange for a better utilisation of skills and to deal with personality clashes. But the nervousness of the Permanent Secretaries might be diminished by the acceptance of a tenure convention, that postings should not, except in situations of the sort indicated above, normally last less than three, or more than five years. The acceptance of a convention means movements exceptional to it attract attention and need justification.

35. In many countries Permanent Secretaries meet regularly to discuss problems of administration. It is understood this occurs to some extent in Guyana; it permits an attempt to get a wider perspective when dealing with personal relations and personality problems as well as a wider view of policies and difficulties as a whole, and is to be recommended.

RECOMMENDATION 10.

THAT Permanent Secretaries should meet regularly as a Committee to discuss problems common to themselves and to the administration, the Convenor and Chairman being the Permanent Secretary of the Public Service Ministry.

36. While it is true that most Ministers are aware of the constitutional relationship between themselves and their Permanent Secretaries, nevertheless in the stress of daily contact it may be that nuances are not fully appreciated. It might be desirable to issue to Ministers and to Permanent Secretaries on appointment some explanation of the factors without the understanding of which a satisfactory relationship may be impossible.

RECOMMENDATION 11.

THAT there should issue to all Permanent Secretaries and Ministers, on first entering office, a brief explanation or development of their respective positions, developing the meaning of Article 45 of the Constitution.

D. Ministries and Departments

37. The Ministerial system is relatively new in Guyana and its development has been affected by changes in the number and functions of Ministries. Complaints were heard, though perhaps less than might have been expected, of the delays and difficulties that arise from the intervention of the Ministerial Secretariat between the Department and the Minister. In some cases they have been minimised by a process of integration, and such a policy has proceeded almost to completion or is advanced in the Ministries of Works and Hydraulics (which as will be seen from the Organisation Chart has no attached Department), (Labour, Health, Education and Agriculture. Nevertheless complaints were made, and clearly the function of a Ministry intervening between a technical Department and a Minister is not always understood, either in the Ministry or in the Department and can lead to friction and to delay.

38. One complaint was of dilatory action in the lower echelons of the Ministry evidenced by tardy referencing and submission of cases, needless referring, vertically and laterally, instead of discussion and finalisation. A system has been evolved in some countries whereby a specific area of a Ministry's activities is allotted to a specific officer - Assistant Secretary or Administrative Assistant - who is himself responsible for preparing the case, either deciding it, if so empowered, or submitting it with a single one-level minute for decision by the Permanent Secretary or by an authority lower than the Permanent Secretary to whom authority to decide has been delegated. This places responsibility for investigation and submission in an identified area and minimises delays, excessive minuting, the unnecessary movement of paper, and therefore the number of people involved. Recommendations are made in section II - METHODS.

39. At present all Permanent Secretaries but two have been drawn from the "generalist" clerical-cum-administrative stream. The policy should be that Permanent Secretaries should be selected on the basis of capacity to perform the duties of the post irrespective of origin. This might lead, in Ministries with a heavy technical content, to a Permanent Secretary technically qualified if he has given evidence of administrative capability. The requirement of general administrative capability, however, must be paramount not only because of the transferability of Permanent Secretaries among Ministries, but because of the need of the Permanent Secretary to take a broad administrative and coordinating view of proposals as affecting the whole body of Government policy and practice rather than a narrower professional one. In modern administrative thought he is desirable as a coordinating generalist. In a Ministry with a large number of relatively unrelated residual functions room for any but a generalist head may

not exist. The formula above, however, would cover all cases and open the way to a freer growth of professional Permanent Secretaries. One of the difficulties expressed has been difficulty in recruiting and retaining technical or professional staff, and it is not uncommon to find professional staff resenting what they consider the pretensions of administrative generalists. A possibility of moving on to Permanent Secretary might both be a career attraction and a morale builder for such staff and help to anchor them in the service.

RECOMMENDATION 12.

THAT the posts of Permanent Secretaries should not be restricted to the generalist clerical administrative stream but should be open to all possessing the requisite qualities. The most important of these is general administrative capacity, in view of the interchangeability of Permanent Secretaries. The necessity of utilising scarce technical or professional skills most advantageously should also be borne in mind.

40. As long, however, as the system of a generalist Permanent Secretary in a Ministry with mainly professional Departments continues, it is vital that the system is worked and that the Permanent Secretary is not bypassed. He exists to perform necessary functions, and impatience with delay should not be allowed to deny him the opportunity to perform them, but should be directed to improving the movement of papers and speed of consideration. For example, joint conferences of permanent and professional heads with Ministers would profitably replace a consecutive dealing with a subject. The system requires tact and understanding in operation just as much as the Permanent Secretary-Minister relationship requires tact and understanding. There is nothing in the quality of the Guyanese Service to suggest it cannot be found.

E. Operating Public Corporations

41. Over the last twenty years the tendency of Governments to transfer certain of their functions from the area of operation by the Public Service proper to Public Corporations has increased considerably. The main reasons for so doing are firstly the extension of the total area of Government activity into fields formerly held to fall into the private sector; this may have a number of widely varying causes, e.g. war or fear of war, political ideology, lack of initiative or of capital in the private sector; secondly, a feeling that certain of the new areas cannot be dealt with efficiently under the financial and administrative disciplines of the Public Service system. Other less desirable motivations may have their part e.g. a desire to confer rewards, in the form of salaries and authority, on the politically faithful. But the touchstone almost everywhere is claimed to be, and certainly should be, demonstrable added efficiency and demonstrable added managerial capacity.

42. The disciplines of the Public Service system were not imposed lightly; they were thought necessary to secure an orderly and careful process of decision, the prevention of patronage and the control of spending. These are essential objectives in all areas of the State's activities and if it is found necessary to make some sacrifice of the means to ensure them in order to secure added efficiency, there should be a clear balance of advantage in doing so. To decide if this exists, there ought in each case, before a Corporation is decided on, to be a careful investigation of where and what the degree of advantage is. This will require de-

tailing what its functions are to be, why the corporation will perform them better, whether the benefit will accrue in service or in money and so on. If the decision then is in favour of creating a Corporation, the scheme should be so devised and particularised as to lead to the greatest increment of added efficiency at the cost of the least sacrifice of administrative and financial desiderata. In recent years, some of the undesirable consequences of too liberal an exemption (of Public Corporations) from financial and Public Service procedures have, in some countries, become more apparent than the added efficiency, and this has led to a reconsideration of the degree of exemption and to some reimposition of financial and personnel controls. Countries everywhere are concerned with the problem of reconciling the requirements of public enterprises for operating and financial flexibility with the needs for controls to assure public accountability and consistency with policy.

43. In Guyana there are nine Public Corporations. The Rice Marketing Board was created in 1946, the Credit Corporation in 1954 following a recommendation of a World Bank Mission, and the Electricity Corporation in 1957, each by its own Ordinance. Most of the remainder were created by Orders made under the Public Corporations Ordinance 1962, which empowers such creations, and specifies, in general terms, the relationship between the Corporations and the Government.

44. Each Public Corporation under the Ordinance is attached to a Ministry. The Minister appoints members of the Board (in practice the Cabinet is consulted) and the Cabinet may remove members. One such member is an official and is usually, not invariably, the Permanent Secretary of the responsible Ministry. The Board has full powers to appoint and dismiss staff except that appointments of staff over \$7,200 per annum require the approval of the Minister. The Cabinet may issue general directives. There are certain restrictions on borrowing etc. The Board's accounts are audited by an auditor appointed by the Cabinet, and, with an annual report, must be submitted to the Legislature. The Electricity Corporation has a financial requirement, taking one year with another, to break even financially.

45. This degree of control leaves the Boards of Corporations with a very considerable autonomy in personnel and financial matters. The Board's freedom extends in some cases also to the Corporation's functions which are specified in wide and imprecise terms. In fact many of the Orders creating Corporations consist only of a line or two, although this is less true of the older Corporations whose Ordinances itemise and circumscribe the objectives of the Corporations in more detail. In these circumstances it is understandable that disquiet is expressed about the activities of some of the Corporations.

46. It is recommended that no Corporation be set up without a preliminary considered and careful investigation into the case for creating the Corporation and the objects it is to achieve. When the Corporation is to perform commercial or quasi-commercial operations the economics on some sort of cost and benefit basis need to be worked out. This may need a proper capitalisation of assets made over, provision for working capital (other than an annual budget provision for "housekeeping") and perhaps some provision about profitability similar to that of the Electricity Corporation. The extent of such operations should be specified in detail in the creating Order. For example the Ordinance creating the Rice Marketing Board excludes it from the retail trade; the Order creating the Agricultural Marketing Corporation does not. A decision of Government to intervene in retail trade should be taken positively.

47. Among the matters to be considered is whether the operations of the Corporation are likely to be improved by giving or denying Public Service status

to its staff. As in the case of "open vote" manual workers, employees in other areas in which Corporations might operate (retail marketing, harbour work, insurance salesmanship, industrial promotion) may be better disciplined and more effective as non-Public Servants. In others e.g. a national insurance office the position may be less clear.

48. Only when such an investigation has provided a convincing case for action, and a working scheme with a clear and full delineation of purpose, resources and controls should the new Corporation be set up. It should not be simply assumed that a Corporation is "a good thing". The position of existing Corporations should, as a matter of urgency and in order to limit the drain on public funds, be re-examined in the light of the comments above. At least one Corporation hardly appears necessary.

49. In particular the possible overlapping of functions as between Corporation and Corporation, and Corporation and Ministry needs careful checking, as also a possibly embarrassing division of functions. Where this occurs the remedy is to remove the overlapping or division. It is not to retain the overlapping and set up yet another body - a coordinating committee or the like - to deal with it.

50. A serious disadvantage, often overlooked, of creating a large number of autonomous Public Corporations is that it increases the number of actions which require clearance in more than one unit before decision and consequently the delays in clearing them. In essence it adds to the number of administrative units which may be involved in the process of decision in any case, a matter mentioned in discussing earlier the number of one group of such units, the Ministries. When substantial blocks of business are transferred from existing Ministries to new Corporations (and it is understood several more are envisaged) it is recommended that it be considered whether the same number of Ministries and Departments will be required to deal with the remaining functions.

51. The necessity carefully to stipulate the objectives of Corporations in the Order constituting them is underlined by the case of the Development Corporation. The Credit Corporation as recommended by the World Bank was intended to provide credit for "agriculture, industry, rural and urban housing". It tended to concentrate largely on housing. Consequently a Corporation was set up to "facilitate, undertake and stimulate industrial development". It had, however, no general resources and consequently had to pass on any of its schemes involving credit to the Credit Corporation. The "undertake" in its functions became wholly minor and these were subsequently changed to "facilitate and stimulate economic development". It has recently, with the blessing of the Development Programme, diversified its activities into agricultural development where it runs a risk of overlapping with the Ministry of Agriculture. It is not that it is wrong that the Development Corporation should interest itself in agricultural development but such an intention should have been specified, and that after the risk of competing with the Ministry had been considered. In practice, the Corporation concerns itself with the development of new products in agriculture and the commercial exploitation of agricultural products leaving to the Ministry traditional crops. It is claimed that there is therefore a clear line of demarcation though whether such a line of demarcation is the correct one or whether there need be a division of responsibility at all is a matter for consideration.

F. Relationship of Corporations with Ministries and Departments

52. Each Corporation is attached to a Ministry and the general policy is to attach a Corporation to the Ministry which deals with the functions most nearly related to its purposes. This is usually followed by nominating the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry on to the Board. A particular difficulty arises in respect of the Development Corporation which has the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance on its Board but not the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Economic Development, although the latter is the responsible Ministry. Presumably in an effort to emphasize the autonomy of Corporations the Ordinance appears to permit only one official member of the Board. If this is the correct reading of the Ordinance, there is a case for amendment. A similar position might arise in connection with the Marketing Corporation which has both general development as well as purely agricultural incidence.

53. Corporations whose activities touch on the interests of a number of Ministries should clear their schemes with those Ministries before they submit them for approval, as in the case of the Development Corporation, to the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance. In practice it is understood the Development Corporation does this and in fact regards one of its main activities in the field of "stimulating" development as assisting private entrepreneurs through the mazes of "red tape".

Control over Public Corporations

54. It is implicit in preceding observations that there is a relaxation of the financial and administrative control which would be exercised over Government Departments in favour of Public Corporations and the degree of remaining control provided by the Public Corporations Ordinance has been described. The control may be considered as applied in two areas -

- (a) in respect of the Corporations' "housekeeping" - its staffing, budget, running expenses, and,
- (b) in respect of its functions.

In respect of the former, complaints have been heard that the controls have been too much relaxed, for example, in respect of the fixation of staff pays. The recommended requirement of greater particularity in objectives and where possible of a condition of profitability based on capitalisation will add to control in respect of the latter. These may, however, not be enough.

55. It is desirable that, in the present difficult staff position in Guyana there should not be allowed to grow up competitive bidding (from Corporations and Departments) for rare staff. Guyana has grown used, in the last few years, to fairly free movement between employment sectors in search of better pay. It is desirable that there should be better arrangements than exist at present for co-ordination of pay scales in Corporations and the Public Service when work is of a common nature.

56. The existing control over Corporations through the submission of annual accounts and reports does not appear to be enough. It might be more effective if

the reports and accounts were in practice considered by the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament or even by a Special Committee, but that may not be practicable. In some countries there is a separate unit in the Government to advise on the effectiveness of Corporations. In others, the Public Service Ministry, through its managerial functions, is entrusted with the coordination of staff working conditions in Corporations with those in the Public Service. It is recommended that, by amendment of the Public Corporations Ordinance, there should be power in the Minister to request the Ministry of the Public Service to investigate and comment on salary scales and related conditions in Public Corporations and to issue directions in the light of such comments. Some such power might indeed be welcome to members of Boards in the present somewhat charged atmosphere of comment. Subject to this, the power of Corporations to engage their own staff should remain except that a directive should be issued that there should be advertisement when filling senior staff appointments.

57. Having said this much about increasing control over the Corporations' housekeeping, the next requirement is that, in respect of their duties, they should be left to do the job they have been created to do. That is to say, in areas for which a Corporation has responsibility, it should not be treated as a subordinate branch of the Ministry and its wishes as merely recommendations to be re-checked for accuracy and desirability by the responsible Ministry, and the Ministry of Finance. If Corporations have their own funds and are placed under commercial discipline, Finance need hardly concern itself with individual actions. It is difficult to specify the exact relationship but a duplication and repetition of the investigations of a scheme and decision on it of a Corporation by a Ministry arising from a Ministry's reluctance to part with authority, can be a crippling thing.

58. Ideally there ought to be an arrangement for the measurement of performance in more detail than a mere scrutiny of the annual reports will permit, but in the Guyanese context, any idea of annual and institutionalised efficiency audit raises difficulties. Efficiency audits can degenerate into "second guessing" and may discourage managerial initiative. Nevertheless, when the Management Services Division of the proposed Public Service Ministry has the capacity to carry out performance audits, it should do so. After all, the reason for creating a Corporation is presumed greater managerial capacity. The creator is entitled to know whether this presumption is being fulfilled.

59. The financing arrangements of several of the Corporations do not encourage the financial discipline referred to above in respect of the functions (not the "housekeeping") of the Corporation. The Marketing Corporation is required to buy at a price fixed by an authority other than itself but left to sell at the market price. When a Corporation is required to carry out "commercial" transactions (as distinct from promotional or educational efforts) there must be a commercial approach to its duties, and some sort of capitalisation of assets, recommended earlier, and possibly the placing at its disposal of risk capital operated as a "revolving fund" will emphasize this. When the Ministry of Agriculture carried out certain marketing activities, results were always annexed to the Annual Estimates in the form of accounts in a semi-commercial form in which an interest item on the value of the assets employed was shown. It was thus possible for the Legislature to see exactly what the activities were costing. The need to enforce a financial discipline, relative to a return on the assets employed is exemplified in the decision in the United Kingdom that the Post Office (which is not a Corporation but shares some attributes of one) should be required to pay a contribution, or in other words a profit on its working, to the Exchequer. A converse position is seen in the attempts to assess working losses on railway lines

kept open for social, rather than commercial purposes and by covering these with a grant to emphasize the commercial test elsewhere. The embarrassment that may arise from a financial autonomy carried too far was seen with the Rice Marketing Board where the Corporation's powers amounted to the State providing, through a guaranteed overdraft, an open-ended subsidy to rice producers. A subsidy may be required here - and elsewhere - in marketing. But the amount the State is willing to provide needs to be decided on and the buying and selling policy adjusted accordingly. The need to introduce a greater accountability should be considered in the recommended review of existing Corporations.

RECOMMENDATION 13.

THAT the creation of new public corporations should only follow a careful investigation of the area for such a creation and a finding of positive advantage in so doing in terms of increased capacity, weighing all relative factors. The factors include:-

- (a) a proliferation of such corporations has the same effect as an increase in administrative units in spreading available talent thin.
- (b) it also leads to an increase in the proportion of decisions needing inter unit clearance, and hence to an increase in coordinating mechanisms and consequent delay in decision.
- (c) it could facilitate the development of areas of patronage, the effect of which on the public image of government should not be underestimated.

RECOMMENDATION 14.

THAT the investigation should result in detailed and precise decisions on the functions of the proposed corporation, on their relationship with functions exercised by existing units, and on its capital structure and financial limitations and these should be incorporated in the Order creating it.

RECOMMENDATION 15.

THAT a review of existing corporations on the above lines should be carried out urgently.

RECOMMENDATION 16.

THAT the degree of autonomy of corporations in respect of "housekeeping" (i.e. scales of pay, staffing) should be reconsidered and arrangements provided for avoidance of competitive bidding for rare staff through the coordination of conditions of service. This might be the responsibility of the Managerial Division of the proposed Public Service Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 17.

THAT Corporations should be subject to a greater degree of financial responsibility for their activities than exists at present. Where possible they should (except when their activities are not capable of costing) be capitalised, commercial type accounts asked for, and some sort of profitability condition attached.

RECOMMENDATION 18.

THAT the limitation of the number of officials on the Boards of Corporations to a single member should be removed, if necessary by amendment of the Public Corporations Ordinance.

RECOMMENDATION 19.

THAT whenever new corporations are created for the exercise of functions presently carried on elsewhere, the possibility of compensating reduction of ministries or their components should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 20.

THAT Public Corporations should not be created except for the performance of a substantial block of duties; small staff units cannot supply the amenities (proper scales, promotion ladders) which are now essential; are wasteful in operation and multiply inescapable overheads.

RECOMMENDATION 21.

THAT once corporations have been created with adequate control over staff and financial matters in the manner suggested above, they should be allowed to get on with their job. They should not be treated as subordinate and largely advisory branches of ministries with their conclusions being rechecked for accuracy.

H. Local Government

60. This is the third area (the others being the Government Departments and the Public Corporations) where the business of Government is carried on.

61. In Guyana, local government is still a minor element in the picture. It covers geographically only about 50 per cent of the coastal strip which is the demographic and economic centre of gravity of the country and hardly exists at all in the vast hinterland. Apart from the City Council of Georgetown and the Town Council of New Amsterdam, its organs are a large number, nearly 100, of what are essentially Village Councils. They have limited functions, limited resources and apparently limited ambitions. In the few visited even the limited resources were not collected, arrears running at two to three years' income. Local government has been the subject of a lengthy review and a plan (the Marshall Report) recommends the creation of a small group of financially viable units covering geographically the greater part of the coastal strip. Legislation to permit this is in draft.

62. It is accordingly useless to comment either on the existing system or on the projected system. It might however be pointed out that the Marshall Report was written eleven years ago in circumstances very different from those existing now. Most material changes have occurred since then - Independence, a democratic Parliamentary system and a Government committed to development. The Marshall Report envisaged the withering away of the District Commissioner system (described subsequently) except in the Interior, partly because it was amateurish and partly because the country might not be able to support both a district and a local

government system. This needs rethinking in the changed circumstances. Development cannot be handled exclusively from the Capital, especially in a country like Guyana. Needless to say, since the Government is fully aware of the fact, the people have to be associated with development - both as contributors and beneficiaries - to ensure local support and local help for community development and also an association with Government's ideas. It will clearly be many years before the whole group of new local government organs will exist and, in the meantime, there is room for much to be done which will justify or rather require a district administrator.

63. The Marshall Report envisages a separate Local Government Service eventually. Initially, as one or two local government units are created, it will probably be necessary to appoint Government Officers as executive officers and there may be a general case for integrating the executive officers into a common cadre with officers in the administration in Georgetown and with District Commissioners in the manner suggested later. It is not only functions but people that tend to get a Georgetown fixation and better work might be done in Ministries by people who have worked outside the capital city.

64. It is, of course, impossible to deal with details of the Marshall Report on the strength of a brief visit but the position of existing bodies with respect to arrears suggests the need for stronger legal processes or stronger administration of existing processes if the new authorities are to be viable.

I. Decentralised Government

65. Decentralised Government operates through a system of nine District Commissioners, six in the coastal area under the Ministry of Local Government and three in the Interior under the Ministry of Home Affairs. In addition most of the executive Ministries and Departments decentralise their operations to some extent and frequently, though not invariably, their geographic divisions coincide with the districts.

66. District Commissioners, as they now exist, are pale shadows of what they were. They have lost their magisterial functions everywhere. On the coast, about half their time is devoted to supervision of petty local authorities and even here the Local Government Board sit heavily over them; they are local agents of the Land Ministry, have some powers over weights and measures, power to register marriages and so on. In the Interior where local government hardly exists, the District Commissioners perform general welfare duties and act as "Government agent", so to speak, in discharging certain statutory functions for a variety of Departments. It is a little surprising therefore that the Marshall Plan envisaged the eventual disappearance of the District Commissioner as an institution.

RECOMMENDATION 22.

THAT the intention to create larger local government units, which will take much time, should not result in any present reduction in the decentralised structure of government.

67. Modern administrative thinking favours decentralisation of functions; it believes in taking Government to the people, not forcing the people to come to Government. This, accords, too with the ideals of a democracy. The feeling is that the people must be associated with the processes of Government. At present Govern-

ment is heavily centralised in Georgetown; the process of concentrating power and authority in the capital seems to be of long standing. While it is true that the new Marshall local government units may counteract this eventually, they are still a long time away and, in the meantime, further decentralisation from Georgetown is desirable. There is a further point. Development will have to turn its attention to the underdeveloped and undeveloped areas. In these areas the activities of developing agencies will need some degree of coordination or some degree of "focus-ing" just as they do at the centre. It seems that the District Commissioner, of relatively low value in his present form, could fulfil an essential need of a forward-looking Government in the districts, that is, a coordinator of development planning, a "smoother" of local conflicts, an interpreter of Government to the local people, and an interpreter of the local people to Government. This is an essential, not an amateur function. District Commissioners appear to still retain some sort of "primus inter pares" status among the officers of Government and some local respect which would contribute to their success.

68. If District Commissioners are to be given a greater part in the administration they should not be the isolated group they tend to be now. It would broaden experience and avoid "Whitehall" mentality if officers working in the Ministries in Georgetown had some knowledge of conditions outside the Ministries and outside Georgetown, derived from a stay in the districts. Conversely, it would help District Commissioners to do their job if they knew better than they do the workings of the Ministries. At present, District Commissioners and Assistant Secretaries are on identical salary scales except that one scale is one increment longer. On the basis of this, they are apparently treated as separate cadres. Recommendations are made later that the whole structure of the Service be reviewed to remove some of the almost meaningless elaboration that appears to exist. It is impossible, in the short time available, to go into this in depth, but the positions of these two groups of officers and the existence of the two relevant scales (A1 & A2) seem examples of divisions which are not only unnecessary but undesirable. Is there any reason why Assistant Secretaries, District Commissioners and the Executive Officers of the new Marshall units should not form a single cadre, interchangeable among posts, sharing a common origin and a common promotion path, progress upon which would be decided on meritorious performance in the different classes of posts?

69. A more problematic development might be to make the District Commissioners responsible for common services required by the local officers of executive Ministries with responsibilities too small to justify separate offices (geological survey, meteorologists, valuers etc.). Indications exist that many professional officers are impatient of, and resent the interference with their professional duties of, administrative requirements and would accept a common service which would, in any case, be cheaper than separate ones. Where the District Commissioner did not provide common services, he would be able to assist with advice on administrative matters (drawn from his experience as an officer in a Ministry suggested above), local officers without such experience.

70. If, as appears inevitable, there will be a greater concentration of attention of development thinking on the Interior, District Commissioners there will have a very important function to perform and efforts should be made to overcome any feeling of remoteness, or of being cut off as a forgotten and underprivileged branch of administration. More visits, not by way of formal inspection, a free flow of information and so on might help plus more frequent meetings of District Commissioners to discuss common problems. These need not be as frequent as meetings of Labour Officers (held monthly).

71. Linked with the above, it is necessary to turn again to the old problem of delegation. It has been suggested that it needs looking at at the centre. This

equally wants doing for the districts. Present over-centralisation may be derived from over-caution (the perfectionism later mentioned) or distrust of juniors or from less savoury causes. Some of the existing arrangements seem at first view inexplicable. The test seems to have been "What, at Georgetown, can we not do and must therefore leave to the district officers?"; it should be "What must, for clear reasons, not be left to the district officers, and therefore be called into Georgetown?" For example, a District Commissioner cannot initiate prosecutions in land cases; (apparently only the decentralised Senior Labour Officer can initiate prosecution in his enforcement area); cannot allow local government units to adjust minor items in their often miniscule budgets; has, in some cases, had the chairmanship of Boards of Guardians removed. He is diminished, not built up.

72. A review of the position with the change of viewpoint suggested above would almost certainly result in a substantial devolution of authority. It might be that there would be even wider advantages than the purely administrative; the change might lift from Minister's shoulders the burden of the pilgrims to Georgetown asking for Ministerial intervention in administrative matters which distracts their attention from their proper functions. The present position reduces District Commissioners, who are in direct contact with the public and who have knowledge of local conditions, to mere postal agents.

73. Despite the length of comments on District Commissioners they are the minor part of decentralised administration. Most executive Ministries have decentralised to some extent and some to a large extent. Nevertheless the same comment applies to their district officers as to District Commissioners - they refer a great deal to headquarters. Here again there is a necessity for a different approach; "What cannot (for given reasons) be dealt with at district level?", instead of "What must we delegate because we cannot centrally handle it?", and the answers should fit into a logical system. As an example of lack of logic, a district officer dealing with one class of appointments, sent the applications to the centre to prepare a short list; he then received the list and carried out the interviews on the basis of which the appointments were made.

74. Reference has been made to the dislike and sometimes ignorance of professional officers respecting administrative (finance and personnel) work. At present the professional officer tends to be, in respect of these matters, a non-contributory link in a chain of command from the Finance or Personnel Officer of the Ministry to the chief clerk or accountant of the district office. In organisational terms such a link can be dispensed with provided a suitable type and rank of officer can be found. This is a matter which Establishment authorities must decide, preferably without adding another class, grade or description to the already ample supply. An added advantage would arise if these posts were made interchangeable with comparable accounting/personnel posts at the centre, for reasons similar to making Assistant Secretaries, District Commissioners and Executive Officers into a common cadre.

RECOMMENDATION 23.

THAT in order to restrict rare professional talents to professional purposes, the unnecessary intervention of professional officers in administrative chains of command should be avoided. In practice, this might lead, for example, in District Engineer's Office to an administrative unit, dealing with the appropriate Principal Assistant Secretary in the ministry on behalf of the District Engineer and headed by a person competent to deal with personnel and financial control. of suitable rank.

RECOMMENDATION 24.

THAT the District Commissioner should be developed as the local representative of government, as the coordinator of development plans at district level, and as an interpreter of government to the people.

RECOMMENDATION 25.

THAT the cadre of District Commissioner, Assistant Secretaries and Executive Officers of the future (Marshall-type) local bodies should be a joint one and service in the districts should be a qualification for advancement.

RECOMMENDATION 26.

THAT District Commissioners should provide common services for decentralised professional officers for whom a separate provision is uneconomic.

RECOMMENDATION 27.

THAT all ministries should check their powers (whether provided by law or by administrative instruction) with a view to delegation below the permanent secretary or to district officers as may be appropriate on the basis that all actions which do not positively need disposal by permanent secretaries or at the centre should be delegated, rather than that actions should be delegated only if they cannot be performed centrally or at the higher level. If necessary legal power to delegate should be taken.

J. Decision Making

75. Civil Services are among the most criticised and the most self critical institutions in the world, and are apt to be made whipping boys for defects or omissions not strictly theirs, by critics inside and outside the profession. One of the most frequently repeated criticisms in Guyana was of an unjustifiable slowness in decision making; this was repeated by Ministers, public servants and outside observers. Apart from criticism of two specific "control" areas, establishment and financial (which will be dealt with separately subsequently), general criticism suggested that this slowness could be caused or contributed to by one or more of the following:-

- (a) defective organisation or over-organisation; too many units involved in one area of action, or major purpose, often accompanied by uncertainty as to where final authority lies, with consequent difficulties of co-ordination or with a need for too many multi-unit clearances;
- (b) defective internal organisation of units;
- (c) defective application of Article 45 of the Constitution; Ministers insisting on themselves deciding matters which under that Article should fall to the Permanent Secretary;
- (d) inadequacy or absence of delegation;
- (e) personal psychological reasons; the fact that a number of persons hold what should be decision-making posts only in an acting capacity and are more concerned with keeping their record free from errors than with do-

ing the job, leading to an incapacity to see the wood (of administration) for the trees (of regulations);

- (f) perfectionism in personal decision; many officers value the absence of an occasional wrong and hasty decision more than a proven capacity to dispose of cases with reasonable expedition and to maintain a steady flow of decision;
- (g) perfectionism in the system; a similar preoccupation in rules and regulations with the need to close all roads to wrong decisions rather than to keep open roads to rapid decisions;
- (h) inadequate knowledge of procedures (partly due to lack of manuals, partly to lack of training) in middle grade officers resulting in decision being forced up to Permanent Secretary level even when delegation nominally exists;
- (i) an out-of-date system; a failure to keep a system designed for one set of circumstances in line with changed circumstances; a failure to scrap institutions and forms where their utility has been outlived; a failure to keep manuals and instruction books up-to-date and in an easily and generally accessible form; a failure to apply a continuous review to the rules and regulations in the spirit of constructive irreverence without which modification will be only marginal;
- (j) professionals' dislike of administrative processes;
- (k) shortage of staff.

76. Many of these have already been referred to either specifically or by implication but it will be convenient to summarise remedies for each in turn.

77. With reference to item (a) of paragraph 75, the administrative principle that Government business should be organised by major purposes into a minimum number of units should always be borne in mind when proposals arise for increasing the number. Units include Ministries, Departments and Public Corporations. The functions of units should be decided with care and stated with legal precision; excessive compression in the pursuit of pretended tidiness is an error. Where a number of units deal with one major purpose, the creation of special coordinating bodies able to coordinate rapidly should be considered; this means through representatives of units able to commit their units and may be at official level or, when policies are involved, at Ministerial level; the need for authority in members of the coordinating body to commit, informally if not formally, their parent body is to ensure speed which is the *raison d'etre* of the body; there already exists a cumbersome coordination procedure through the old fashioned consecutive movement of paper from one unit to another - the objection to it is that it is too slow and too ineffective. An attempt was made to elicit from Ministries an indication of where they thought the allocation or division of functions was a handicap in their operations, but this secured little more than a short scrutiny of the Organisation Chart of the Government (Appendix B) would itself suggest.

78. Almost all units have internal organisation and an organisation chart; in some cases the basis of the organisation (e.g. by subject rather than by clientele or the reverse) may be questioned as less likely to promote efficiency but this is not a common problem. Most of them conformed to classic requirements, reasonable lines of command, spans of control and the like. Where difficulty might arise was

in haziness about who was entitled to do what and also in the ability of the control organs inside the unit to match and work with the control organs - Finance, Establishment and Planning - outside the unit. This will be reverted to later. What also seemed at fault is a matter of method - a tendency to accept the delay of file movement (and possible retention) for every stage of discussion. A suggestion has been made to eliminate hierarchic minuting in Ministries.

79. The relationship between Ministers and Permanent Secretaries has been dealt with earlier. It will always be a difficult one, and improvement will require a direct contribution from both sides, as well as the exercise of tact and understanding. It demands -

- (a) from the Public Service a better, more rapid, more positive approach to the Ministers' desire to "get things done";
- (b) from Ministers a realisation that it is in their own personal interests to resist constituents' or political supporters' pressures to get a slice of power or place and to leave Permanent Secretaries to get on with their job of personnel control.

A corollary of both these is the need for a long hard look from both angles (the risk of creating an area of political or personal patronage versus a better efficiency approach) at proposals to hive off areas of operation to Public Corporations.

80. A complete delegation scheme in respect of the establishment function of the Governor under the old regime exists, and continues till superseded. (Suggestions in respect of this will be found in a subsequent part). Financial delegations also exist and will be dealt with separately. The need for delegation, within a unit, of power in respect of the unit's functions is no less. The allotment to a Minister of responsibility for a Department is the first level of delegation (from the jointly responsible Cabinet under Article 35 of the Constitution) and the Rules of Business, the drafting of which was suggested earlier, might logically form the first section of a Delegation Code. The question remains then of delegations, below Permanent Secretary level, of non-financial and non-establishment matters, i.e., of matters relating to the substance of the Ministry's functions. An effort was made to get from Ministries, a statement of such delegations to departmental and district head levels but with only limited success. The powers of district heads as distinct from departmental heads have had separate reference in discussing decentralised Government but the following comments apply to delegation in operative Ministries and Departments generally. Systematic delegations were seldom found and the tendency was to find such statements as "Assistant Secretaries dispose of routine matters". This may be delegation, but it is not systematic delegation and it is not adequate delegation. Perhaps one of the difficulties is isolating recognisable groups of actions power in respect of which can be delegated; another may be a feeling that with relatively small units the Permanent Secretary or Departmental Head is capable of getting by without considerable delegation. Yet Permanent Secretaries are said to be overworked and the overwork delays decisions. The problem is not new; nor is the solution. The extent of delegation has recently been investigated at the request of the Economic Sub-Committee of Cabinet. What is required is that all Ministries and Departments should now go through their functions, attempt to isolate blocks of work capable of delegation (as, for example, in the Labour Department powers exercisable by Labour Exchange Officers) and delegate them by a formal instruction. It follows that the Permanent Secretaries and departmental heads must enforce the delegation and neither call up, nor allow the delegate to refer up, delegated matters other than for good cause. Further room for delegation both to and below Permanent Secretaries in personnel matters will be mentioned separately, but there is a need to be delegation-minded in other matters, which does not

appear to be the case at present. The action suggested above includes powers drawn from statute, appreciating however the fact that such powers may not legally be capable of delegation other than by amendment of the statute. Another area where parallel action is required is in respect of the Boards, Committees etc., charged statutorily with executive or supervisory responsibilities, e.g. the Local Government Board. Some of these were created to associate the public with decisions at a time when Government was still non-democratic. Their existence and powers now need review.

81. With further reference to item (d) of paragraph 75, there were repeated criticisms that, below the highly competent group of Permanent Secretaries, there were second and third lines of lower competence. The correctness of this should not be taken for granted and certainly should not be allowed to inhibit delegation or to serve as an excuse for non-delegation. It stands to reason that second and third liners are less competent than first liners. But they will remain so if first liners refuse to trust them, and when eventually they rise to the top they will bring their incompetence with them. The philosophy of the Service should underline that function itself creates competence to function, and people should be allowed to make errors without attempting to centralise the whole process of decision, drafting and direction. Accepting this philosophy is another form of training for second and third liners and will help the more formal training discussed under the heading of "Training" later. There is, in present attitudes, another example of the perfectionism which is mentioned later as existing both in the system and individual decisions. First liners cannot afford to "train" all possible successors in the technical sense, i.e. the full second line, but each line should be prepared to groom, i.e. train in the personal sense, those coming along.

RECOMMENDATION 28.

THAT to permit, through delegation, a greater expedition in decision, Permanent Secretaries should exercise reasonable, but not excessive, supervision of the quality of delegated work, i.e. must trust their subordinates to carry out duties properly delegated to them and should neither apply supervision to an extent that negates the delegation, nor permit unnecessary references to them of delegated matters.

82. Regarding item (e) of paragraph 75, the inhibitory effect on persons holding posts in an acting capacity (over an extended period) while hoping for substantive promotion has been repeatedly mentioned. Later recommendations will be directed towards reducing the period preceding substantive promotion, but it is impossible to eliminate the period. At the same time the disadvantages arising from anything which extends this period of uncertainty should be borne in mind. Some of the malaise in the Service has been ascribed, with the creation of a constitutionally executive Public Service Commission, to the absence of a right of appeal such as formerly lay to the Governor. Within the present Constitution, of course, no appeal can lie, but, if it were possible to provide one in the belief that it would convince the Service of the integrity of "due process" in a manner the present position does not, it would still be necessary to balance the bad effect of further delays and periods of uncertainty in promotion matters against such added conviction for the unconvinced as would result (and which might not be much).

83. Perfectionism in personal decision - the acceptance of delay and work-piling rather than of some slight fall in polish and accuracy - is another contributor to delay. It is easy to describe but it is difficult to say much about. No commentator on a system can afford to recommend a drop in the accuracy of work. Nevertheless, perhaps the mention of the matter, along with other personal attitudes which may contribute to avoidable delay and indecision, will help. It is appropriate to add that in a system like Guyana's with a relatively large number of units and a consequent need of considerable inter-Ministerial clearance, perfectionism in one Ministry may cause frustration in a number of others.

84. A more serious matter is perfectionism in the system. The Guyanese executive still operates largely under rules, regulations and delegations made for a compact limited colonial system where accuracy particularly in financial and establishment affairs, counted more than speed and where a country uncommitted to economic advance could afford to drag over a decision. As an example, the power to write off losses was strictly limited; so was the power to obtain material or carry out repairs; the power to deal with even casual leave of middle grade employees was centralised. The whole represented a frame of mind which is now outworn. Steps to cure this are recommended in the subsequent parts; they include as prime necessities -

- (a) a regular revision and continuous scrutiny of rules, regulations, forms, etc;
- (b) an approach to framing new ones in a spirit of "constructive irreverence" to the old.

A realisation that a procedure which consumes hundreds of man-hours to prevent the loss of a few dollars itself loses many dollars is important. It is to be hoped, too, that a continuation of bodies whose utility has disappeared and of forms and returns serving no clearly valuable purpose, will be avoided. The Public Service Ministry proposed later, will contribute to the elimination of these, but the initiative should come from an alert Permanent Secretary.

85. It is realised that much of what is said in this report is already known to alert Permanent Secretaries and what is lacking is not so much knowledge of what is to be done as ideas of how to do it and a convenient opportunity. There is something to be said for unorthodox methods when orthodox approaches fail to produce results.

86. It might well be considered whether a crash programme to survey procedures and up-date superannuated Departmental manuals might not be done through the simultaneous (say 1/4/67) placing in each Ministry of an officer on special duty for a period of say three months (by detaching him temporarily from what are described as "routine duties"). A simultaneous and spectacular Government crash programme of such a kind would focus attention and effort on a vital problem in a dramatic exercise whose recommendations could not be ignored. It should be publicised at its commencement, and its results should be even more publicised. A similar Government-wide spectacular exercise on forms and returns and on manuals might equally pay off.

87. A contributory to delay in decision-making is the attitude of some professional officers. Some insist on being allowed to concentrate on professional functions; some accept that professional duties have to be performed in an ad-

ministrative framework but dislike administrative duties and do not bother to learn anything about them. The first attitude is seen in some hospital administrations where, in fact, administration (handled by hospital administrators) is entirely separated from professional medical duties and doctors are left to do their job. A less satisfactory position is seen in connection with engineering where professional duties are much more mixed up with staff relations and financial control. In discussing decentralised administration suggestions were made which might help in many cases. But there are professional officers who cannot be insulated from administration and it would help and avoid later frustration if all professional officers, on joining the Service, were given a brief course on the administrative implications of their job and were told something about the financial and establishment environment, in which they are to live. A brief booklet on the subject might be a possible alternative if courses are too difficult to arrange (A Professional Officer's Guide to the Administrative Structure and Financial and Establishment Requirements of Government).

88. There is a shortage of staff, particularly professional staff. Insofar as this proceeds from recruitment delays and from lack of (financial) attractiveness it is dealt with elsewhere. All that need be said here is that rather than allow vacancies in professional posts to hold up the work of permanent staff generally, it would be an economy to utilise the services of professionals in the private sector, of course under adequate financial control.

K. Planning and Development

89. Reference has already been made to the three areas of central control over Ministries, Planning and Development, Finance and Personnel, of the need for them to be supported by substantial authority, of the special position of Finance, and of the general desirability of the other two to be placed as close as possible to authority (an executive President's Secretariat or a Prime Minister's Office). This desirability appears to extend to Guyana.

90. Guyana already has a Development Programme 1966-72 and the need then arises for a central body to deal with -

- (a) progress in the implementation of projects;
- (b) the periodic (or continuous if resources are tight) review, coordination and adjustment of the plan.

There is an Economic Sub-Committee of the Cabinet but the executive portion of the task is performed by the staff of the Ministry of Economic Development and it is this body which is responsible for the duties indicated above, and to which the observations in the previous paragraph apply.

91. Planning in the precise technical sense is not in evidence. Permanent Secretaries and senior professional officers draw attention to this themselves, as a serious weakness they cannot remedy without qualified staff. Before works are undertaken they would like to have an assessment and planned distribution of the labour, material and financial resources involved in both the capital construction and subsequent maintenance. The Development Programme 1966-72 is a broad statement of national objectives akin to a political manifesto, and each of the intended projects therein should be properly "planned" technically, economically, financially, and administratively before it is undertaken. Since the necessary expertise is not yet available in Guyana it can only be acquired from

overseas by bringing in consultants or by sending Guyanese away for training or, preferably, by both these means. Some project in particular could be selected for planning purposes and the actual plan developed in the Opex manner by a local team under the guidance of an overseas expert. The expert and his Guyanese counterpart should exchange visits to continue their contact on the particular project and to enlarge the planning technique and experience.

92. The execution of the projects of the Programme is carried out by the executive Ministries alongside their usual functions. To that extent they function in two ways -

- (a) maintenance of existing services
- (b) provision of new development.

The Ministries most affected are those dealing with Transport and Communications in their various forms, Agriculture and, of course, Works and Hydraulics. Projects in the Programme are included in the separate capital budget, items for inclusion in which pass through the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance.

93. There is need of providing a continuous dialogue between the central organ and a planning, development and statistical unit or cell in all those Ministries whose present commitments include an adequate degree of plan implementation, just as there is of a Personnel and Finance cell (the Finance Officer) for dealing with the other control functions. In view of the shortage of qualified personnel (economists, etc.) this may not be easy but it will not only maintain contact but add to the utility of the work done in the Ministry and the unlikelihood of it turning out to be infructuous. The size of the unit or cell would vary with the Ministries, but it would need to be near the Permanent Secretary and the Permanent Secretary should see that it exists and functions. The dialogue would amount to a continuous exchange of information about implementation and statistics between the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministerial sources.

RECOMMENDATION 29.

THAT in Ministries responsible for a considerable degree of development implementation, there should be an office or section responsible for the supervision of implementation and for maintaining contact with the Ministry of Economic Development for all purposes connected with the plan. When the amount of work does not justify a separate unit, then the duty should be imposed on an existing unit as a specific responsibility.

94. Since the general financial position is tight and development financing depends heavily on procurement of special funds, it is clear that there must be a continuous contact between the Ministry of Finance and that of Economic Development especially as the aims of the two (monetary stability and development) may be frequently conflicting, and also some arrangement for settling differences. The present weekly meetings between the two Permanent Secretaries and their principal advisers is understood to be successful and adequate. The Economic Sub-Committee of the Cabinet supplements this at a higher level. The Rules of Business should, of course, contain provision for resolving differences.

95. Due to the uncertainty of the money flow, there will equally have to be continuous contact with the principal executing Ministries (probably Works,

Lands, Agriculture and Trade). There needs to be foresight in this, i.e. the Ministries need to be warned of prospective shortages so that they can programme their work. Reference has been made earlier to complaints of delays in decision owing to old "paper flow" methods of inter-unit coordination, and the planning units in Ministries must seek a more direct and continuous contact with the Ministry of Economic Development than a paper one.

RECOMMENDATION 30.

THAT there should be continuous contact between the Ministry of Economic Development on the one hand and executive Ministries on the other to permit by early warning and foresight, the latter to accommodate their programming to the probable flow of capital funds.

96. Public Corporations are even now involved in development, and if some of the projected new ones (Telecommunications, Harbours, Water) are created they too will be involved. If their involvement is sufficient the idea of having a representative on their Board of the Ministry of Economic Development as well as of the "responsible" Ministry (if necessary by amendment of the Ordinance) should be considered. It should, however, be noticed that a too great proliferation of Corporations will lead, in development as in administration generally, to possibly insuperable difficulties of coordination. The temptation to create Public Corporations is, in the field of Development, particularly strong. The general observations already made on the considerations that should restrain excessive action in this respect apply. There is a great necessity to avoid a disorderly creation of Corporations to perform functions which are in fact redundant and which may otherwise make organisation both complex and confusing.

97. There is something that might be called "development spirit" in public servants. It could be developed, as earlier suggested, by an appeal to patriotism, to idealism and to belonging to an efficient, honoured and respected Service. Steps suggested elsewhere to overcome the present malaise of the Service will thus contribute to development.

98. The Ministry of Economic Development is responsible for suggesting modifications of the plan not only in accordance with the availability of funds but of progress actually secured and will need to know something of the latter. At present it has an inspector ("Programme Chaser") who is adequate. It may, if need arises, be able to stretch the services of the Public Service Inspectors, suggested in connection with the Public Service Ministry, to cover this.

99. It has not yet been found necessary to attempt a projection of the needs of the Public Service arising from the development plan and apparently it is thought there might be enough "slack" in the machine to cope, if methods are improved, with the added work. It is recommended, nevertheless, that some sort of projection should be attempted so that it may marry with the structural survey of the Service separately recommended.

RECOMMENDATION 31.

THAT a projection of the effect of the Development Plan in terms of additional personnel required should be undertaken and considered in connection with the review of the Public Service structure separately recommended.

L. Financial Procedures

100. The second of the "control" functions, that of expenditure exercised through the Finance Division of the Ministry of Finance, attracted a quantity of criticism, second only to the personnel control exercised by the Public Service Commission and the Establishments Division of the Ministry. Typical was the first remark of a witness that "archaic" procedures should be removed.

101. Although there is no intention to discount the sincerity of the criticism it may, to a certain extent, ignore two vital facts -

- (a) In financial administration the executive is not its own master. It is an agent of the legislature, answerable to the legislature and relying on controls provided by the legislature to maintain efficiency.
- (b) There is considerable financial stringency and it is likely to continue. Consequently, there has to be a strict control over expenditure and a determination to avoid over-commitment of resources, which may be very unwelcome to executive ministries.

102. No doubt for unavoidable reasons, budgets have been passed late (Article 111 of the Constitution does not prescribe a time for passing). Although under Article 112 of the Constitution read with Section 18 of the Financial Administration and Audit Ordinance, power exists to authorise expenditure for up to three months of the financial (which is also the calendar) year, in anticipation of the usual warrant of withdrawal from the appropriate Fund, this power does not extend to "new" projects, including development projects, for which a resolution of the Legislature is required. Although expenditure is eventually authorised, the general effect may be to postpone action, and to disorganise programming for the year. It is anticipated that budgets will in future be passed earlier and it is most desirable that every effort should be made to do this, if necessary by laying down a statutory or constitutional limit of time. A matter in which the legislature tends not to assist financial administration as it could is in the matter of audit. The Audit Reports have been delayed largely because the annual accounts have been closed late. When completed, they have either not been considered at all by the Public Accounts Committee or considered so late as seriously to diminish the utility of the process. Even after the Committee has reported, a reply to the Committee's observations has not been insisted on. These omissions may be due to the disorganisation that has occurred in Government offices, and an indication that a realisation of their effects exists is that the law has been amended to reduce from six to four months the period within which the Accountant General must transmit his accounts to the Director of Audit and from four to three the period covered under Section 18 of the Financial Administration and Audit Ordinance. The two facts that must be emphasized are that:-

- (a) with a system of annual budgets, appropriations delayed may mean appropriations unused and work undone or at least work unsatisfactorily programmed, staff laid off or wasted, and operative departments frustrated or discontented;
- (b) audit and review delayed may mean audit and review ineffective.

RECOMMENDATION 32.

THAT the legislature assist the control of finance by insisting that the audit report reach it in time, by ensuring a thorough examination by the Public

Accounts Committee, and by insisting on a reasonable reply to the Committee's comments.

103. The annual estimates are prepared under a system which appears to have changed little. Current expenditure is shown under 68 heads, mostly divided into a number of sub-heads. Usually the first sub-head provides for personal emoluments, and the staff are shown against this sub-head in detail. Capital expenditure is shown separately for each ministry, divided into sub-heads each of which covers a single development scheme or project. There is no arrangement for virement despite the highly particularised nature of the capital estimates, and there is the traditional one year budget system throughout (Section 30 of the Financial Administration and Audit Ordinance limits the authority conferred by an appropriation for a financial year to the financial year). Any difficulty in development matters arising from this is dealt with by informally regarding a scheme spreading over a number of years, once begun, as a commitment in fact though not in law in subsequent years and with a relatively small programme anything more elaborate seems at present unnecessary.

104. The Ministry of Finance deals with finance, budgeting, accounting, etc. through a Finance Division divided into five sections. No reference is made here to its Establishment functions which are dealt with in a subsequent part. It is believed that difficulties have been found in finding staff of satisfactory quality and it may be that there is a shortage of posts. Delays in disposal of a control ministry (Finance, Establishments or Planning) have snowballing effects in executing ministries. In addition a suggestion in the succeeding paragraph will increase staff needs of the Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 33.

THAT there should be no reluctance to increase staff in control ministries where it is necessary.

105. The Ministry has its counterpart unit in all ministries, in the form of Finance Officers, of Principal Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretary status. The Finance Officer usually deals with all "housekeeping" functions, finance, accounts, establishments. There is no guarantee that he has skills in any of these or that he has had experience in the Ministry of Finance, and in fact the complaint is that many have been brought up in a strictly "secretariat" tradition and have no interest in, and little knowledge of, financial administration. This would be avoided if the cadre of the Ministry of Finance were expanded at a suitable level (Assistant Secretary or Administrative Assistant) so that an increasing proportion of officers passed through these posts on their way to outside ministries. There is no reason to doubt that adequate work exists giving an insight into financial administration. In addition, there is often need, in ministries with heavy planning, development and spending functions, for someone with Finance Ministry background who can advise on the financial implications of schemes, on the likely financial reactions and so on at an early stage of consideration, instead of waiting for a later financial judgement which, if unfavourable, results in much wasted effort, and some countries attach Financial Advisers (officers drawn from the group of officers trained in the Ministry of Finance as part of a "Finance Pool") to planning and spending ministries if necessary in addition to the existing Finance Officer. It may be that such a system is not necessary in the comparatively small units here (although lack of knowledge of Financial Rules and Regulations among departmental officers has been mentioned as leading to much infructuous work and to too much reliance on the Ministry of Finance's scrutiny), but thought needs to be given to an earlier consideration of financial implications in ministerial activities.

RECOMMENDATION 34.

THAT consideration be given to a system designed to provide a larger number of officers well experienced in the Ministry of Finance to assist other ministries, especially those with heavy planning and spending programmes.

106. There are regulations governing the purchase of stores. These allow local purchase of stores without quotations up to \$50. Purchases of greater value must be handled by quotation or by a hierarchic series of Tender Boards. It has been claimed that the level of \$50 is unrealistically low: that it contributes to bottlenecks and to waste of resources (for example, equipment and staff being unused for want of a petty small part replacement) while it contributes little to securing the safety of financial control. In this, as in other matters, it is necessary to weigh advantages and disadvantages before arriving at a decision. The levels at present in effect were introduced at a time when money values were higher, but more particularly when the flow of government expenditure ran at perhaps one third of the present combined budget. While the necessity for not loosening financial control too excessively is appreciated, it might well be that a level of \$50 above which an individual is unable to purchase is on the low side.

RECOMMENDATION 35.

THAT the limits within which the Tender Boards operate be re-examined.

107. The approved procedures for purchase especially where the Crown Agents are involved, secure substantial savings compared with local purchase, for example in the field of drugs and medical supplies. On the other hand they inevitably involve delays, and delays involve expensive local purchase or exceptional transport costs. When the resources of Government permit, it would be profitable to lay down a minimum stock level of medical equipment and drugs, and provide for replenishment as soon as the stock falls to this level. This might require an investment of say three months expenditure but it would probably result in lower local purchases and less frustration.

108. The power to write off losses and the power to condemn stores are subject to somewhat similar considerations involving higher levels of authority than is essential.

RECOMMENDATION 36.

THAT the limit of authority to deal with loss and write-off be re-examined.

109. It may well be that there will be reluctance to increase limits of local write offs and of local purchases because of a fear of increasing corruption. Many states are faced with the problem of increasing corruption in the public service. Some have had to take special measures to combat it, such as special "anti-corruption" police units or a requirement of a declaration of the assets of public servants and their immediate families at entrance to the service. Some have altered their disciplinary codes either to make proof of a general reputation for corruption a basis for removal, or to place on public servants the onus of proving the legality of the resources for the acquisition of substantial assets during service. These meet with mixed degrees of success, but they are more likely to secure results than keeping the limits of "write off" or local acquisitions at a level where delays caused may outweigh advantages in safety gained.

M. Delegation

110. Popular belief to the contrary notwithstanding and subject to the observations in preceding paragraphs, it does not appear that lack of financial delegation is a considerable contributory to delay. As has been indicated, once a budget has passed, and subject to a degree of reservation dictated in some cases by the "ways and means" position, departments have full authority to go ahead with spending. There may, however, be room for delegation in some aspects of control, for example, passing of Travelling Allowance Bills, certain advances and so on. The Sub-Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs had, in July 1966, asked for a review of delegations and a number of replies, not as large as might be expected, but highly pertinent, have been received. A thorough investigation of this sort is preferable to picking out and quoting examples in a report such as this.

RECOMMENDATION 37.

THAT the general review of delegated power, as ordered by the Cabinet Economic Sub-Committee, be expedited. While financial propriety must be assured, the benefits arising from restricting delegation should be weighed against procedural delays caused.

111. In general it does not seem that financial control is unnecessarily rigid or disproportionate to the financial needs or to a situation where financial discipline is essential. There is perhaps an excessive belief that the only way to contain corruption and dishonesty is by centralisation and by denial of authority to persons who prima facie must be presumed worthy of trust if only because of the degree of non-financial responsibility entrusted to them. Beyond some adjustments of procedures which proceed from a perhaps excessive distrust of integrity, the financial control does not appear to require substantial change. It is true that the main interest is to ensure that executive agencies operate within the financial limits of sanctions; it is equally true that in some countries emphasis is changing to elaborate measurements of performance and to attempts to relate benefits to costs. But it is far from certain that such action is possible or is, in fact, appropriate or desirable in Guyana at the moment. Certainly it is essential that Guyana obtain value for money but, for the time being, this will have to be done without additional elaborate machinery and within the existing system.

I. ORGANISATION (CONTINUED).

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

A. The Public Service

112. The Public Service means service of the Crown in a civil capacity in respect of the Government of Guyana. It thus includes, besides those working in Ministries and Departments, servants of such constitutional authorities as the Director of Audit and the Service Commissions, but excludes servants of Public Corporations. A few constitutional provisions refer to it but there is no Public Service statute, and it is regulated by regulations and orders made by the executive.

113. A recently carried out man-power survey gives a total of some 22,000 persons in the public sector. This excludes the uniformed services, but includes teachers in the denominational schools who are not Government employed and employees of Public Corporations, though those are a relatively small proportion. Of the total of 22,000 under 500 are professional staff and professionally qualified, 500 are non-professional with specialised training (nurses, surveyors), 1,500 administrative executive and supervisory, 2,200 clerical, 3,300 craftsmen and technical workers, 8,400 service workers which include non-graduate teachers and 5,300 manual workers.

114. The Public Service formerly had a considerable career attractiveness, appealed to a good quality candidate and had high morale. Its relatively small intake for the non-professional and non-technical area could be met from the outturn of the educational system and did, in fact, attract that outturn. The consensus of evidence is that this is no longer the case, and the following among others are mentioned as the contributory causes:-

- (a) a distrust of official efforts to retain the Service as a merit dominated non-political career service, in view of the political history and some present political attitudes in the country;
- (b) a change in community values and a growing insistence on the importance of immediate material rewards; the existing high levels of Public Service expenditure and of taxation having left the Service in a weak position to compete in material rewards with developing industry and commerce;
- (c) the Guyanese readiness to move at home and abroad in pursuit of better jobs, and the pay gap between Guyana and not only advanced countries, but also other Commonwealth Caribbean countries. There is no reason to expect this to decrease.

This change in attitudes has contributed (it is not the sole cause) to a substantial number of vacancies existing in the Service, and to some general loss of spirit in its ranks.

115. What is to be done about this? It is impossible, even if it were likely to be useful, to attempt to overcome this malaise by through-the-line salary revisions - by buying a way out. The increases recommended in the Guillebaud Report

were postulated on the basis that total revenue would rise at an accurately forecast rate while expansion of the Service could be limited to four per cent per annum. They were accordingly accepted on a forecast that, in the second instance, has been negated and to some extent mortgaged the future. It is necessary to turn to other means; an appeal to patriotism, to idealism, to a sense of belonging to a live, progressive, honourable and efficient organisation. These are matters on which attention should be concentrated, and subsequent recommendations devote attention to this.

RECOMMENDATION 38

THAT attention should be devoted to increasing the appeal of the Public Service by appeals to a spirit of service, patriotism and also by efforts to make the Service a more efficient and honourable organisation. There should be a campaign in the secondary schools by lectures and addresses, mounted either by the proposed Public Service Ministry or the Government's public relations mechanism, and a booklet explaining the Public Service as a career should be prepared and made widely available.

116. Nevertheless something may be said of salary differentials. Reference has been made above to the Guyanese readiness to move abroad in search of more material rewards and to the fact that the per capita income in a number of Caribbean countries has been increasing and permitting pay rises faster than in Guyana. A country can spend on its Public Service only what it can afford, and that is a matter for internal and political decision. Nevertheless, the manner in which it is spent must bear in mind administrative facts including the mobility mentioned above, and this raises the question of differentials. A Permanent Secretary draws \$10,320; a second class clerk, fresh from school, draws \$1,400. The multiple is about seven. Taxation is steeply graded and in the "take home pay" the multiple is nearer five. Guyana's frame of mind, as far as a visitor can judge, is generally egalitarian and its society homogeneous (from the economic point of view) and the differential between top and bottom in the Public Service possibly accords with national values and does not appear to be widely questioned. Nevertheless it must be asked whether this low differential is not a prime cause of the lack of enthusiasm for the Public Service as a career which undoubtedly exists. In the United Kingdom a Permanent Secretary draws nearly twice the salary of a University Professor; in Guyana a Professor, often years younger, draws substantially more, and in the University of the West Indies more still. It is no wonder that the Public Service does not attract. Salaries are adjusted following salary commissions and these comments might be borne in mind when the next commission is created. The observations on this particular subject of the Priestly Commission in the United Kingdom are not as irrelevant to Guyanese conditions as might be expected.

RECOMMENDATION 39

THAT in the interest of increasing the attractiveness of the Public Service to highly qualified generalist and professional officers, the structural effect of existing pay differentials should be examined.

117. The distinctly generous leave concessions are undoubtedly a career attraction. Nonetheless, they use money for the advantage of public servants without leaving them much choice. They may be rationalised on the basis that overseas travel broadens the mind and knowledge, but, they were not created with this object

in mind. It might be considered whether their cost should be diverted to increasing differentials.

118. The Service is organised on the basis that it is to be a "career" Service, and contract appointments, except for expatriate staff, are exceptions. Although the outturns of the expanded secondary educational system and of the University of Guyana seem likely to overtake any earlier shortage and indeed in the near future to provide enough to ensure competition for posts (even assuming Public Service employment fails to regain its former attractiveness), the shortage of technical and professional staff is likely to persist much longer. Steps are recommended later to attract such staff into the Service by relaxation of "career" concepts for those groups through a gratuity system after a specific period such as occurs in the University. This recognises the fact that, in certain professional areas, lifetime service and a distant pension no longer attract. The "career" concept was designed to attract people into the Service, not to keep them out and, insofar as it does the latter, should be modified.

RECOMMENDATION 40

THAT the "career" aspect should not be allowed to dominate admission, structural pay and pension policies of the Public Service to an extent to inhibit recruitment.

119. Some teachers are Government servants, but those in denominational and private schools (these being in the majority) are not. Apparently policy is to be directed to restricting school development to the Government sector and eventually perhaps the local government authorities, to be created, will deal with local management of education. The Constitution provides that, to such extent as Parliament may provide, service as a teacher may not be construed as service in the Public Service. It is recommended that Parliament should make provision in this respect. The teaching profession is not linked in many of its requirements with the Public Service, and it adds to congestion and delay in Public Service personnel processes to treat the two identically. Conversely, to unite the present Public Service teachers with other teachers in a single professional group will make the teaching profession more of a united profession. Clearly, teachers who are public servants will dislike the change but some means of allaying dissatisfaction is not impossible. Many of the regulations appropriate to the Public Service are quite inappropriate in the teaching profession.

RECOMMENDATION 41

THAT consideration should be given to the possibility of action under Article 125 (5) of the Constitution to form a united teaching profession by integrating into a Government Teaching Service all the teachers in the Government system.

120. Works staff appointed on "open vote" provisions may be regarded as temporary members of the Public Service, thus acquiring for themselves some degree of Public Service status and the protection of the Public Service Disciplinary Code. Works staff employed by contractors are not so regarded, and industrial discipline is said to be better. It might be desirable that the labouring staff (this would exclude clerical and supervisory staff and needs definition) should be specifically excluded from the definition of public servant, if in fact they come within it, and left to be covered by labour law. If this requires an amendment of the Constitution it may be considered when revision comes up. Alternatively, the

introduction of a National Insurance Scheme may provide an opportunity. The personnel control of the Public Service is sufficiently cumbersome without adding this unnecessary burden to it.

RECOMMENDATION 42

THAT the position of non-permanent labouring staff paid from "open vote" reserves should be examined, with a view to placing them under the general Labour Code rather than the Civil Service Code. If, as is probable, such staff are not public servants as defined in the Constitution the position should be drawn to the attention of employing officers.

B. Personnel Agencies

121. The administration of personnel matters is shared by the Public Service Commission, the Public Service Commission Secretariat, the Treasury (Establishment), the Ministry of Education and the several other Ministries. The fairly rapid development of this system in recent times should be borne in mind.

122. Before 1953 the Public Service of British Guiana was administered under the traditional colonial system. Constitutional responsibility for all staff matters was assigned to the Chief Secretary and discharged through the Establishment Department. In practice, because of the Financial Secretary's concern with matters requiring the provision of funds Treasury advice weighed heavily in regard to Establishments, grading etc., but the Constitutional responsibility nevertheless remained with the Chief Secretary. The selection of candidates for promotion and appointments was generally referred by the Chief Secretary to two standing Committees for advice and then to the Governor for decision.

123. When the Ministerial system of Government was recommended by the Constitution Commission of 1950-51, the usual device was suggested for guaranteeing the political neutrality of the Public Service, namely, the setting up of an independent Public Service Commission. The Government accepted these recommendations and established the Commission in 1953. Its functions at that stage were purely advisory, the Governor still having absolute discretion in matters of appointment, promotion, transfer, training and discipline.

124. The 1960 Conference in London affirmed the importance of ensuring for the Public Service an independent status free from political control and decided, subject to a certain proviso, that the Public Service Commission would become an executive body. In readiness for this change the Personnel Section of the Establishment Department was converted into the Secretariat of the Commission, and the Commission replaced the Chief Secretary on 1 December, 1960, as personnel adviser to the Governor. At the same time the Governor formally assigned responsibility for the Establishment Section to the Financial Secretary, thereby validating the de facto situation.

125. The Public Service Commission did not, in fact, become an executive body until 26 May, 1966. It is now one of the entrenched organs in the Constitution (The Guyana Independence Order 1966). The functions thereby vested in the Commission are "the power to make appointments to public offices and to remove and exercise disciplinary control over persons holding or acting in such offices...."

126. Although the Commission's own functions are circumscribed by law, its Secretariat headed by the Secretary deals independently with many other functions it inherited from the former Personnel Section. In this respect the Commission and its Secretariat are separate institutions.

127. The Establishment Section which, as stated, was formally entrusted to the Financial Secretary in 1960, is now known as the Establishment Division of the Ministry of Finance or simply as Treasury (Establishment).

128. Subtending the Commission and Treasury are the other Ministries, which together form the lower deck of the personnel administrative structure. They exercise certain minor powers under delegated authority and refer everything else to the Commission or Treasury as the case may require. The delegation to Ministries, however, is neither explicit nor extensive, as will be shown. The actual distribution of functions among these agencies by delegation from the Governor at 1 December 1960, was as follows:-

Public Service Commission

- (a) Commission itself: Appointments and discipline above salary scale Cl.
- (b) Secretariat only: Confirmation of probationary appointments, transfers to and from Guyana, confidential reports, certificates of service, retirements (including those on grounds of general inefficiency), renewal of contracts, extension of contracts, extension of service beyond 55, staff records, selection for training courses, re-engagement of dismissed officers, re-employment of pensioners, competitive examinations for entry to or promotion within the Public Service, petitions regarding the above matters, ex gratia awards, qualifications (prescribing and assessing), advertisements and indents for vacancies, training (need for pre-entry, etc.; and selection for University or equivalent), pensions and gratuities (grants or reductions), applications for leave not delegated to Departments.

Ministry of Finance

Establishment Division:

Establishments, complements, gradings, salaries, wages, allowances, conditions of service (including leave, passages, invaliding procedure), Whitley Councils and other staff negotiations, wages committees, uniforms, rent, examinations, advances and allowances, invaliding, administration of estates of deceased officers, resignations,

Establishment Division
(Contd.)

widows' and orphans' pensions, staff proposals in annual and supplementary estimates, organisation and methods, general orders, staff lists, petitions regarding above matters.

Other Ministries

No powers were delegated to other Ministries at that stage (1 December, 1960).

129. By directive dated 3 April, 1962 (P.S.C. Circ. 27/1962) the Governor delegated the following powers of appointment and discipline:

(a) To the Chairman, Public Service Commission, acting on the advice of the Commission)

(a) Appointments

Power to act within salary scales A8 - 19, B2, P1 - 3, P5 - 6.

(b) Acting Appointments

\$5,280 and above (fixed). Salary scales A1 - 7. Scales in (a) above.

(c) Discipline

Scales A9a - 19, B2, B8a, P1 - 3, P5 - 6.

(b) To Permanent Secretaries, acting on the advice of a Ministry Committee)

(a) Appointments

Power to act within salary scales B1, B3 - 10, C1 - 8, P7 - 8.

(b) Acting Appointments

Scales in (a) above.

(c) Discipline

Scales B1, B3 - 10, C1 - 8, P7 - 8.

(There were certain qualifications which need not be mentioned here.)

130. Legally this delegation is continued by Article 12 of the Guyana Independence Order, 1966, until such time as the Commission may make its own delegation order. The Commission has not yet done so. Consequently the powers of Permanent Secretaries (Heads of Ministries) are still limited to those entrusted to them by the Governor four years before Independence.

131. The 1960 delegation conferred no powers on Permanent Secretaries but Circular 68/1960 spoke of "all matters not already delegated to Heads of Departments", implying that they already possessed some; presumably they originated in General Orders. The 1962 delegation covered only appointments and discipline within the lower salary scales.

132. On the evidence of Permanent Secretaries themselves they are in fact dealing with a variety of personnel matters but the source of their authority is far from clear. The thread of delegation is a tangled skein and so tenuous as to be not

worth unravelling. It should be discarded in favour of one much more ample and intelligible.

133. Parsimonious delegation to Permanent Secretaries is one of the root causes of the delays about which so much is heard - from Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, staff associations and citizens. Another contributing factor is the confusion between the functions of the Public Service Commission Secretariat and Treasury as itemised above. Valuable time is lost if Departments happen to guess wrongly which one to approach. More time (and patience) is lost if, as Permanent Secretaries allege, there is a disclaimer of jurisdiction by both the central agencies. Most of the delay and exasperation is attributable to these defects of delegation, that is to say to excessive centralisation and to a splitting of the centre itself into two not infrequently reluctant parts.

134. Under the Constitution final authority rests with the Governor-General or the Prime Minister in regard to Permanent Secretaries and kindred officials.

135. The division of responsibility for appointments and discipline is shown in the following table:-

Levels of Authority for Appointments and Discipline

Authority vested in	For Appointments (Including Promotion)	For Discipline
Governor-General	<p>Permanent Secretaries, Director of Public Prosecutions, Solicitor General, Director of Audit in accordance with advice of Public Service Commission.</p> <p>Permanent Secretaries <u>by transfer</u> in accordance with advice of Prime Minister.</p> <p>Secretary to Cabinet, representatives abroad, in accordance with advice of Prime Minister.</p>	
Prime Minister	<p>Certain offices (overseas and external affairs) <u>by transfer</u>.</p>	
Public Service Commission	<p>All appointments other than the foregoing.</p>	<p>Power to remove and exercise disciplinary control over all persons in public offices.</p>

The above powers are conferred by the Constitution. The following are delegated by the Public Service Commission.

Authority vested in	For Appointments (Including Promotion)	For Discipline
Public Service Commission	Any two Commissioners may appoint to the junior ranks.	
Permanent Secretaries	Offices within scales B1 to 10, C1 to 8, P7 and 8 on the advice of a Ministry Committee.	Offices within scales B1 to 10, C1 to 8, P7 and 8.

The same levels of authority apply in regard to acting appointments.

Though the number of tiers in this scheme is irreducible, much more of the personnel work of the Service should be delegated to the lowest of the four. The central controlling bodies should control mainly by laying down policy and rules of procedure, and allowing the Permanent Secretaries to deal with personnel matters as a normal part of their managerial function. A proper scheme of delegation should provide for devolution of authority within the controlling bodies as well as outside them. A suitable code of delegated powers will be suggested after indicating the lines on which the central personnel machinery should first be reconstructed.

C. Public Service Commission

136. The Public Service Commission was set up in 1953 to advise the Governor on appointments and discipline.

137. At Independence (26 May 1966) it was reconstituted and given executive authority in the same field (Articles 95-105 of the Constitution of Guyana). The Commission shall consist of five or six members appointed by the Governor-General as follows:-

- (a) three on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition;
- (b) two on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with bodies representing public officers;
- (c) one at the Prime Minister's option and on his advice.

From the members a Chairman and a Deputy Chairman shall be appointed on the recommendation of the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. At the moment there are five members, of whom only the Chairman and one other serve full time.

138. Conflicting evidence was heard on the subject of the Commission. The Civil Service Association and the Federation were pleased to be more or less "represented" on the Commission and complained mainly of delays; the Permanent Secretaries offered no comment on the composition of the Commission but were more strongly critical of inordinate delays and lack of delegation; the Leader of the Opposition (Dr. Cheddi Jagan) thought the Commission as constituted could hardly be impartial. The alternative he advocated was a Commission of equal representatives of Government

and Opposition with a mutually agreed Chairman. This is tantamount to arguing that the representative basis of the Commission should be political instead of industrial and is something only the Guyanese themselves can debate and decide by the electoral process. It is obviously not a matter on which an expression of opinion would be expected in this report.

139. For the good of the Public Service, however, to say nothing of the good of the country, it is essential that the Public Service Commission enjoy public confidence in its integrity. Where political opinions and feelings run deep some suspicion and distrust are inevitable, but they could be minimised by opening up the Commission's proceedings for review on appeal if it ever became constitutionally possible to do so.

140. Article 15 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, origin, politics, colour or creed. Naturally the respect shown for this policy will be closely watched by all sections of the community and transgressions will be alleged and motives imputed all too freely. In this situation it is better to let justice seem to be done, by creating a right of appeal, than to try and convince people ex parte that it has in fact been done. Whenever a citizen is aggrieved by an act or omission of a public servant he can appeal to the Ombudsman for a review of the case. But a public servant or candidate for the Public Service is expressly debarred from access to the Ombudsman by Article 53 (6) of the Constitution. Removal of this ban would strengthen public confidence in the integrity of the Public Service Commission as a protector of constitutional rights. This is a point to which serious consideration is commended whenever Constitutional amendments are contemplated.

141. The Commission, properly and conventionally, is an independent body. In operation its independence borders on aloofness. This is particularly unfortunate in a body whose composition denies it the benefit of a direct and intimate knowledge of the up-to-date workings and demands of the Public Service, and which for the want of any P.S.C. Inspectors on its staff, is deprived of the best secondary source of that knowledge. In many countries the Public Service Commission is so constituted that serving officers may be, and usually are, appointed to the Commission, thus bringing to it a deep insight and understanding of the environment in which the vacancies occur. These Commissions lose nothing in independence through the free movement of their members out of, and back into, the Public Service. Indeed some virtue is seen in a policy of interchangeability among Permanent Secretaries and Commissioners. The constitution of the Guyana Public Service Commission is heavily biased the other way, being composed entirely of members drawn from outside the Service (though some present members are in fact past public servants). The top echelon of the Public Service itself would have much of value to contribute. These aspects merit serious consideration in the best interests of the Public Service whenever any Constitutional amendments are being promoted.

RECOMMENDATION 43

THAT the points made in paragraphs 139, 140 and 141 be considered if and when the Constitution is reviewed.

142. Grave dissatisfaction was evinced on all sides at the prolonged delays in disposing of personnel business, particularly the business of appointments and discipline. Delay in clearing these matters was said to be a serious source of inefficiency throughout the Public Service. People of every rank are affected - and some disaffected - by it, long gaps open up in the continuity of functions, jobs lose momentum and even come to a halt. Once an air of resignation is generated

by this it is not easily dissipated. The causes of delay obviously must be eradicated if the Public Service is to rise to the challenge of Independence.

143. The Commission, as freely acknowledged by all witnesses, was faced with a formidable task when it acquired executive power on 26 May 1966. Almost a total ban had been imposed for two years (1962-64) on the filling of vacancies and a serious back log had accumulated by 31 December 1964.

144. A quantitative assessment of the volume of work performed by the Commission is difficult to make but the following figures give some indication:-

	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966 (Jan-Oct.)
(a) Meetings held	176	102	147	190	122
(b) Candidates interviewed	861	616	912	866	709
(c) Vacancies filled	764	554	830	533	631
(d) Acting (including temporary) appointments	200	212	240	396	353
(e) Disciplinary cases	13	12	3	33	31
(f) Petitions and appeals from Public Officers	7	3	4	24	22
(g) Premature retirements	10	16	27	27	28
(h) Matters dealt with by circulation of papers - (d), (e), (f), (g),	520	500	631	631	629

Roughly half as much again is believed to be discharged - by the Chairman and Secretariat only - on behalf of the Police Staff Commission. Appraising from these figures the actual weight of work entailed at every stage, it is clearly desirable that the load should be relieved substantially by delegation and other means to ensure prompt attention to the operational needs of Government.

D. Public Service Commission Secretariat

145. Whereas the Public Service Commission is an independent statutory corporation its Secretariat is, in effect, a Government Department staffed with public servants and discharging certain personnel functions for the Government under delegated authority. The Secretariat is the servant of the Commission in respect of the Commission's powers but independent in respect of its own (delegated) powers.

146. What might be called the personal Office of the Secretary consists of two small secretariats, each of four people, one of them to prepare Commission minutes and the other to prepare agenda and make all arrangements for meetings.

147. The main body of staff form the Secretariat proper, organised as follows:-

- Principal Personnel Officer - Senior Service Section
- Clerical Service and Discipline
- Principal Personnel Officer - Junior Service Section
- Woman Secretary
- Leave
- Training, Pensions, Accounts

An organisation chart of the Commission and Secretariat is included at Annex C.

148. The Secretariat also services the Police Staff Commission which accounts for about a third of the work.

149. The modus operandi of the Commission and Secretariat will be discussed in Part II. For the moment the organisational weakness to be noted is that they have no field staff (in some countries called P.S.C. Inspectors) to accumulate direct knowledge of Departmental functions and personnel by a constant round of visits and discussions.

150. Responsibilities are not apportioned to the best advantage in the P.S.C. Secretariat. Most files reach the desk of the Secretary for his personal attention with the result that he is visibly overloaded. The other senior officers obviously have latent capacity for accepting the responsibility of taking decisions for and on behalf of the Secretary and thereby cutting off much of the work at their own level. (The same principle of devolution holds good for all other Ministries). The two Principal Personnel Officers of P.A.S. rank should operate as deputy secretaries and dispose of business on the "exception principle", i.e. by transacting the whole of it in the Secretary's name (or their own if preferred) except matters expressly reserved for the Secretary in person. This change alone would transform the speed and efficiency of the P.S.C. Secretariat to the certain benefit of all Ministries.

151. Two somewhat similar sections of the Secretariat are organised on different lines. The Clerical Service section is organised functionally and the Junior Service section is organised departmentally. In the one case each man takes some of the actions for all of the Departments and in the other case each man takes all of the actions for some of the Departments. Functional organisation produces work of specialist quality but makes it harder to fill a post when the incumbent is absent. Organisation in Departmental groups permits of a greater degree of interchangeability and enhances the P.S.C. knowledge of Departments. Whether both sections should be organised on the same basis is a question deserving of closer examination.

E. Establishment Division of Ministry of Finance

152. The Establishment Division of the Ministry of Finance is the other main agency for the central control of personnel administration. It is headed by a Principal Establishment Officer and treated as an integral part of the Ministry. The Permanent Secretary exercises full control subject to the Minister of Finance.

153. The Division is sub-divided into two Sections as follows:

Assistant Secretary - Rates of Pay and Complements
Rates of pay, gradings, classification, complements, allowances, overtime.

Assistant Secretary - Conditions of Service
Superannuation, compensation, leave etc., other conditions, staff relations, Ministry staffing.

An organisation chart is included at Annex D.

154. The Division administers a pay system under which the principal Government posts are allocated to one of 65 salary scales (F and A). For other posts there are another 31 scales (B and C). The usual run of scales is five or six years, though some extend to nine. Grading of posts in such fine distinctions calls for a high degree of knowledge of job content and a perceptive subtlety of assessment. These requisites would seem difficult to acquire without tools. The only staff aid is an O & M unit, understaffed. Ideas for developing a Pay Research Unit and an Inspection Unit have not yet materialised. In practice the Principal Establishment Officer relies on personal knowledge derived from a small staff.

155. The apparent duplication of many subjects of interest to both Treasury (Establishment) and P.S.C. Secretariat, with no clear lines of demarkation, causes a fair amount of confusion in these two agencies themselves as well as in the various Ministries. Further reference will be made to this defect shortly.

F. Ministry of Education

156. Responsibility for Public Service training falls neither to the Commission (or its Secretariat) nor to Treasury but to the Ministry of Education, aided by two advisory committees. The fact is recorded here merely to complete the organisational picture. Discussion is reserved for Part III - Training.

G. Proposed Ministry of the Public Service

157. As a managerial responsibility, personnel administration is an entity and its parts are inter-related. To respect this coherence and profit by it, the personnel function should be performed by a single agency. In Guyana, ostensibly on the British model, it is divided between the Public Service Commission and the

Establishment Division of Treasury. The rationale of this pattern is that, as a safeguard against patronage, appointments to the Public Service should be made by a Commission that is independent of Government whereas staff complements, salaries and conditions of service should be under Government control, hence within a Department.

158. Usually the Department is Treasury because so much of the Government budget (in Guyana about 40 per cent) is devoted to the payroll. This argument, however, is by no means unassailable and such control as Government must retain over personnel administration could well be exercised through a Department other than Treasury. In modern practice the personnel agency aims one way or another to inspire staff with a certain pride and zeal which Treasury by nature is less able to instil.

159. On the cost argument Treasury should logically administer public works, health, education, etc., which spend the other 60 per cent of the budget, but is content (and effective) with remote control instead. The same remote control would be adequate over the personnel function, which is just as specialised as the others. Evidence is lacking that Treasury in fact saves money on personnel that no other agency would save, or that a special agency for administering personnel would show more extravagant tendencies than the existing special agencies for other purposes.

160. The British precedent of Treasury control is rather deceptive. Treasury there has two Permanent Secretaries, one over Finance and the other over Establishments - virtually separate Departments - and it is the Permanent Secretary over Establishments who is titular head of the Civil Service. If the internal separation in U.K. were made absolute, the Finance Department's control over the Establishment Department would be no less than it is at present.

161. For Guyana, the complete severance of Establishments from Finance is strongly recommended, so that the management of personnel can be expanded to a full Ministry, with a Permanent Secretary of its own, and assume all the functions that the term connotes in contemporary practice. The new Ministry would be responsible for complements, gradings, salaries and conditions, inspection, training, improvement of methods and many other management services. The full range is suggested at Annex E - in comparison with the range in two other countries. They could be grouped as shown in the organisation chart at Annex F.

162. Reverting to the original point that personnel administration is one and indivisible because it deals with a homogeneous group of single purpose subjects, the best result, functionally, could be expected from amalgamating the Public Service Commission and the Establishment Division of Treasury. A single authority would then deal with the whole personnel field, as in large business firms, and as in some Commonwealth countries. In one of these (New Zealand), the State Services Commission is the sole personnel authority, but in a dual role. It is an independent Commission in dealing with individuals (on appointments, discipline, etc.) but is responsible to a Minister for its other (i.e. Government) functions. Thus it commands the legal and physical resources to inspect and improve methods before approving complements; to fill vacancies with direct knowledge of the duties and methods; to gear staff training to revised methods; to promote staff with familiarity of their duties and merit, and generally to bring the whole battery of techniques to bear on the main task of developing an efficient Public Service. As more than passing interest was shown in the New Zealand institution and a desire expressed for further information, a brief description of it is given at Annex G.

163. Though this model cannot be adopted by Guyana in its entirety (because of the entrenched status of the Public Service Commission under the Constitution)

nevertheless a satisfactory adaptation could be wrought by linking the Commission in close association with a new personnel authority without derogating from the Commission's functions or independence. On matters of domestic administration (P.S.C. budget, accommodation, etc.) the Commission's requirements could be processed through the other personnel authority in the manner of the Judiciary through the Attorney-General or a public corporation through its associated Ministry. The two agencies could also share common services to avoid duplication.

164. An apt name for the new personnel authority, denoting its functions and prestige, would be Ministry of the Public Service. Its Permanent Secretary would be primus inter pares among the Permanent Secretaries and, as earlier recommended, responsible, ideally, to the Prime Minister.

165. Most undertakings, public or private, involve labour, finance and supply, sometimes expressed as the three M's - manpower, money and material. In an undertaking as large as the Public Service of Guyana each of these ingredients is of such size and importance as to warrant central direction and control, and is so specialised as to be handled best by three separate agencies. For these reasons Public Service personnel management should be the concern of one agency (the suggested new Ministry), finance, naturally, the concern of Treasury, and supply or material the concern of someone else (perhaps the Ministry of Works as sole agent).

166. The proposed Ministry of the Public Service would, of course, be an additional one numerically but not entirely additional in substance. Two of its intended components (Establishments and Training) already exist elsewhere and would be taken over. Even the third main component (Management Services) is present already in embryonic form. The idea is to bring these three elements together as interacting parts of a single personnel agency and develop them to the point where they exert a truly significant influence on the efficiency and economy of the Government machine. To achieve this purpose it is imperative that they be concentrated and intensified.

167. Since it is not possible to unify personnel administration completely by integrating the Public Service Commission with any other body, the next best alternative is to confine the Commission strictly to its constitutional functions (appointments and discipline) and vest all other personnel matters in the associated new body - the Public Service Ministry.

168. The Ministry would then be responsible for the following activities:

<u>Personnel</u> <u>Division</u>	<u>Training</u> <u>Division</u>	<u>Management Services</u> <u>Division</u>
	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Departmental inspection	Education	O & M
Establishments	External training	Work study
Gradings	Inter-Departmental training	Clerical work measurement
Salary Scales		Forms design
Conditions		Suggestions
Personnel reports		Incentives
		Appliances

<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>
Departmental training	Machinery of Government
O. & M. training	Public Corporations
Manuals	Comparative studies
Desk files	Costing techniques
Procedure lists	Operational research
Correspondence	Computers
schedules	Punched cards
Publications	Network analysis

In addition it would have a Division of Common Services ("housekeeping" functions) including:

Finance	Accommodation
Accounts	Typing
Legal	Telephones
Library	General Orders
Registry	Official Circulars
Mail	Public Relations

These domestic services could be shared with the P.S.C. Secretariat, if housed together, thus avoiding unnecessary duplication.

169. The Ministry could be organised as indicated in the chart at Annex F.

170. The true intent and purpose of this concept must be stressed. The proposal is designed to bring together all the non-P.S.C. personnel functions - Personnel (including Establishments), Training, Management Services - and concentrate them in a single agency as reciprocating parts of a very specialised art - personnel administration. The concept is not academic but practical: it is the most fundamental, far reaching and necessary mechanism that can be suggested for raising the Public Service to the highest, or even an acceptable, pitch of efficiency. It is the key recommendation in this report.

171. This solution with local variations is well tried in many other countries, among them being New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, India, Ceylon and Ghana.

172. The Ministry, however, must have the reality as well as the appearance of authority or it will fail in its object. It must have the power, indeed the duty, to enter every other Department of its own volition and not merely by invitation. By direct and continuous contact of this kind the Ministry must keep itself informed of the nature, quality and quantity of both the work and the staff throughout the Public Service and take positive action on its own initiative as and when it thinks fit. It must indisputably have this overall authority, and use it, with due discretion, to improve the organisation of work, modernise the facilities, simplify procedures, raise output standards, amalgamate or abolish posts as well as establish new ones, revise gradings, devise incentives, organise training of all trainable groups or individuals, strengthen the merit system of promotion and, notwithstanding that the real remedy for loss of morale is a political one, do all it can to instil pride, discipline and a sense of responsibility in each and every public servant. Clearly such a Ministry must have executive power and not be emasculated by being restricted to a purely advisory role. Need it be said that a dictatorial attitude in exercising its authority would obstruct the new Ministry just as surely as lack of executive power. It must try to effect reforms by consultation and persuasion rather than by wielding a big stick. The Permanent Secretary, therefore, must enjoy the confidence of his confreres that he will reinforce, certainly not undermine, their own authority.

RECOMMENDATION 44

THAT a new personnel agency, called Ministry of the Public Service or Public Service Ministry, be established to centralise and expand all the personnel control functions at present divided among the P.S.C. Secretariat, the Establishments Division of Treasury and the Training Division of the Ministry of Education and Race Relations.

RECOMMENDATION 45

THAT the Public Service Ministry consist of the following Divisions:

<u>PROPOSED</u>	<u>REPLACING</u>
1. PERSONNEL DIVISION	{ P.S.C. Secretariat* Establishment Division
2. TRAINING DIVISION	Training Division of Ministry of Education
3. MANAGEMENT SERVICES DIVISION	O. & M. Section
4. DIVISION OF COMMON SERVICES	"Housekeeping" units of P.S.C. Secretariat.

*(A small Secretariat servicing the Public Service Commission with agenda, minutes and arrangements for meetings would remain with the Commission).

RECOMMENDATION 46

THAT the functions of the DIVISIONS be allocated as suggested in paragraph 168.

RECOMMENDATION 47

THAT the Public Service Ministry be responsible to the Prime Minister.

RECOMMENDATION 48

THAT the Permanent Secretary of the Public Service Ministry, as primus inter pares, be the Convenor and Chairman of the Permanent Secretaries Committee.

RECOMMENDATION 49

THAT the new Public Service Ministry call into being a standing Permanent Secretaries Committee to discuss and implement ways and means of improving efficiency and economy.

RECOMMENDATION 50

THAT the Permanent Secretaries Committee begin with an "ideas session" at which they pool their knowledge of deficiencies for the Public Service Ministry to draw up an agenda for action in order of priority.

RECOMMENDATION 51

THAT a sub-committee of the Permanent Secretaries Committee meet representatives of banking, commerce, industry and the University once or twice a year, under the chairmanship of the head of the Public Service Ministry to discuss efficiency and economy in the Public Service.

H. Public Service Legislation

173. The necessarily narrow confines of the Constitution in its references to the Public Service Commission might well be amplified by a Public Service law in which governing principles are laid down. The basic tenets would be embodied in a Public Service Act and the more numerous ancillary rules would be set out in Public Service Regulations wherein they could be altered more easily, but not too easily, as and when necessary. A law of this kind to regulate the Public Service is generally regarded as a fundamental requirement. A sample Table of Contents for such legislation is offered at Annex G as a guide. Some adaptation would, of course, be required to fit it to the needs of Guyana.

174. The Act should, inter alia, prescribe the responsibilities of the new Public Service Ministry on the following lines:

- (1) The Ministry shall be responsible for:
 - (a) Reviewing and advising Government on the Machinery of Government, including such matters as allocation of functions, creation, amalgamation or abolition of Departments, co-ordination of activities of Departments, extent and nature of controls by one Department over others;
 - (b) Reviewing the efficiency and economy of each Department, including Permanent Secretary's responsibilities;
 - (c) Provision of suitable office accommodation, including prescription and supervision of physical working conditions;
 - (d) Approving and reviewing establishments of staff and grading of posts;
 - (e) Acting as the central personnel authority for the Public Service in all matters except the Constitutional functions of the Public Service Commission;
 - (f) Prescribing basic training programmes, including furnishing advice on and assisting with training, making recommendations to Minister on facilities;
 - (g) Providing management consultation services, including advice as to efficient work and control methods, techniques, data processing equipment, and problems of organisation.

- (2) The Ministry shall conduct inspections and investigations and be entitled to such reports as it considers necessary to advise the Permanent Secretary or report to the Minister.

Pending the enactment of a Public Service law, this paragraph, at least, could be the subject of a Cabinet directive.

RECOMMENDATION 52

THAT a Public Service Act be passed, constituting the Public Service Ministry, prescribing its powers and duties, and laying down broad principles over the entire field of personnel administration outside the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission.

175. The acute problem of expediting personnel administration can be resolved in several ways, viz:

- (a) by unifying personnel work (other than the strictly limited functions of the P.S.C.) in a single Ministry of the kind suggested, charged with the duty of promoting efficiency in the Public Service;
- (b) by delegation to the optimum degree within the new Ministry and the P.S.C. and from them to Permanent Secretaries;
- (c) by improving disciplinary measures;
- (d) by revising personnel policies to harmonise with the real needs of Guyana today;
- (e) by improving methods and procedures;
- (f) by systematic training.

The first of these reforms has already been discussed, work methods will be covered in Part II and training in Part III. Delegation of personnel functions, discipline and personnel policy remain to be considered at this point.

I. Delegation

176. Beyond all doubt, further delegation on a generous scale would be one of the best remedies for the chronic congestion of work in the central personnel agencies. Where administrations function mainly by delegation they usually find that work done at the seat of operations is not only faster and less elaborate but also more realistic. Certain safeguards, however, are necessary.

177. Existing delegation is hard to ascertain because it has to be traced through a series of General Orders dealing with various subjects ad hoc. While it is appropriate to indicate the degree of delegation under each subject in this way, all these scattered definitions should, in addition, be consolidated in a single Code of Delegated Authority for ready reference.

178. The Code should lay down different levels of delegation as one of the safeguards. Powers at level A would be exercisable only by Permanent Secretaries, at level B by either the Permanent Secretary or other specified officers, and at level C by either the B group or by district controlling officers of sufficient grading.

179. Officers below Permanent Secretary who are empowered under the Code should enter in a personal register the briefest of details, enough for identification, of the cases they deal with. The registers should be scanned periodically by the Permanent Secretary or a P.A.S. and be open at all times to inspection by the Public Service Commission or the Public Service Ministry.

180. If undue influence intrudes in any instance where the Code allows the decision to be taken within the Department, the Permanent Secretary should have the right to elect whether to make the decision himself or to have it made by a panel of three Permanent Secretaries (including himself) or to refer the case to the Commission or Public Service Ministry, as appropriate, for decision.

181. Any officer aggrieved by a decision under delegated authority should be permitted to request that it be reviewed by the controlling authority which granted the delegation. This, of course, is an inherent right but should be regarded as the proper method of seeking redress. In effect it becomes "an appeal to Caesar."

182. Among the matters to be delegated to Ministries the following should be included:

Allowances: Bicycle, duty, local, field, station, hard-lying, accommodation.

Appointments: Open-Vote temporary appointments, acting appointments (except to P.A.S.), substantive appointments below A Scales - the last two to be exercised with the advice of a Ministry Committee.

Discipline: Suspension or interdiction, disciplinary decisions in all cases other than major offences above Scale A.1.

Leave: All annual leave, and vacation leave spent inside or outside Guyana.

Increments: All scale increments, postponement of increments for cause, application of efficiency bars, acceleration of increments within prescribed rules.

Stores: Write-offs up to \$500 except losses by fraud or negligence, without Treasury consent.

Unpaid Accounts: Payment of claims outstanding at 31 December, without Accountant General's consent.

These suggestions are illustrative, not exhaustive.

183. A precedent for a comprehensive Code of Delegation of personnel matters is being left behind for further reference.

184. Pending establishment of the Ministry of the Public Service, the Code of Delegation should be issued by the existing controlling authorities, viz; Public Service Commission, Treasury (Establishments), and Accountant General.

RECOMMENDATION 53

THAT a Code of Delegation be compiled as follows and issued urgently:

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
Cabinet	Ministers
	Permanent Secretaries
	Others

<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
Public Service Commission	Members (PSC) Permanent Secretaries Others
Public Service Ministry	Own staff Permanent Secretaries Others

sections of the Code to be released progressively when ready.

RECOMMENDATION 54

THAT each Permanent Secretary issue a Memorandum of Delegation of both the Ministry's functions and personnel administration to successive levels of staff.

J. Discipline

185. Public Service offences and penalties are not prescribed by law. Consequently the allegation of an offence has to be referred to a Law Officer to see if there is a prima facie case. The offender is then asked to answer the charge. His answer is referred to the Commission by the Permanent Secretary with comments. The P.S.C. Secretariat decides upon a committee to hear the case, working on the principle of "trial by peers" except that a legal chairman is chosen if the offender's salary exceeds \$2880. The Commission itself authorises the committee to proceed, and the Secretary issues the necessary instructions to the committee and the offender. The committee hears the charge (the offender being represented by counsel if he so desires) and reports its verdict, not penalty, to the P.S.C. Secretary. He refers it to the Commission with suggested alternatives. The Commission then decides what penalty should be imposed and the decision is conveyed by the Secretary through the Permanent Secretary.

186. The procedure does not vary in relation to the gravity of the offence but in relation to salary, and is said to take, on the average, about nine months. By common consent it is too cumbersome and protracted, and is ripe for reform. The Permanent Secretary may deal with the matter if the salary of the offender is less than \$2784, but he must be advised by a Departmental Committee.

187. Several changes for the better can be suggested.

188. First, offences could be defined by law as in the criminal code, so that everyone would know what acts or omissions are forbidden. No charge would be laid except in the wording of a prescribed offence, namely one of the following:

- (a) failure to comply with a Public Service Act, regulation or instruction;
- (b) disobedience, default or insubordination;
- (c) negligence, indolence, incompetence;
- (d) behaviour causing distress or adverse performance;
- (e) using intoxicating liquors or drugs to excess;
- (f) improper use of property or stores;

- (g) disclosure or use of information;
- (h) absence or habitual irregularity;
- (i) any improper conduct.

(Obviously these tabloid "definitions" would have to be expanded.)

189. Secondly, a distinction could be made between "major" and "minor" offences, at the discretion of the Permanent Secretary. The principle of distinguishing cases on the basis of salary is probably unsound in jurisprudence. All but a few offences would be "minor" and suitable to be dealt with summarily by the Permanent Secretary or lower delegate close to the time and scene of the occurrence.

190. Thirdly, the Public Service law could prescribe the following penalties:

- (a) caution and reprimand;
- (b) a fine not exceeding \$X, deductible from salary;
- (c) transfer to other duties;
- (d) reduction in salary;
- (e) dismissal.

(Again, the prescription of penalties should be precise.)

No other penalty would be permissible.

191. Fourthly, the offender could be allowed a right of appeal to the Commission from the decision of a Permanent Secretary or other delegate.

192. In any event, the Permanent Secretary should send a copy of the charge and the offender's answer to the Commission, with advice of the decision, at the end of the proceedings. The Commission should keep a register of all cases.

193. In dealing with "major" offences, the Commission should instruct the Permanent Secretary what charge to lay and what committee to use (if guilt is denied); and not see the papers again until the Permanent Secretary reports the verdict for Commission attention.

RECOMMENDATION 55

THAT special attention be paid in the proposed Public Service Act and Code of Delegation to defining offences and penalties and to decentralising the exercise of disciplinary powers.

K. Personnel Policies

194. Ailing administration is often traceable to outdated policy. If policy is no longer relevant to the times it cannot give satisfaction however it is administered. This seems to be the case in Guyana. Personnel policies which originated in the special conditions of the old order should be reviewed to see if they are still validly ministering to the new order. Those briefly examined in the following paragraphs fail this test and should be revised. As they are a random sample, probably some of the others are obsolete too.

195. "Personnel", not "Establishments"

In the course of the proposed re-organisation the abolition of the word

"Establishments" as a divisional title and the substitution of "Personnel" would have a symbolic and tonic effect. The subjects actually dealt with by "Establishments" range far wider than the true meaning of the word, and all of them, including "establishment" itself in its strict sense, fall within the modern connotation of "Personnel" as a managerial function. Throughout this report, unless the context suggests otherwise, "personnel administration" is used comprehensively to include "establishments".

196. Decentralisation

Decentralisation of personnel work is another desirable change of policy. Decisions will be made promptly if there is devolution of authority to fifteen Ministries but dilatorily if reserved to one central authority. In the nature of things decisions taken at the seat of operations are also more likely to be sound. By delegating, the Commission would not abrogate its responsibilities but merely discharge them by remote control. And it would, of course, retain direct control of appointments above a given level.

197. Undue Regard For "Posts"

Tradition has perhaps settled into a greater respect for inanimate "posts" than for the vital purpose they serve and for the imperative need to fill them quickly. Personnel administration should be concerned with people rather than posts, and less preoccupied with satisfying the rules than with contributing to the achievement of national objectives. Government should be assisted to carry out its election manifesto by relevant personnel policies; otherwise Parkinson's latest law of "denial by delay" comes into operation. The paramount change in personnel policy demanded by the entirely new situation of 26 May 1966 is a corresponding attitude of mind in the personnel agencies and in all State employees. Rules must be regarded as simply an orderly way of attaining ends rather than as ends in themselves, which means they must be flexible, not rigid, and at times bent if not broken. More flexible procedures will be suggested in Part II (METHODS).

198. Lists of Duties

Little point is seen in debating the job specification with the Permanent Secretary, sometimes for several months, to try and mould it to the Commission's (or Treasury's) ideas before advertising. It does not alter the grading or the field of applicants; it merely delays the appointment and prevents the Department from getting on with the job. Unless it is obviously incorrect, the Permanent Secretary's statement of the job content should be accepted, even if he adds or subtracts some of the previous duties of the post.

199. Entrance Qualifications

A more pliant policy is needed in regard to prerequisites for entry. Suitable candidates ought not to be rejected by insisting on a literal interpretation of the entry requirements when their qualifications are actually as good if not better. The problem of determining equivalence is admittedly difficult but too much importance should not be attached to it, bearing in mind that such assessments are not an exact science but a matter of opinion and differ greatly from one country to another. The P.S.C. could be advised on these cases by a committee consisting of one Commissioner, the Chief Education Officer and the Permanent Secretary concerned.

200. Age Limits

The age limit of 23 seems anachronistic. Indeed it is doubtful whether any age restriction at all is relevant today, except perhaps an upper limit of 45 to

allow the candidate time to qualify for minimum pension. Up to 45, a new entrant could be started on a salary step (not exceeding the top step of his scale) based on his educational qualifications and his years of relevant experience. Many good mature people could be recruited on this basis and, hopefully, set an example in attitude and industry to those younger people whose outlook may call for correction.

201. Promotion Criteria

The criteria for promotion should be reviewed and defined by law. The principle of promotion on merit is said to need strengthening, as against promotion by seniority. Whether this is true is a question that cannot be answered off-hand but is deserving of proper study.

202. Promotion Posts

By agreement with the Civil Service Association certain posts are regarded as "Promotion Posts", meaning that they are reserved for staff in those particular occupations, e.g. clerks Class I, auditors, information officers, technical assistants, firemen and literally a hundred others. These posts are filled from suitably qualified candidates in the grades immediately below, but if there are no such candidates the posts are advertised in the normal way. Candidates for "promotion" vacancies are not interviewed. They are simply promoted on seniority as there is no change of duties. Promotion of clerks from Class II to Class I is a case in point. Two comments are relevant. If promotion is automatic (as it is when seniority is the criterion), why not coalesce the two grades into one? On the other hand, if two grades are retained they would serve a better purpose if used as screening points at which to select the best, not the senior, candidates for prior advancement. In other words, such promotions, by rewarding merit, could become one of the most effective items in a system of incentives and sanctions.

203. Lateral Recruitment

The points of entry into the Clerical Service are as follows:

Education	Age Limit	Class	Salary Scale
GCE - 5 O Levels	23	Class 2 Clerk	A32 minimum
GCE - 3 A Levels	23	" " "	A32 minimum + 2 increments
Univ. degree (ord.)	25	" " "	A32 minimum + 6 increments
Univ. degree (Hons.)	27	Senior Clerk	A19 minimum

Thus lateral entry is permissible within strict limits. If these limitations were relaxed in two ways the door would be open to other recruits who could be expected to become good public servants. First the age limits could be abolished as already suggested; then candidates could be credited, for purposes of starting salary, with their years of relevant experience in previous employment. If a man with GCE (3A Levels) had five years comparable experience as a clerk elsewhere he would be given credit for it and appointed at a starting salary of A 32 minimum plus 2 plus 5 increments, and not turned away because he is over 23.

204. Contract Employment

Progress under the Government's Development Programme is impeded by a dearth of professional and technical officers. The "brain drain" affects Guyana as it does all other nations save one. The problem of enticing Guyanese doctors, engineers, architects, economists, etc. back home may be eased by devising a system of contract

appointments for terms of 2 to 7 years, with terminal gratuities as an inducement. The concept of a Public Service as solely a career service is outmoded. Many people today have no desire to make a career in Government service but would willingly accept contract employment for a few years if only to gain experience. Consequently two types of enlistment are called for.

205. **Acting Appointments**

The practice of making acting appointments could be loosened considerably. Many complaints are heard about it. The process of selection for acting appointments absorbs too much valuable time that would be better devoted to making substantive appointments. The need for acting appointments stems from the long leave entitlement and it confers "acting" pay that is naturally prized. The attention bestowed on it is understood to be aimed at finding the officer, in whatever Department he may be, to whom the extra pay should be allotted. In fact, however, only the posts of Permanent Secretaries, Principal Assistant Secretaries and Chief Accountants are said to be supplied from another Department; all other posts are filled pro tem from within the Department concerned. Permanent Secretaries should therefore be allowed to make these acting appointments themselves, especially as the "acting" tenure carries no right to the substantive appointment. If the long-leave privilege is to be retained it should be on the understanding that its unfortunate side effect (inefficiency through the "acting appointment" procedure) cannot be permitted to continue.

206. **Impending Vacancies**

The occasional practice of advertising "impending" vacancies should become the general rule. When notice of a retirement or resignation is received, weeks or months before it takes effect, the impending vacancy should be advertised immediately so that an appointment can be made before the post is vacated.

207. **Interviews: Exclusion of Permanent Secretaries**

The policy of excluding Permanent Secretaries from Commission interviews is not conducive to making the best selection. In virtually every case the Permanent Secretary should be present or represented by a senior officer, especially for professional or technical appointments. Indeed the interviews should be conducted by the Ministry representative more than by the Commission, to direct the questions more closely to the duties of the post. After the interviews the Ministry representative should remain for discussion with the Commission and then withdraw to allow the Commission to reach a decision in private. The present practice is slightly unreal.

208. **Interviews: Decentralisation**

The preceding paragraph relates, of course, to cases where the interviews must, for good reason, be taken by the Commission itself. These cases should, however, be in the minority. In most cases candidates on the short-list (to be drawn up by the Permanent Secretary instead of by the Commission) should be interviewed by a Committee within the Ministry including the Permanent Secretary, if necessary, and the chief Technical Officer, if appropriate. The Permanent Secretary should then make the appointment himself if within his delegated authority; otherwise submit his report and recommendation to the Commission. The Commission should only re-interview in exceptional cases, and then preferably in the presence of the Permanent Secretary.

209. **Incentives and Sanctions**

The tendency is strong in most Public Services to treat everyone alike.

Sometimes it is overstrong. The intention is to do justice to all, but the ends of justice can only be served by distinguishing between cases (as in fact is done in the Law Courts everyday). Although some distinctions are made in Guyana - in confidential reports and in promotion by merit - they are not a pronounced feature of personnel policy. Greater selectivity would benefit the Service as a whole. The merit principle, already applied to promotions, should also apply to other terms and conditions of service. Incentives would include double increments, gradings "personal to officer", rewards for suggestions, special duties allowances, etc. Sanctions would include a withholding of increments, enforcement of efficiency bars (at present almost a dead letter). The situation calls for treatment on merit just as much as promotion on merit. To prevent the incentive purpose from being neutralised by weakly granting the benefits to everybody without distinction, and to contain the cost, the number rewarded should be restricted to a proportion of their group, say 10 per cent. A 10 per cent quota would probably cover the outstanding people worthy of merit recognition. (In France extra increments may be granted to the best officers to the extent that they are withheld from others. In Yugo-Slavia 10 per cent of the total payroll is reserved for distribution at the end of the year to all public servants on a merit scale).

210. Retirement and Recruitment

The retirement rules allow a public servant on "fixed" establishment to retire on pension optionally at 50 or compulsorily at 55. A section of public opinion holds that these age qualifications should be raised to 55 and 60 as the country is unnecessarily losing five years of valuable experience. Closer study would be required before a correct judgment could be formed on this subject. Obviously the State would retain a man's experience five years longer and pay out his pension five years less, but might lose in other ways. Would the man's executive drive be sustained till 60, or even 55, in the climate of Guyana? If not, he would be better to yield to a younger man still in his prime. The development programme calls for dynamic leadership which cannot be provided if a man is past his peak. Furthermore a career service means a promotion service and the men coming up lose morale if their promotion prospects are postponed, perhaps lost. A falling off of efficiency and some loss of staff at those levels is likely to occur and recruitment at the bottom may shrink too. Finally, all present public servants have a "contract of service" entitling them to the benefits of the rules under which they joined the Service. All these factors have to be weighed against the supposed advantage, often illusory, of retaining older men. If on balance, after careful study, the retirement age is to be raised it should be done only by degrees, say by one year every three years, and on a compensation or inducement formula.

211. Recruitment, of course, is closely linked with the rate of loss from retirements and other causes. Just now the signs are bright for the future of the Service and retirement policy should not be de-liberalised in haste or this future might be jeopardised.

212. So far this year recruitment of basic grade clerical staff has exceeded requirements as shown in the following table:

	Class II Clerks (A32)	Clerical Assistants (A34)
Provided in 1966 Estimates	469	380
Appointed Class II Clerks	322	
Appointed Clerical Assts.		223
Appointed Temporary Cl.II Clerks pending confirmation	155	
Appointed Temporary Cler. Assts. pending confirmation		129
Employed temporarily as Clerks pending interview	78	
Employed temporarily as Cler. Assts. pending interview		33
Total recruited	555	385
Excess recruits (employed against vacancies in higher grades)	86	5

With such an ample intake of qualified recruits at the bottom and the prospect of steady graduate recruitment from the University of Guyana, stability and steady advancement in the Service seem assured. It may well be that the present retirement policy is the best in these circumstances.

213. Employment of Women

The women's group in the Public Service tendered evidence of discrimination against them. Several criticisms can be made against continued discrimination between the sexes: it is a breach of the Constitution, a breach of promise (1957) and an outmoded attitude. The corrective measures suggested in writing by the women's representatives are commended for most favourable consideration. Their main complaint - that they are classified as "Clerical Assistants" with lower than the Class 2 Clerks' maximum for men, and therefore unable to compete for promotion to Class I Clerk' - would be overcome by amalgamating the Class 2 and Class I scales with an efficiency bar. This would legitimate what is the de facto practice with men and extend it to women.

214. These are but examples of the scope and need for change in personnel policy. The entire field should be reviewed with the object of redefining policy before producing an up-to-date edition of the Public Service Handbook of General Orders.

RECOMMENDATION 56

THAT personnel policies, particularly those mentioned in paragraphs 195 to 213 and itemised hereunder be reviewed and changed if they are outmoded or impede the national effort.

"Personnel", not "Establishments"
Decentralisation
Undue Regard For "Posts"
Lists of Duties
Entrance Qualifications
Age Limits
Promotion Criteria
Promotion Posts
Lateral Recruitment
Contract Employment
Acting Appointments
Impending Vacancies
Interviews: Exclusion of Permanent Secretaries
Interviews: Decentralisation
Incentives and Sanctions
Retirement and Recruitment
Employment of Women

RECOMMENDATION 57

THAT a 1-year moratorium extendable to 2-years be declared on the policy of requiring all vacant posts to be re-justified and the duties to be redefined before the posts are advertised and filled.

RECOMMENDATION 58

THAT, during the moratorium the continued need for the posts and the correctness of the duties be accepted on the ipse dixit of the Permanent Secretary.

L. Salary Structure

215 The Public Service contains five readily distinguishable groups, viz.,

- (a) Clerical Service: including accounting posts and ascending to Administrative posts;
- (b) Professional: all the recognised professions, separately;
- (c) Technical: all the numerous sub-professional occupations or techniques, separately.
- (d) Steno-typing and Typing: including Secretaries
- (e) Messengersial, etc. messengers and kindred posts above.

The first, fourth and fifth groups represent separate streams of promotion. The Professional and Technical groups are not promotion streams in the same sense as they comprise unrelated skills that are not interchangeable.

216. The entire service can also be divided another way into two categories

called Fixed Posts and Unfixed Posts. Fixed Posts are full-time permanent posts on scales with a salary maximum over \$1877. These are all pensionable and subject to standard recruitment procedures. Unfixed posts are all others except those paid out of Open Votes. They are permanent but normally attract gratuity, not pension unless service therein exceeds 20 years.

217. Posts are also referred to as either Classified or Unclassified which is not exactly synonymous with Fixed or Unfixed. Among the Unfixed posts are quite a number of people whose qualifications do not meet the standard for entry to the Classified Service, so they are taken on (and often employed indefinitely) as Unclassified.

218. The Public Service is thus made up of "posts" or, to use the constitutional description, "offices". Each post is allotted a parcel of duties held to require a certain level of skill for their performance, and the post is "graded" i.e. fitted into a pay scale with other posts held to involve an equivalent level of skill. The pay does not vary with the calibre of the person who occupies the post. These two factors, posts requiring similar levels of competence to carry similar pay, and posts to carry pay independent of any special competence in the holder, are bases of the system, well understood and highly valued by the staff. The task of fitting posts into the salary structure is carried out by the periodic Pay Commission or Pay Review bodies and, between times, by the Establishment Division of the Ministry of Finance.

219. The pay rates or scales into which posts are fitted include 26 fixed 'F' rates, 39 'A' scales, 17 'B' scales and 14 'C' scales. This high degree of elaboration has been increased by the creation of new scales since the last Pay Commission. In some cases the difference between scales is merely that one scale is an increment longer (scales A1, A2 and A6, A7), and in the current Estimates two scales (A2, A3) are identical.

220. Any pay structure, to work well, must earn acceptance by the workers for its patent fairness. Scales that are refined beyond the accuracy attainable in grading the duties of the posts tend to offend this principle. There is a continual stream of applications from Ministries and Departments to regrade posts upward (no downward regrading apparently ever occurs) and the Establishment Division tries to deal with these on a basis that will seem to the staff to be rational. Because this is scarcely possible, the result is a steady stream of upgradings, each with its own snowballing effect, each decided ad hoc on an individual review and each contributory to a steady upward drift in Public Service costs.

221. Earlier recommendations for strengthening the machinery for dealing with such matters include inspection of, and interchange with, Ministries to ensure a better knowledge of working conditions; but that is not likely to be enough, and a more radical cure must be considered. The existing scales should be reorganised in a deliberate effort to simplify the structure of the Service by reducing the excessive multiplicity of grades. Since this will involve the salaries of incumbent public servants the implementation of such changes may have to await a general salary revision, but there is no reason why the structural investigation should not go ahead in anticipation of such a revision. The recommendation carries the corollary, in day-to-day administration, that the present elaboration should be reduced at every opportunity, certainly never increased.

222. The Guyanese structure leaves no doubt it is intended for a "career" Service. A promotion ladder, designed to satisfy legitimate aspirations to

advancement, exists in many areas. A promotion ladder may, however, be difficult to provide where groups are small or not hierarchically organised. Such cases, other than those on fixed pay, may be met by providing extended incremental scales, restricting the lengthened scales to posts for which genuine scale-to-scale promotion is not available. A scrutiny of the existing allotment of posts to scales does not disclose any such guiding practice. This too is a matter to which the recommended review should devote attention. One of the common objections to lengthy incremental scales is that, by providing automatic salary advancement over a long period, they are basically disincentive. This objection can be met by inserting one or more efficiency bars on a consistent pattern and particularly by making them effective.

223. A satisfactory pay system must take into account the educational system and the labour position. Hitherto recruitment for the clerical-administrative stream has been mainly at one level (Class II Clerks) and almost all senior members of the Guyanese generalist Public Service have risen to their present positions from the bottom. The development of a University in Georgetown, in addition to the generously provided facilities for attending universities overseas, means that graduates in increasing numbers will become available in the next few years. There is advantage to be gained from direct recruitment of graduates, and the new Ministry should consider allotting a quota of Administrative Assistant vacancies for direct intake, leaving the balance for promotion. A quota system is desirable as in practice seeking to determine "merit" between a graduate with higher education but no work experience and a promotee without higher education but much work experience is a somewhat unrealistic exercise.

224. "Classified" and "Unclassified" staff have been mentioned. Unclassified staff were recruited to posts originally regarded as temporary, without the educational qualifications exacted for permanent posts. Many of the posts have acquired a semi-permanent status but their holders cannot be made permanent because of their original educational inadequacy. It is undesirable to have a "permanent-temporary" underprivileged group, and regulations should be made for the Service and not the Service for regulations. Possession of a prescribed educational qualification is held to be evidence of a desired degree of competence, but it is not the only possible evidence. Competence may also be acquired by experience on the job. In any structural revision some relaxation of educational qualifications and age limits should be considered in favour of those who can claim that a period of satisfactory service gives proof of an equivalent competence.

225. Structural review should lead to the preparation of "Schemes of Service" for the recognisable streams mentioned earlier. These should indicate for each stream the admission requirements, the promotion avenues and the sources of promotees. Such schemes, not only make career possibilities known to members of the stream but by specifying, for example, the areas from which promotees can be drawn might shorten the duration of selection and promotion procedures in the Public Service Commission. The rudiments of such a system exist in the "Promotion Posts" of the P.S.C. It is not intended, however, that there should be mutually exclusive promotion streams. On the contrary, the philosophy is that every private carried the field marshal's baton in his knapsack. The idea is simply to indicate, for information, the normal, not exceptional, lines of promotion for each stream.

RECOMMENDATION 59

THAT the new PERSONNEL DIVISION review and simplify the multiplicity of salary scales.

M. Industrial Relations

226. Any disabilities of the Guyana Public Service appear to be more psychological than organisational, and due to traumatic experiences that are now history. Concentration on improving organisation and methods, though it cannot help but do a lot of good, is by no means enough on its own to restore the Service to full health and vigour. A good deal of attention must also be paid to the even more important task of reviving a corporate and individual spirit of confidence and public service.

227. Apart from any steps that might be taken at Ministerial level to inspire and galvanise the Public Service, a positive programme should be developed by the central personnel authorities, mainly by the new Ministry of the Public Service supported by the Public Service Commission and the unions.

228. The Civil Service Association and the Federation of Unions of Government Employees advocate the appointment of Industrial Relations Officers. This is a commendable idea but can be introduced without creating additional posts of this kind. Industrial relations, human relations, staff welfare, joint consultation, etc. are now recognised as parts of the normal personnel function of management; so the proper course is to re-orient the thinking of all Personnel Officers and other engaged in controlling personnel. These are the people who already are supposed to be the industrial officers of the Service. They should be activated accordingly by retraining through short courses, instructional literature, seminars, and periodical returns by them of their efforts in this area.

229. In formulating personnel policy the controlling authorities should consider the angle of human relations as well as institutional requirements. This does not mean pandering to employees in a soft manner: indeed it could mean applying a little more strictness by raising standards, and by treating the worthy and unworthy on their merits instead of with a dull sameness which is actually inequable. It means making a reality of joint consultation (the present Whitley system is merely a discouraging token) and studying the most effective ways and means of getting new policy and attitudes to be known and accepted. It means taking deliberate steps within Ministries to involve all personnel by communicating to them the Departmental functions, targets and progress (in relation to national aims) at intervals and demonstrating to each one how his work contributes to the grand design. If that sounds a trifle pretentious it is nevertheless the kind of presentation that needs to be made by high level talks, by films, by radio, by illustrated leaflets, by graphs, by conducted tours of field operations, by explanatory sessions with technical officers, and every other way of getting the message across. Admittedly this is not done elsewhere to the extent that it should be; but it is an important direction in which Guyana could show the way.

230. If the Whitley Council system is to be retained - and no reason is seen to denigrate it in principle - it should be operated conscientiously and not left to undergo atrophy through disuse. If experience has proved it to be unworkable it should be wound up and replaced by genuine joint consultation with the employee organisations on an ad hoc basis.

231. The industrial relations duties should be grafted on to the Personnel Officer posts in all Ministries as a point of contact for staff representatives and negotiators. The Personnel Division of the new Ministry of the Public Service should handle industrial relations for the Service as a whole and stimulate and control this activity in the other Ministries.

RECOMMENDATION 60

THAT in the interests of better industrial relations the processes of joint consultation be reviewed and changed to more practicable forms if not working satisfactorily in their present (Whitley Council) form.

RECOMMENDATION 61

THAT a constructive policy of staff relations in general be developed on modern lines to minimise frustration and enhance the spirit of public service.

II. METHODS

232. It is an occupational hazard for public servants to be taxed with chronic delay, attributed to a bureaucratic addiction to "red tape". In Guyana this criticism is very pronounced. The treatment, paradoxically, should be a little more of the same so-called "red tape" on the principle of homeopathy. When analysed, the undue delays are seen to be due not to too much system but to too little. The full potential of the well educated people in the Public Service is not being realised because their efforts tend to be dissipated for lack of an orderly methodology.

233. A problem arises as to what matters should be taken up in this discussion of Methods as some items, such as the documentation of organisation (charts, instructions, etc.), could be, and in fact have been, just as well linked with Organisation in Part I. However, these borderline items are included here, at the cost of mild repetition, for the sake of cohesion and completeness.

234. Different Departments have different ways of handling similar matters, some better than others. If the best of these methods could be standardised throughout the Service the flow of work would be improved and staff on transfer from other Departments would adapt themselves more readily. This is a matter for the Management Services Division.

RECOMMENDATION 62

THAT common procedures be standardised throughout the Public Service by the Management Service Division.

235. Foremost among the definitive requirements is some Public Service legislation as explained earlier. The Constitution establishes the Public Service Commission and confers its powers. Outside the limited jurisdiction of the P.S.C. there is the full range of personnel administration which would be the province of

the proposed Ministry of the Public Service. The new Ministry itself would be best constituted by a Public Service Act on the lines already mentioned. The Act would lay down fundamental principles for the development of a career service on a basis of efficiency and economy.

236. Subordinate legislation would follow in the form of Public Service Regulations setting out the more important administrative requirements for complying with the Act itself.

RECOMMENDATION 63

THAT the Public Service Act be followed by subordinate Regulations on administrative procedure and requirements.

237. Once the Public Service legislation is created, a complete revision of the General Orders should be undertaken jointly by the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Ministry. "Public Service Manual" might be a more appropriate name in the altered circumstances, especially if it covers both Commission and Ministry requirements. But if it is thought necessary for each of the two authorities to publish its own directives the title "Public Service Manual" could be used by the Ministry and General Orders retained by the Commission. (One of the directives in both manuals would require up-to-date annotation of distributed copies). The Financial Regulations, Stores Regulations and Tender Boards Regulations should also be revised and re-issued.

RECOMMENDATION 64

THAT personnel policies and practices be published in a Public Service Manual to be issued jointly or severally by the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 65

THAT the Financial Regulations, Stores Regulations, and Tender Boards Regulations also be revised.

238. Each Ministry should also produce a manual of its own, describing its functions, how it is organised, what policies apply, what procedures are to be followed and what are the lines and levels of authority. In some Ministries an all-embracing compendium would probably be too big and too costly to issue to everybody if most of the staff were concerned with only a small part of it. In those cases, a series of sectional manuals would be more relevant and economical.

RECOMMENDATION 66

THAT all Ministries write or rewrite Departmental Manuals or Handbooks explaining the policy and procedure for administering their functions.

239. The imperative need of a formal Code of Delegation has been stressed in Part I, or rather the need for two separate Codes. One of them would codify the

delegation of financial authority from Cabinet to Ministries and Permanent Secretaries; the other would formalise and enlarge considerably the delegation of personnel administration from the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Ministry (jointly) to Permanent Secretaries and below.

240. Permanent Secretaries, in turn, would find it advantageous to compose a Memorandum of Delegation down the line. Evidence has come from several sources that Permanent Secretaries are not receiving the support they are entitled to expect and that a reluctance to take responsibility is all too prevalent. This may be because it is less troublesome to "pass the buck" if the Permanent Secretary will accept it, or simply because the staff do not appreciate what discretion they are expected to exercise. In either case, formal delegation along with explanatory guidance would put the matter beyond doubt. The Permanent Secretary should, of course, insist that decisions be made at the level of delegated authority except for good reason. Since people usually rise to the occasion, no decline in quality of work need be apprehended as a result of delegation. On the contrary the standard is more likely to improve, especially in promptitude.

241. Registers to record decisions made under delegation would be a desirable adjunct. Not only would they give the Permanent Secretary a necessary form of control but also provide the delegates with a ready reference to precedents.

RECOMMENDATION 67

THAT delegation in terms of Recommendations 53 and 54 be subject to reasonable controls and safeguards.

242. Unless there is some policy objection, every Ministry should be obliged by law to submit annual reports through its Minister to Parliament, to give public account of its stewardship in the interests of good administration. Presumably no such obligation can be imposed on the Public Service Commission but voluntary compliance by the Commission would add much value to the system.

RECOMMENDATION 68

THAT every Ministry be required by law to make an Annual Report to its Minister for presentation to Parliament, and the Public Service Commission be invited to produce one also.

243. The Public Service Ministry should produce an Annual Public Service Staff List as a valuable tool in day-to-day personnel administration and as an historic record of the Service. All staff should be included in their Departments, occupations and grades. The mechanics of production could be farmed out among all Ministries. Using the same type-face they would each supply the copy for the composite list to be printed by photolitho process.

RECOMMENDATION 69

THAT an Annual Staff List be printed.

244. The problem of overlap and confusion between the functions of the P.S.C. Secretariat and Treasury (Establishment) would be solved by transferring both sets

of functions to the new Public Service Ministry and sorting them out there. In the meantime there is not much point in trying to draw a clear line of demarcation between the two existing agencies.

245. Contributory causes of delay are inadequate supervision and control. Senior people including harassed Permanent Secretaries despair of getting acceptable work from their subordinates and find it easier to do the job themselves, much as they would like to concentrate on management and training. But, hard as it may be, they should make renewed efforts to delegate and train because a chief whose personal contribution is merely to coax a 75 percent effort from his staff gets many more work units out of them than one who lets them run down to 50 per cent while he does much too much himself. Some helpful techniques can, in fact, be recalled to mind.

246. Dilatoriness begins with the arrival of mail in the office. It is sorted into folders, perused by the Permanent Secretary, sent to the Registry for attaching to the files, then delivered to the action section. That should happen the same morning or afternoon but may take a few days. Thereafter it passes somewhat leisurely from desk to desk with nobody tracking it along or feeling responsible for it. Each man is clear of the matter as soon as he minutes the file to someone else. Understandably minuting is the practice, to excess. Several innovations are suggested to expedite the handling of business.

247. A Correspondence Schedule should be introduced for each section leader. All letters and telegrams for his section should be entered on the Schedule immediately they are received. As action on each letter is completed it is marked off the Schedule with initials and date. As far as possible correspondence should be cleared within a week, i.e. Monday - Saturday, Tuesday - Monday, etc. Correspondence not cleared in that period should be struck off and transferred to a Delayed Correspondence Schedule. Delays in excess of a fortnight should be brought to the notice of the supervisor. Section leaders would control and expedite clearance of correspondence by daily reference to the Schedules.

RECOMMENDATION 70

THAT a system of scheduling inward correspondence, etc. be introduced to expedite attention to the subject matter.

248. This system depends on someone in particular being named as "Action Officer" on each letter and thereby becoming responsible to see that it is fully and finally dealt with. He becomes, as it were, the "owner" of the file, not a part owner with a negligible interest. Avoidance of delay is his personal responsibility.

RECOMMENDATION 71

THAT an "Action Officer" be named to carry personal responsibility for completion of each transaction.

249. Perhaps the Action Officer is not sure what is the correct action to take on a letter. An Action Sheet or Procedure Sheet will tell him. An Action Sheet is a "check list" of the routine steps to be taken, by whom and in what sequence, for a particular type of transaction. Printed or cyclostyled stocks of these

sheets are kept in the unit and one of them is attached on top of the individual case file until all action on that case has been completed, initialled and dated. It serves as a transit guide in cases where the routine lends itself to this treatment.

RECOMMENDATION 72

THAT Action Sheets be used to expedite business by indicating the sequence of action.

250. Minuting files should cease if it merely gets rid of them or contributes nothing to the solution of the problem. If the Action Officer has a question to ask he should ask it in person and act on the answer; if he needs some further information he should phone for it or go and get it. Section leaders and supervisors should, by example and injunction, discourage needless minuting. Any officer in the line who refers a matter to higher authority should be required to state what course he recommends.

RECOMMENDATION 73

THAT no minuting be countenanced unless it contributes to the necessary elucidation or the solution of a problem.

RECOMMENDATION 74

THAT officers referring matters for decision should state what course they recommend.

251. Every Department should have an effective Follow-up system. Indeed such a system should be standardised throughout the Service. At present, if a letter or file is referred out of the possession of the "owner" (the Action Officer) it is likely to be lost sight of, and forgotten. In short-term cases, the Correspondence Schedule will be adequate as a follow-up device. In longer term cases a "Bring Up" slip or desk diary should be used in addition. Bring-up slips themselves should be entered on the Correspondence Schedule on the day they come up, otherwise they too may vanish without trace.

RECOMMENDATION 75

THAT effective follow-up systems be standardised for use by all Departments.

252. The Desk File is another aid to efficiency. It is a file, kept at the desk of each officer, which sets out his duties and the action involved in each duty - rather like a collection of Action Sheets. A newcomer to the desk can quickly settle in and perform the duties because the steps are recorded for him in telegraphic form in the Desk File.

RECOMMENDATION 76

THAT a Desk File of duties and actions be prepared for ready reference at each post.

253. Some criterion by which to judge whether the quantum of production is reasonable would be helpful to supervisors in managing their staffs, and to officers concerned with fixing complements. The usual technique is to work out by calculation from experience or by work study a set of "output standards" or "norms". This is not a pressing need, least of all in small units, but is nevertheless a refinement that serves a useful purpose. Some Public Services have incentive payment schemes for certain repetitive work and use the "norm" as the zero line in the scale of bonus rates.

RECOMMENDATION 77

THAT output standards or norms be compiled as yardsticks.

254. The Public Service Ministry, on taking over the O & M unit, should expand it, put the members through a proper course of training, and set them a constructive programme of assignments, preferably of service-wide application. Registry systems are a good example. Departmental systems are far from uniform and others vary a lot in their efficiency. The best system should be identified and standardised. It may be a synthesis of best elements from several Departments. O & M can tackle this kind of exercise and produce a Public Service Handbook on Records Management. Other studies and other handbooks would follow in due course and the Public Service Ministry would thus exert its influence in raising the general standard of Departments to the level of the best.

RECOMMENDATION 78

THAT the O and M Section be expanded and assigned a constructive programme of service-wide work studies and similar tasks.

255. The O & M experts are not the only potential source of ideas for improvement of methods. The staff on the job often have ideas too, and are certainly more numerous. But staff in general are inclined to disbelieve that their ideas are really welcome, so they refrain from offering them. If this scepticism is dispelled a flow of new thinking on work methods can be stimulated. This would be a good thing not only for the value of the ideas themselves but also for the sense of participation engendered in staff at the operational level. The desire to participate can be satisfied by introducing a well-conceived Suggestions Scheme. It is not enough to issue a bald notice that suggestions are invited. A formal Scheme should be devised in consultation with the staff organisations, inaugurated with convincing publicity and promoted assiduously thereafter. An effective Scheme can be based on a few simple principles, viz:

- (a) it will be centrally administered (by the Public Service Ministry);
- (b) all suggestions will be promptly transmitted to the central point;
- (c) they will be registered and numbered there;
- (d) they will be acknowledged immediately;
- (e) they will then be evaluated by the right experts;
- (f) on the basis of the evaluation the central agency will adjudicate on them and, if adopted, make an award ranging from commendation to a cash payment.

An overseas scheme of this nature had the effect of increasing the number of suggestions from 6 the year before to 5767 in the sixth year after, and corresponding awards from nil to G \$12,500.

RECOMMENDATION 79

THAT a convincing Suggestions Scheme be devised and promoted continuously throughout the Service.

256. To impress staff that the Scheme is genuine, all suggestions can be published concisely in classified groups, (Accepted, Not Accepted, etc.) together with the awards, at quarterly intervals in the Public Service Official Circular mentioned later. If the originator of a suggestion prefers his name not to be published, "Anon" can be substituted.

257. Innovations in one setting are often valid in other settings. To ensure that they are applied wherever relevant throughout the Service it is worthwhile publishing an annual Catalogue of Accepted O & M Ideas And Suggestions.

RECOMMENDATION 80

THAT innovations from accepted ideas in one Department be applied by the Public Service Ministry to other Departments, and be publicised throughout the service to stimulate fresh ideas.

258. It has been said that "that which is not inspected deteriorates", and it is as true of the Public Service as of other industries. In Guyana the Public Service has grown in a few short years from an elementary Colonial administration to a Service of such size and complexity that it can only be supervised by remote control. Delegation, as explained, is imperative; and where there is substantial delegation it must be supervised and controlled by inspection and other methods. The time has therefore arrived for the institution of an inspection system.

259. Both external and internal inspections are envisaged. Departments would be "inspected" by the Public Service Ministry's Inspectors both sectionally in the course of everyday contact and comprehensively in full-dress reviews every year or two. They would also be "inspected" (again for want of a better word) by their own supervisory staff pursuant to an officially prescribed internal check routine. As regards accounting work, the internal check would need to be systematic and regular, and meet with the approval of the Accountant-General and Auditor-General. Within agreed limits these officials might accept internal check in lieu of their own checks, subject to proper certificates. In regard to clerical-cum-administrative work, the internal check would be of a more informal and random kind. The "accounting" check would be in the nature of an audit and the "administration" check more of a supervisor's way of satisfying himself as to the true state of affairs.

260. For full-dress inspections it is useful to have a standard Inspection Check-List so that all the significant aspects of efficiency and economy are examined. The Check-List would have to be drawn up and introduced by the Public Service Ministry.

261. The Public Service Ministry should arrange for all Ministries to allot inspection duties officially to selected personnel so that at least one person in each of them is charged with the responsibility to carry out internal checks or

inspections to the extent laid down. Likewise the Public Service Ministry should decide what full-dress external inspections its own Inspectors are to make each year.

262. In days gone by, inspection reports were notoriously censorious and destructive. Inspection of this sort should be avoided in Guyana. It has no place in the concept of inspection today. On the contrary an inspector should be constructive and instructive, correcting faults and making adjustments on the spot with a minimum of paper work. His reports should be a record of things put right in this way, or still to be put right, rather than a categorical "run down" on every item in the Check-List. Consequently the reports would serve as agendas for requisite action, and as a means of verifying the action later.

263. A copy of every full-dress report, internal or external, should be sent to the Public Service Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 81

THAT both external and internal inspection of personnel and performance (i.e. efficiency audits) be instituted throughout the Public Service on lines to be laid down by the Public Service Ministry.

264. Scope for improvement is usually to be found in the method of preparing reports and replies to correspondence. Drafting by hand is still a favoured method and has the advantage that the draft can be corrected before it is typed. On the other hand it is a slow process, perpetuates "officialese" and does not develop the writer's confidence. Dictation cultivates a more natural free-flowing style. However this is not a subject on which to be too insistent. Suffice it to say that where dictation is the practice, regularity is to be commended. If an officer habitually dictates first thing every morning he will find it much easier to "keep on top" of his work. The typed letters, etc. will come to him before the end of the day for signature and despatch, and a sense of urgency thus develops in him.

265. The value of tape recorders for dictation has not been overlooked but, like the value of mechanisation in general, is not so relevant as in countries where the Public Service is much larger and the unemployment problem less acute.

RECOMMENDATION 82

THAT dictation be encouraged by deliberate means and practised at regular times each day.

266. Incidentally, letters still begin with the abrupt salutation "Sir", continue in the worn out (and untrue) phraseology "I am directed to refer to your letter" and end with the insincere assurance "I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant". This ritualistic style seems out of tune with the world of reality and it would be more appropriate, and establish better rapport, if it were discarded in favour of something more natural and human, such as "Dear Mr. Brown, Thank you for your letter. etc. Yours sincerely,"

RECOMMENDATION 83

THAT a modern friendly style of correspondence be used in place of archaic elegance.

267. Among the miscellany of matters which usually repay critical examination by O & M are transcription, design of forms, and degree of checking. Hours can be spent on transcription where one clerk copies details from an application form to an index card and passes it to another to enter in a register, and to yet another to make out a certificate or grant or receipt. Not only are time and money wasted in the process but also the risk of error is multiplied by the number of times the original is re-copied. Transcription is largely avoidable by designing forms in a no-carbon set that "register" with one another and thus serve all purposes from beginning to end of the transaction. The one writing or typing on the top form penetrates to the other forms in the set and completes the job at one strike. Ingenuity in the design of forms can achieve other economies as well, and should therefore be one of the special tools of the Public Service Ministry in its quest for efficiency.

268. Checking, often but not exclusively associated with transcription, can also be carried to excess. Checking of every single item is not always necessary and costs more than it is worth, for several reasons: the average incidence of errors may be too small to warrant it; machines (even if no more than typewriters using "registering" forms) may perhaps do original and counterpart work, and obviate checking almost entirely. An analysis of items often points the way to a selective system of checking. High value items, usually few, should still be checked individually, medium value items at random, and low value items, usually the majority, could be given the most perfunctory scrutiny if not ignored altogether since errors in that sector may be inconsequential. In any case the overs and unders will tend to cancel each other out. O & M should look for opportunities to apply graded checking of this kind.

RECOMMENDATION 84

THAT transcription, checking and design of forms be listed among the subjects for O and M attention.

269. A few specific procedures that have come under notice are worth mentioning.

270. Apparently rent demands are not issued to tenants of leasehold land and in one district the arrears were twice the annual dues. Tenants call and pay at the office whatever and whenever they can. If each tenancy were recorded on punched cards it would be a simple matter to produce individual rent demands for mailing before due date, together with a tabulation of all cases for control purposes. At present the method of ascertaining what a tenant has paid and how much he still owes is to search laboriously through his file.

RECOMMENDATION 85

THAT rent demands be produced (from punched cards) and issued to all lessees.

271. Most public servants are on a long salary scale of annual increments. But the increments are not paid until affirmatively and individually authorised by the P.S.C. Secretariat or in the lower grades by Departmental Head. Increment certificates (two copies typed separately, not simultaneously by carbon) are prepared in the Department for every officer and sent to the P.S.C. along with the Confidential

Report. Both copies are signed - one to the Department and the other to the Accountant General - as authorities for payment. (As it happens, the authorising officer in the P.S.C. is on Scale A14, well below the grading of even Assistant Secretaries - A2, in the employing Departments.) No cogent reason is known why increment certificates should not be abolished altogether and annual increments paid automatically unless deliberately stopped by the Permanent Secretary in particular cases; in other words why the "exception principle" should not be applied.

RECOMMENDATION 86

THAT salary increments be paid automatically unless specifically stopped in particular cases.

272. Confidential Reports are made on almost every officer every year. The time involved can well be imagined. Moreover reporting systems have anything but a tonic effect on staff morale as they create suspense, apprehension and disappointment. The reports are viewed by the controlling authorities as a necessary evil and by the staff as an unnecessary judgment. The question is whether, on balance, personal reports are really necessary so often. If they were spaced at intervals of 18 months or even two years, would anything of significance be lost? Undoubtedly something would be gained - in time and cost, and in relief from emotional strain on both Permanent Secretaries and their staffs. The frequency of reporting is deserving of reconsideration.

RECOMMENDATION 87

THAT Confidential Reports be made biennially instead of annually.

273. The practice of advertising "impending" vacancies is occasional rather than general. In most cases vacancies are not advertised until they occur, with the inevitable result that they remain vacant for an appreciable time. Arrangements should be made for the advertising of impending vacancies to be the universal procedure. As soon as notice of resignation or retirement is received, the Permanent Secretary should initiate action to advertise the post, thereby reducing the vacancy gap by at least a month.

RECOMMENDATION 88

THAT impending vacancies be advertised immediately they become known.

274. The question of filling "consequential" vacancies at the same time as "prime" vacancies is raised for consideration. In Guyana there would be difficulties but the advantages might outweigh the objections. When a vacancy in Ministry X is advertised there is a fairly strong presumption (how strong is ascertainable from a study of the records) that it will be filled from within the same Ministry. Generally speaking, the only posts that are inter-Departmental are those of Permanent Secretary, Principal Assistant Secretary and Chief Accountant. On the assumption, then, that someone in Ministry X, in the rank below the vacant post, will succeed to it, candidates could be invited to apply for the advertised vacancy with the real motive of being considered for the consequential vacancy. In Services where this procedure is the rule it is well understood and operates satisfactorily. Vacancy No. 1 and consequential vacancy No. 2 are filled simultaneously, with obvious advantages. The impediments in Guyana would seem to be the convention that

the full duties of a post must always be advertised and the impossibility, not to say impropriety, of predicting what consequential vacancy will occur (so that its duties may be advertised in the same Notice); also that more applicants, further down the scale, will be drawn into the field and the number of interviews will probably be doubled. Nevertheless, if some modification could be entertained of the system of advertising duty lists and relying heavily on short-list interviews, then a policy of filling consequential vacancies along with original vacancies would become feasible.

RECOMMENDATION 89

THAT consequential vacancies be filled at the same time as the prime vacancies as often as possible.

275. Vacancies are advertised inside the Public Service by individual Vacancy Notices and publicly, if necessary, in abbreviated newspapers advertisements and the Official Gazette. Each Vacancy Notice is lengthy and has to be stencilled and run off in quantity for issue to Departments. This year 59 such notices have been issued up to 26th October. An alternative is suggested; that a Public Service Official Circular be published on a fixed day each week. The P.S.O.C. would promulgate Vacancies, Appointments and Notices (e.g. instructions, announcements, exhortations, etc.). It would replace the steady stream of individual vacancy notices, would give official notice of appointments and obviate the need for separate advice to each unsuccessful applicant, and would widely publicise the various other notices. The same type-setting could be re-used in the Gazette whenever public advertisement was desired. Again, however, such an innovation would depend on a willingness and a way to cut out the duty lists from the advertisement. The P.S.O.C. would simply be arranged as follows:-

VACANCIES

Vacancy Number	Ministry	Vacant Post	Grading
49	Labour	Personnel Officer	A13
50	Health	Nursing Supervisor	A16

In a constant preamble, i.e. reprinted every week, the P.S.O.C. would set out the standard conditions to be observed, e.g. closing date, availability of duty lists for inspection, obligation to use official application form, applicants to be not more than two grades below, immediate consequential vacancy (if in same Department) to be filled unless indicated otherwise, all appointments to be notified in a later P.S.O.C., etc. In exceptional cases some description of the job will need to be given. It should be sufficient to indicate it, in tabloid form, in a numbered footnote. As there is an approved list of duties on record for every post, intending applicants should be informed in the P.S.O.C. preamble that they may inspect the list at either the Department or the Office of the Commission.

RECOMMENDATION 90

THAT a weekly "Public Service Official Circular" be published to notify vacancies, appointments and instructions; and that individual advertisements and replies to applicants be abolished.

III. TRAINING

A. Training Organisation

276. The Ministry of Education and Race Relations is responsible for all aspects of training in and for the Public Service. The Minister of Education is assisted by two Committees, viz:

A. Training Advisory Committee: to advise on training policy and nominations for training courses. Ministries represented are:

Education (Chairman),
Finance (Establishments),
Economic Development,
Office of the Prime Minister,
Public Service Commission Secretariat, and
the Training Officer is Secretary.

B. Scholarship Selection Committee: to make recommendations for scholarship awards. Ministries represented are:

Education (Chairman),
Finance (Establishments),
Office of the Prime Minister, and
the Training Officer is Secretary.

277. Within the Ministry of Education is a Training Division headed by an officer at present just below Principal Assistant Secretary designated Training Officer who is responsible for training matters. The Division is organised to handle internal training through its own Training Centre, run by an Assistant Secretary as Training Officer, and external training through universities and institutions outside the Public Service (see organisation chart at Annex I).

278. The Training Division administers the Public Service Training Rules drawn up in 1965. Rule 3 runs as follows:-

"Without prejudice to the duty of Permanent Secretaries to organise training for the staff of Ministries, the responsibility for advising the Government and the Public Service Commission shall rest with the Training Division."

The reputed duty of Permanent Secretaries (not defined elsewhere) is "to organise training", which is an executive function. But the Rule goes on to imply that executive decisions lie with the Government and the Public Service Commission, as it says the Training Division shall be their adviser. This Rule needs clarification. Indeed it would best be rewritten because training is not, in fact, a constitutional responsibility of the Public Service Commission at all. The re-writing, however, should await the creation of the Public Service Ministry as that should properly be the source of training policy, direction and control.

279. The Mills Report (1953) said the Public Service Commission should be

responsible for training. The Linsell Report (1966) points out that "in most Services it is the Public Service Commission which conducts training courses" and that a (1965) United Nations Mission to Jamaica recommended that training be placed there. In Guyana the Public Service Commission itself advocates the same principle on the grounds that training is a qualification for promotion in, or appointment to, the Public Service, and therefore whoever selects people for training is, in effect, pre-selecting them for promotion or appointment. This, the Commission believes, should be its sole prerogative. While this argument is persuasive it cannot be carried too far or it would preclude a Permanent Secretary from imparting training to any of his officers lest he precommit the Public Service Commission to promote them ahead of others; or prevent one Ministry from training its staff until all Ministries were ready to do likewise, so that all Administrative Assistants, for example, could compete for promotion on equal terms. However, the point appears to be purely academic as the Commission's functions are defined by the Constitution and training is not one of them. The training function could, of course, be transferred to the P.S.C. Secretariat by order of Cabinet but that would still not confer jurisdiction on the Commission itself. In regard to matters that are ultra vires the Commission, its Secretariat is a separate organ and not subject to Commission direction. So the Secretariat would take the training responsibility and discharge it independently of the Commission, just as it does (or is supposed to do) in regard to all its other responsibilities apart from appointments, removals and discipline. Training would simply become an additional item among the personnel administration functions of the Secretariat, all of which seem more fittingly to belong to the proposed Public Service Ministry. To avoid disruption, training should remain the province of the Ministry of Education until the new Ministry is established and ready to take over. Even then the Prime Minister could, if he thought fit, leave Public Service training to be carried out under his general guidance by some other Minister, as in the case of defence and external affairs.

RECOMMENDATION 91

THAT the Public Service Training Rules be revised when the Training Division is transferred to the new Public Service Ministry.

280. The Training Division of the Ministry of Education has two main concerns:

(a) internal training; _____

(b) external training;

and the work ratio of the former to the latter is about 1 : 3.

281. Internal training conducted by the Training Division (as distinct from Permanent Secretaries) has so far been focussed on induction courses for 20 or so clerical entrants each time. These run for four or five weeks (mornings only) at the Public Service Training Centre. In these Courses the Centre, with a capacity of 250 a year, has worked through a three year back-log. Against this, the clerical intake might be only 50 a year. Even with present understaffing there seems to be latent capacity at the Centre, but it will diminish if courses are started for supervisors, accountants and other Service-wide categories.

B. Internal Training

282. Internal training is sub-divided into inter-Departmental training and

Departmental training. A successful beginning, but only a beginning, has been made with inter-Departmental training. In the majority of Departments the surface of their own in-service training is virtually unscratched. Hence much remains to be done.

283. In the inter-Departmental area, the Training Division has drawn up a list of central training courses, as follows:-

Administration, Management and Supervision.	Introduction of New Form of Annual Confidential Reports and Related Staff Reporting Instructions.
Central Training Courses: Programme of Staff Training.	Young Officers in Barbice.
Administrative Cadets.	Industrial Relations.
Departmental Instructors.	Secretaries.
Personnel Officers.	Superintendents of Typists.
Statistical Clerks.	Civil Service Staff Relations - Training Officers.
Office Procedure (Registry, Files etc.)	Palantype Operators.
Public Service Training Forum.	Private Secretary's Certificate.
Work Study.	Organisation and Methods.
National Training Schemes outside the Public Service.	Steno-Reporting Work.
Induction courses for New Entrants.	Government Supervisory Personnel.
Course for Diplomatic Personnel.	Personnel Management.
Accounting Officers.	Vocational Training in Hotels and Catering Industries by German Expert.
Local Training for the Public Service.	

284. Some difficulty is being experienced in getting any of these courses under way, sorely needed though they are. This unfortunate stalemate will continue until the Training Officer's staff (one Administrative Assistant on internal training) is strengthened by the addition of an Assistant Secretary. Making this recommendation the Linsell Report mentions a 1965 estimate that 12 officers (excluding clerks) were required in a similar situation in Jamaica. One more post is not likely to be the answer to the local staffing problem; nevertheless, it will help to get things moving, and the final staffing requirement can be ascertained empirically, by degrees. The important thing is to equip the Division to plan and inaugurate its programme of central courses in the shortest time possible. All of them are urgently needed to instil proper attitudes and increase productivity. Probably nothing in the administrative sphere will do so much to revitalise the Public Service in spirit and efficiency.

285. The Linsell recommendation that the Training Officer's designation be changed to Director of Training with the status of a Head of Department is also supported. It would fit quite well into the organisational pattern of a Public Service Ministry

and indicate the significance attached to training for the new era.

RECOMMENDATION 92

THAT the Training Officer's designation be changed to that of Director of Training and his Division be equipped with staff and resources to discharge its full responsibilities.

286. The second type of internal training is Departmental training, i.e. training within each Department, on or off the job, to perform the everyday tasks. Training of this kind is too often skimmed or neglected though the value of it is universally acknowledged. Public Servants should be taught their "trade" whether they be accounts clerks, cashiers, correspondence clerks, registry clerks, or whatever. But they are usually left to learn on the job as best they can. Learning by experience is only part of the learning process and, on its own, is extremely wasteful. Sound tuition can supplement and accelerate it dramatically. Probably everyone concedes this quite cheerfully. Yet very little is done about it. Apart from the systematic Departmental training carried out in Audit, Customs, and Post Office there is scarcely any Departmental training worth the name anywhere in the Public Service. This is a pity, because brisk formal "trade" training in every Department would be the quickest and best corrective of any apathy, slackness or incompetence that may be in evidence.

287. The reasons given for official neglect of the training obligation are that everyone is too busy to give tuition and there are too few people to be trained anyway. These are mitigating circumstances but not admissible excuses. Training can be done with the right attitude and organisation. The "attitude" should be to regard training as an investment of time and not a waste of time. The "organisation" should be to spread the task in terms of trainers and intervals of time so that it does not bear too heavily on anyone in particular.

288. The Director of Audit, for one, finds it possible to run a well-planned internal training programme. About 1½ hours are devoted to it every Saturday, the lectures being given by selected members of the staff in turn. He himself takes some of the training sessions. Other Ministries could be recommended to study his scheme.

289. Training is a supervisor's duty, a part of supervision, and any supervisor doing his job does in fact impart it in some fashion or other. But it is desultory and unplanned. If only the same time that the supervisor spends correcting mistakes were devoted to formal training, both he and his staff would be better off and none of them taking time out.

290. A resolute effort, therefore, should be made in every Department to identify "trainable groups" or even individuals, and then ascertain their "training needs". The most expert person in each "trade" could fairly quickly draw up a curriculum and plan a series of instructional sessions either in class or at the desk. The sessions could be short, sharp bursts of training and probably all the better for that. If there are several sections engaged in the same "trade", all the section leaders could be used in rotation to give these short talks. They would be surprised how much they themselves would learn from their own teaching. The innovation of really serious Departmental training should be introduced by an inspirational pep talk by the Permanent Secretary to get everybody involved and in the mood.

291. The ideal would be to appoint a Training Officer in every Ministry to plan, organise and direct the internal training; but the scale is probably not large

enough to justify it. Nevertheless, this co-ordinating role should be assigned part time to some senior official as one of his specific duties. If necessary, a compensating reduction of his responsibilities could be made by re-allocation of duties.

292. Needless to say the training to be carried out by Ministries in this way should be stimulated, guided and assisted by the Training Division (of the Public Service Ministry). The Division should be responsible to see that adequate Departmental training is provided in whatever way is most appropriate for each "trade".

293. The usual control device is a training card that follows each trainee through his courses and records the formal instruction he receives.

294. Internal training appears to be the Cinderella compared with external training notwithstanding that internal training is the type most likely to help the Service regain its esprit de corps. On the other hand experience elsewhere suggests that training schemes often depend for their success on carrots or sticks because the number of people who will submit to training out of sheer love of efficiency is not great. Training is therefore an area where incentives and sanctions could be applied as advocated earlier.

RECOMMENDATION 93

THAT the proposed Public Service Law place a duty on Permanent Secretaries, in consultation with the Training Division of the Public Service Ministry, to arrange courses (if warranted) or other suitable training to improve the efficiency of the staff in the execution of their current duties and to fit them for promotion.

RECOMMENDATION 94

THAT (if not unconstitutional) the Public Service Regulations require a statement of satisfactory training to be supplied before the appointment of a probationer is confirmed.

RECOMMENDATION 95

THAT the inter-Departmental courses mentioned in paragraph 283 be planned for commencement early in 1967.

RECOMMENDATION 96

THAT "trainable categories" and "training needs" be identified and "trade" training be instituted forthwith in all Departments.

C. External Training

295. At any given date the Guyanese Public Service has a large number of its officers in training overseas. According to the Linsell Report, during the year to last June, 118 senior Government Officials were sent on various courses averaging four months, mainly to Britain, America, Canada and the Caribbean. In regard to external training, Guyana must have one of the most highly trained Services in the

world. The fact is not revealed solely by the statistics: it is self evident to an observer on short acquaintance. The intellectual and academic level of Guyanese public servants ensures that the end-product of their work is first class; but somehow it emerges all too slowly. This could be ascribed perhaps to a certain lack of confidence in making decisions, as already surmised, but undoubtedly also to the almost total default of Departments and the Service as a whole in providing internal training. The point to be taken is not that external training should be replaced by internal training but that, unless balanced by internal training, it tends to be wasted. In the passing phase of the moment, the internal training should, of course, be exhortatory and inspirational as much as vocational.

296. In October the Training Division invites Permanent Secretaries to submit proposals for external training for the ensuing calendar year. A distinction is made between "essential" training and "desirable" training and "permitted" training. Essential training must be "fully justified" and endorsed by the Departmental Minister. The Training Advisory Committee considers the proposals and makes recommendations to the Minister of Education. If the nominee is a public servant (some are not) his nomination is referred to the Public Service Commission for approval. The Commission's qualms over this procedure have been mentioned in paragraph 279 with a suggestion that the jurisdiction be transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Public Service Ministry. Full pay leave is granted for essential training, half pay for desirable training and no pay for permitted training.

297. The Training Division should, while continuing meanwhile to operate the overseas training programme in association with the leave privilege, embark on a study of the real training needs of Departments (i.e. divorced from the leave privilege) so that the best utilisation might be made of special (University) schools which seem likely to emerge throughout the Caribbean in medicine, law, agriculture, mining, business management, engineering, etc.

RECOMMENDATION 97

THAT the Training Division survey the external training needs of Departments on the basis of "public interest" (i.e. divorced from the long leave privilege) and endeavour, as opportunity offers, to make that the criterion for selecting personnel for external training.

298. Now that a Public Administration faculty exists at the University of Guyana the liaison already established between the Professor and the Training Division should be formalised for the mutual benefit of both institutions. Their tentative discussions on what kind of forum should be provided for public servants to meet and discuss public administration should be brought to fruition. An Institute of Public Administration has been mooted and would serve the purpose admirably.

RECOMMENDATION 98

THAT the Training Division formalise its association with the University of Guyana for their mutual benefit and, as an early topic, consider what forum (such as an Institute of Public Administration) should be created to enable public servants to study and discuss public administration.

IV. CONCLUSION

299. This survey, as intended, is no more than a reconnaissance to isolate areas where improvements could be made. It is implicit in the report that the recommendations, if approved in principle, will need to be implemented, after more detailed examination, in a planned and controlled way by a "follow up" team. If advice and help is desired in specifying the kind of expertise best suited to the task and in recruiting overseas experts to serve with Guyanese counterparts it will be readily forthcoming.

300. Guyana is fortunate in the intrinsic quality of its Public Service, notably in the senior administrative and professional echelons. Ministries are headed by able and dedicated Permanent Secretaries and staffed by people of good education and potential. In general the structure of organisation is sound and quite defensible on the reasoning which brought it into being. What the Public Service appears to lack at the moment is an air of elan and confident technique. This is understandable in the light of recent events and is doubtless a passing phase. It is accentuated by the serious loss a few years ago of middle grade staff whose accumulated experience will take quite some time to replace. The recommendations in this report are designed to accelerate the day as far as administrative measures can do so.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

I. ORGANISATION

RECOMMENDATION 1 (following para. 19)

THAT the administrative principle that Government business should be organised by major purposes into the minimum number of units should be borne in mind in view -

- (a) of the risk of spreading limited trained and experienced personnel too thinly among the units,
- (b) of the additional demands on such personnel for consequential co-ordinating units,
- (c) of the additional demands made on and for district staff.

RECOMMENDATION 2 (following para. 20)

THAT the functions of units (ministries and departments) should be specified with care and precision; excessive compression in the pursuit of tidiness is self defeating and does not give the Public Service the knowledge on which to base action.

RECOMMENDATION 3 (following para. 22)

THAT Rules of Business of the Government of Guyana including the delegation of powers to ministers, procedures to be followed on differences between ministers, requirements of concurrence of control ministers when proposals involve planning, financial or establishment considerations should be framed. These would, in fact, be the first chapters of the Delegation Code separately recommended later.

RECOMMENDATIONS 4 to 7 (following para. 23)

RECOMMENDATION 4

THAT when a number of units deal with a major purpose e.g. Transport, coordinating arrangements are essential and specification of their functions and power is as important as of the functions and powers of the units to be co-ordinated.

RECOMMENDATION 5

THAT informal coordination (of the type of the weekly meetings between the Permanent Secretaries of Economic Development and Finance) has a valuable part to play and should be extended wherever possible.

RECOMMENDATION 6

THAT wherever possible coordinating bodies should be authoritative; that is, units should be represented by persons able to commit their units.

RECOMMENDATION 7

THAT coordinating bodies seldom function sufficiently well to cure completely the adverse effects on decision making of too many cooks stirring the same broth and are not a substitute for organisation by major purpose.

RECOMMENDATIONS 8 and 9 (following para. 26)

RECOMMENDATION 8

THAT the three main control functions, Establishments, Finance and Planning and Development should be separate, and each should form a separate portfolio. They need to be adequately staffed as delays in them affect all ministries in a snowballing way.

RECOMMENDATION 9

THAT both Establishments and Planning, by their nature require the support of, and to be located close to, effective political authority, if they are to be successful. They frequently are located in the Prime Minister's (or President's) Office. In the existing circumstances of Guyana this is particularly necessary.

RECOMMENDATION 10 (following para. 35)

THAT Permanent Secretaries should meet regularly as a Committee to discuss problems common to themselves and to the administration, the Convenor and Chairman being the Permanent Secretary of the Public Service Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 11 (following para. 36)

THAT there should issue to all Permanent Secretaries and Ministers, on first entering office, a brief explanation or development of their respective positions, developing the meaning of Article 45 of the Constitution.

RECOMMENDATION 12 (following para. 39)

THAT the posts of Permanent Secretaries should not be restricted to the generalist clerical administrative stream but should be open to all possessing the requisite qualities. The most important of these is general administrative capacity, in view of the interchangeability of Permanent Secretaries. The necessity of utilising scarce technical or professional skills most advantageously should also be borne in mind.

RECOMMENDATIONS 13 to 21 (following para. 59)**RECOMMENDATION 13**

THAT the creation of new public corporations should only follow a careful investigation of the area for such a creation and a finding of positive advantage in so doing in terms of increased capacity, weighing all relative factors. The factors include:-

- (a) a proliferation of such corporations has the same effect as an increase in administrative units in spreading available talent thin.
- (b) it also leads to an increase in the proportion of decisions needing inter unit clearance, and hence to an increase in coordinating mechanisms and consequent delay in decision.
- (c) it could facilitate the development of areas of patronage, the effect of which on the public image of government should not be underestimated.

RECOMMENDATION 14

THAT the investigation should result in detailed and precise decisions on the functions of the proposed corporation, on its relationship with functions exercised by existing units, and on its capital structure and financial limitations and these should be incorporated in the Order creating it.

RECOMMENDATION 15

THAT a review of existing corporations on the above lines should be carried out urgently.

RECOMMENDATION 16

THAT the degree of autonomy of corporations in respect of "housekeeping" (i.e. scales of pay, staffing) should be reconsidered and arrangements provided for avoidance of competitive bidding for rare staff through the coordination of conditions of service. This might be the responsibility of the Managerial Division of the proposed Public Service Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 17

THAT Corporations should be subject to a greater degree of financial responsibility for their activities than exists at present. Where possible they should (except when their activities are not capable of costing) be capitalised, commercial type accounts asked for, and some sort of profitability condition attached.

RECOMMENDATION 18

THAT the limitation of the number of officials on the Boards of Corporations to a single member should be removed, if necessary by amendment of the Public Corporations Ordinance.

RECOMMENDATION 19

THAT whenever new corporations are created for the exercise of functions presently carried on elsewhere, the possibility of compensating reduction of ministers or their components should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 20

THAT Public Corporations should not be created except for the performance of a substantial block of duties; small staff units cannot supply the amenities (proper scales, promotion ladders) which are now essential; are wasteful in operation and multiply inescapable overheads.

RECOMMENDATION 21

THAT once corporations have been created with adequate control over staff and financial matters in the manner suggested above, they should be allowed to get on with their job. They should not be treated as subordinate and largely advisory branches of ministries with their conclusions being rechecked for accuracy.

RECOMMENDATION 22 (following para. 66)

THAT the intention to create larger local government units, which will take much time, should not result in any present reduction in the decentralised structure of government.

RECOMMENDATIONS 23 to 27 (following para. 74)

RECOMMENDATION 23

THAT in order to restrict rare professional talents to professional purposes, the unnecessary intervention of professional officers in administrative chains of command should be avoided. In practice, this might lead, for example, in District Engineer's Office to an administrative unit, dealing with the appropriate Principal Assistant Secretary in the ministry on behalf of the District Engineer and headed by a person competent to deal with personnel and financial control, of suitable rank.

RECOMMENDATION 24

THAT the District Commissioner should be developed as the local representative of government, as the coordinator of development plans at district level, and as an interpreter of government to the people.

RECOMMENDATION 25

THAT the cadre of District Commissioners, Assistant Secretaries and Executive Officers of the future (Marshall-type) local bodies should be a joint one and service in the districts should be a qualification for advancement.

RECOMMENDATION 26

THAT District Commissioners should provide common services for decentralised professional officers for whom a separate provision is uneconomic.

RECOMMENDATION 27

THAT all ministries should check their powers, (whether provided by law or by administrative instruction) with a view to delegation below the Permanent Secretary or to district officers as may be appropriate on the basis that all actions which do not positively need disposal by Permanent Secretaries or at the centre should be delegated; rather than that actions should be delegated only if they cannot be performed centrally or at the higher level. If necessary legal power to delegate should be taken.

RECOMMENDATION 28 (following para. 81)

THAT to permit through delegation, a greater expedition in decision, Permanent Secretaries should exercise reasonable, but not excessive supervision of the quality of delegated work i.e. must trust their subordinates to carry out duties properly delegated to them and should neither apply supervision to an extent that negatives the delegation, nor permit unnecessary references to them of delegated matters.

RECOMMENDATION 29 (following para. 93)

THAT in Ministries responsible for a considerable degree of development implementation, there should be an office or section responsible for the supervision of implementation and for maintaining contact with the Ministry of Economic Development for all purposes connected with the plan. When the amount of work does not justify a separate unit, then the duty should be imposed on an existing unit as a specific responsibility.

RECOMMENDATION 30 (following para. 95)

THAT there should be continuous contact between the Ministry of Economic Development on the one hand and executive Ministries on the other to permit by early warning and foresight, the latter to accommodate their programming to the probable flow of capital funds.

RECOMMENDATION 31 (following para. 99)

THAT a projection of the effect of the Development Plan in terms of additional personnel required should be undertaken and considered in connection with the review of the Public Service structure separately recommended.

RECOMMENDATION 32 (following para. 102)

THAT the legislature assist the control of finance by insisting that the audit report reach it in time, by ensuring a thorough examination by the Public

Accounts Committee, and by insisting on a reasonable reply to the Committee's comments.

RECOMMENDATION 33 (following para. 104)

THAT there should be no reluctance to increase staff in control ministries where it is necessary.

RECOMMENDATION 34 (following para. 105)

THAT consideration be given to a system designed to provide a larger number of officers well experienced in the Ministry of Finance to assist other ministries, especially those with heavy planning and spending programmes.

RECOMMENDATION 35 (following para. 106)

THAT the limits within which the Tender Boards operate be re-examined.

RECOMMENDATION 36 (following para. 108)

THAT the approved procedures for purchase and the power to write off losses and to condemn stores be re-examined.

RECOMMENDATION 37 (following para. 110)

THAT the general review of delegated power, as ordered by the Cabinet Economic Sub-Committee, be expedited. While financial propriety must be assured, the benefits arising from restricting delegation should be weighed against procedural delays caused.

RECOMMENDATION 38 (following para. 115)

THAT attention should be devoted to increasing the appeal of the Public Service by appeals to a spirit of service, patriotism and also by efforts to make the Service a more efficient and honourable organisation. There should be a campaign in the secondary schools by lectures and addresses, mounted either by the proposed Public Service Ministry or the Government's public relations mechanism, and a booklet explaining the Public Service as a career should be prepared and made widely available.

RECOMMENDATION 39 (following para. 116)

THAT in the interest of increasing the attractiveness of the Public Service to highly qualified generalist and professional officers, the structural effect of existing pay differentials should be examined.

RECOMMENDATION 40 (following para. 118)

THAT the "career" aspect should not be allowed to dominate admission, structural, pay and pension policies of the Public Service to an extent to inhibit recruitment.

RECOMMENDATION 41 (following para. 119)

THAT consideration should be given to the possibility of action under Article 125 (5) of the Constitution to form a united teaching profession by integrating into a Government Teaching Service all the teachers in the Government system.

RECOMMENDATION 42 (following para. 120)

THAT the position of non-permanent labouring staff paid from "open vote" reserves should be examined, with a view to placing them under the general Labour Code rather than the Civil Service Code. If, as is probable, such staff are not public servants as defined in the Constitution the position should be drawn to the attention of employing officers.

RECOMMENDATION 43 (following para. 141)

THAT the points made in paragraphs 139, 140 and 141 be considered if and when the Constitution is reviewed.

RECOMMENDATIONS 44 to 51 (following para. 172)

RECOMMENDATION 44

THAT a new personnel agency, called Ministry of the Public Service or Public Service Ministry, be established to centralise and expand all the personnel control functions at present divided among the P.S.C. Secretariat, the Establishments Division of Treasury and the Training Division of the Ministry of Education and Race Relations.

RECOMMENDATION 45

THAT the Public Service Ministry consist of the following Divisions:

<u>Proposed</u>	<u>Replacing</u>
1. PERSONNEL DIVISION	P.S.C. Secretariat* Establishment Division
2. TRAINING DIVISION	Training Division of Ministry of Education.
3. MANAGEMENT SERVICES DIVISION	O. & M. Section

Proposed

Replacing

4. DIVISION OF COMMON SERVICES

"Housekeeping" units of P.S.C. Secretariat.

*(A small Secretariat servicing the Public Service Commission with agenda, minutes and arrangements for meetings would remain with the Commission.)

RECOMMENDATION 46

THAT the functions of the DIVISIONS be allocated as suggested in paragraph 168.

RECOMMENDATION 47

THAT the Public Service Ministry be responsible to the Prime Minister.

RECOMMENDATION 48

THAT the Permanent Secretary of the Public Service Ministry, as primus inter pares, be the Convenor and Chairman of the Permanent Secretaries' Committee.

RECOMMENDATION 49

THAT the new Public Service Ministry call into being a standing Permanent Secretaries' Committee to discuss and implement ways and means of improving efficiency and economy.

RECOMMENDATION 50

THAT the Permanent Secretaries Committee begin with an "ideas session" at which they pool their knowledge of deficiencies for the Public Service Ministry to draw up an agenda for action in order of priority.

RECOMMENDATION 51

THAT a sub-committee of the Permanent Secretaries' Committee meet representatives of banking, commerce, industry and the University once or twice a year, under the chairmanship of the head of the Public Service Ministry to discuss efficiency and economy in the Public Service.

RECOMMENDATION 52 (following para. 174)

THAT a Public Service Act be passed, constituting the Public Service Ministry, prescribing its powers and duties, and laying down broad principles over the entire field of personnel administration outside the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission.

RECOMMENDATIONS 53 and 54 (following para. 184)

RECOMMENDATION 53

THAT a Code of Delegation be compiled as follows and issued urgently:

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
Cabinet	Ministers Permanent Secretaries Others
Public Service Commission	Members (PSC) Permanent Secretaries Others
Public Service Ministry	Own staff Permanent Secretaries Others

sections of the Code to be released progressively when ready.

RECOMMENDATION 54

THAT each Permanent Secretary issue a Memorandum of Delegation of both the Ministry's functions and personnel administration to successive levels of staff.

RECOMMENDATION 55 (following para. 193)

THAT special attention be paid in the proposed Public Service Act and Code of Delegation to defining offences and penalties and to decentralising the exercise of disciplinary powers.

RECOMMENDATIONS 56 to 58 (following para. 214)

RECOMMENDATION 56

THAT personnel policies, particularly those mentioned in paragraphs 195 to 213 and itemised hereunder be reviewed and changed if they are outmoded or impede the national effort:

"Personnel", not "Establishment"

Decentralisation

Undue Regard For "Posts"

Lists of Duties

Entrance Qualifications

Age Limits

Promotion Criteria

Promotion Posts

Lateral Recruitment

Contract Employment

RECOMMENDATIONS 56 to 58 (following para. 214) (CONT'D).

Acting Appointments
Impending Vacancies
Interviews: Exclusion of Permanent Secretaries
Interviews: Decentralisation
Incentives and Sanctions
Retirement and Recruitment
Employment of Women

RECOMMENDATION 57

THAT a 1-year moratorium extendable to 2-years be declared on the policy of requiring all vacant posts to be re-justified and the duties to be redefined before the posts are advertised and filled.

RECOMMENDATION 58

THAT, during the moratorium the continued need for the posts and the correctness of the duties be accepted on the ipse dixit of the Permanent Secretary.

RECOMMENDATION 59 (following para. 225)

THAT the new PERSONNEL DIVISION review and simplify the multiplicity of salary scales.

RECOMMENDATIONS 60 and 61 (following para. 231)

RECOMMENDATION 60

THAT in the interests of better industrial relations the processes of joint consultation be reviewed and changed to more practicable forms if not working satisfactorily in their present (Whitley Council) form.

RECOMMENDATION 61

THAT a constructive policy of staff relations in general be developed on modern lines to minimise frustration and enhance the spirit of public service.

II. METHODS

RECOMMENDATION 62 (following para. 234)

THAT common procedures be standardised throughout the Public Service by the Management Services Division.

RECOMMENDATION 63 (following para. 236)

THAT the Public Service Act be followed by subordinate Regulations on administrative procedure and requirements.

RECOMMENDATIONS 64 and 65 (following para. 237)

RECOMMENDATION 64

THAT personnel policies and practices be published in a Public Service Manual to be issued jointly or severally by the Public Service Commission and the Public Service Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 65

THAT the Financial Regulations, Stores Regulations and Tender Boards Regulations also be revised.

RECOMMENDATION 66 (following para. 238)

THAT all Ministries write or rewrite Departmental Manuals or Handbooks explaining the policy and procedure for administering their functions.

RECOMMENDATION 67 (following para. 241)

THAT delegation in terms of Recommendations 53 and 54 be subject to reasonable controls and safeguards.

RECOMMENDATION 68 (following para. 242)

THAT every Ministry be required by law to make an Annual Report to its Minister for presentation to Parliament, and the Public Service Commission be invited to produce one also.

RECOMMENDATION 69 (following para. 243)

THAT an Annual Staff List be printed.

RECOMMENDATION 70 (following para. 247)

THAT a system of scheduling inward correspondence, etc., be introduced to expedite attention to the subject matter.

RECOMMENDATION 71 (following para. 248)

THAT an "Action Officer" be named to carry personal responsibility for completion of each transaction.

RECOMMENDATION 72 (following para. 249)

THAT Action Sheets be used to expedite business by indicating the sequence of action.

RECOMMENDATIONS 73 and 74 (following para. 250)

RECOMMENDATION 73

THAT no minuting be countenanced unless it contributes to the necessary elucidation or the solution of a problem.

RECOMMENDATION 74

THAT officers referring matters for decision should state what course they recommend.

RECOMMENDATION 75 (following para. 251)

THAT effective follow-up systems be standardised for use by all Departments.

RECOMMENDATION 76 (following para. 252)

THAT a Desk File of duties and actions be prepared for ready reference at each post.

RECOMMENDATION 77 (following para. 253)

THAT output standards or norms be compiled as yardsticks.

RECOMMENDATION 78 (following para. 254)

THAT the O and M Section be expanded and assigned a constructive programme of Service-wide work studies and similar tasks.

RECOMMENDATION 79 (following para. 255)

THAT a convincing Suggestions Scheme be devised and promoted continuously throughout the Service.

RECOMMENDATION 80 (following para. 257)

THAT innovations from accepted ideas in one Department be applied by the Public Service Ministry to other Departments, and be publicised throughout the service to stimulate fresh ideas.

RECOMMENDATION 81 (following para. 263)

THAT both external and internal inspection of personnel and performance (i.e. efficiency audits) be instituted throughout the Public Service on lines to be laid down by the Public Service Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 82 (following para. 265)

THAT dictation be encouraged by deliberate means and practised at regular times each day.

RECOMMENDATION 83 (following para. 266)

THAT a modern friendly style of correspondence be used in place of archaic elegance.

RECOMMENDATION 84 (following para. 268)

THAT transcription, checking and design of forms be listed among the subjects for O and M attention.

RECOMMENDATION 85 (following para. 270)

THAT rent demands be produced (from punched cards) and issued to all lessees.

RECOMMENDATION 86 (following para. 271)

THAT salary increments be paid automatically unless specifically stopped in particular cases.

RECOMMENDATION 87 (following para. 272)

THAT Confidential Reports be made biennially instead of annually.

RECOMMENDATION 88 (following para. 273)

THAT impending vacancies be advertised immediately they become known.

RECOMMENDATION 89 (following para. 274)

THAT consequential vacancies be filled at the same time as the prime vacancies as often as possible.

RECOMMENDATION 90 (following para. 275)

THAT a weekly "Public Service Official Circular" be published to notify vacancies, appointments and instructions; and that individual advertisements and replies to applicants be abolished.

III. TRAINING

RECOMMENDATION 91 (following para. 279)

THAT the Public Service Training Rules be revised when the Training Division is transferred to the new Public Service Ministry.

RECOMMENDATION 92 (following para. 285)

THAT the Training Officer's designation be changed to that of Director of Training and his Division be equipped with staff and resources to discharge its full responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION 93 to 96 (following para. 294)

RECOMMENDATION 93

THAT the proposed Public Service law place a duty on Permanent Secretaries, in consultation with the Training Division of the Public Service Ministry, to arrange courses (if warranted) or other suitable training to improve the efficiency of the staff in the execution of their current duties and to fit them for promotion.

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RECOMMENDATION 96

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RECOMMENDATION 98 (following para. 298)

THAT the Training Division formalise its association with the University of Guyana for their mutual benefit and, as an early topic, consider what forum (such as an Institute of Public Administration) should be created to enable public servants to study and discuss public administration.

GUYANA DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC STATISTICS

YEAR	G.N.P. in millions	PERCENTAGE INCREASE	POPULATION # in thousands	PERCENTAGE INCREASE	URBAN CONSUMER PRICE INDICES	PERCENTAGE INCREASE	CURRENT BUDGET in millions	PERCENTAGE INCREASE	PERSONAL EMOLUMENTS in millions	PERCENTAGE INCREASE	NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANTS (including security forces)	PERCENTAGE INCREASE
1953	\$ 175.8		465 ^o		88.4		\$ 31.4		\$ 7.4		4,155 †	
1959	239.4	36	559 ^o	20	100	13	45.5 ^o	45	14.2	92	6,087 †	46.5
1965	293.9*	23	653 ^o	17	110.7*	11	81.8**	80	32.8**	131	7,599 †	20
1966			662 ^{oo}	1	118.0 (August)	7	84.2**	3	36.2**	10	8,600 †	11.6

Inclusive of Amerindians

o Statistical Bureau


† Establishment as shown in Annual Estimates

* Estimate. Source: Economic Survey of British Guiana

** Estimate. Source: Annual Estimates for 1966

oo As at 30th June, 1966.


GUYANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND SECRETARIAT



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ANNEX C

ESTABLISHMENTS DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FINANCE



MANAGEMENT SERVICES (INCLUDING TRAINING)

Function	Britain	New Zealand	Suggested for Guyana P.S.M.
1. Machinery of Government	*	*	*
2. Comparative studies	*	*	*
3. Costing techniques	*	*	*
4. Computer projects	*	*	*
5. Punched card equipment	*	*	*
6. Operational research	*	*	*
7. O. & M.	*	*	*
8. Work study	*	*	*
9. Small Office machines	*	*	*
10. Clerical work measurement	*	*	*
11. Network analysis	*	*	*
12. Information (publications)	*	*	*
13. Training in O. and M.	*	*	*
14. Layout Planning		*	*
15. Office Manuals		*	*
16. Desk Files		*	*
17. Forms design		*	*
18. Incentives		*	*
19. Suggestions Scheme		*	*
20. Establishments			*
21. Gradings			*
22. Salary scales			*
23. Pay research			*
24. Terms and conditions			*
25. Office inspections			*
26. Staff reports			*
27. Office Accommodation			*


MANAGEMENT SERVICES (INCLUDING TRAINING)

Function	Britain	New Zealand	Suggested for Guyana P.S.M.
28. Education			*
29. Staff training			*

N.B. Nos. 14-29 are also performed in Britain and Nos. 20-29 in New Zealand, but not in the Management Service Division of the personnel agency.

PROPOSED MINISTRY OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE

PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION



MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE
NEW ZEALAND STATE SERVICES ACT 1962

1. From 1912 to 1962 the Public Service Commission was completely independent of Ministerial control though empowered to deal with the entire range of personnel, establishment and efficiency functions for the "Public Service", that is to say for all Departments except Post Office, Railways, Police, Armed Services and a few others.

2. In 1962, on the advice of the (McCarthy) Royal Commission, the Public Service Act was rewritten as the State Services Act 1962 and the Commission was renamed State Services Commission because it was given certain efficiency audit functions in relation to the previously exempt Services and other bodies dependent on Government funds. In effect, and in varying degrees, it became a Commission for all Services of the State.

3. The Act introduced some new principles and was more definitive. The Commission was distinguished for the first time from "a Department of State to be known as the Office of the State Services Commission". The Commission itself was cast in two separate roles: it was made responsible to a Minister, again for the first time, "for the administration of the Act" but in matters relating to individual employees (e.g. appointment, promotion, demotion, transfer, discipline, dismissal) it remained independent of any Minister. "Minister" means the one for the time being charged with the administration of the Act.

4. The Commission consists of not more than four persons appointed by the Governor-General in Council on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. One of them is Chairman and "permanent head of the Office" of the S.S.C. and another is Deputy Chairman. The term of appointment is not more than five years but members are eligible for reappointment.

5. Although private citizens are eligible, not one in fact has been appointed in the whole history of the P.S.C. since 1912. (This, however, may change at any time by an infusion from outside.) Only senior public servants have been appointed so far. They serve full-time and their term of office is "deemed to be continuous service" in the State services for purposes of superannuation rights, reappointment in the State services and entitlement to leave privileges.

6. In respect of "the Public Service" as defined (see para. 1), the Commission is responsible for:

- (a) Reviewing the following: machinery of government; allocation of functions; creation, abolition, amalgamation of Departments; co-ordination and controls;
- (b) Reviewing efficiency and economy of each Department, and permanent heads' discharge of responsibilities;
- (c) Provision of office accommodation and prescription of physical working conditions;
- (d) Approving and reviewing establishments (without reference to Treasury);
- (e) Acting as central personnel authority;
- (f) Prescribing basic training programmes, advising and assisting with training and recommending facilities;

- (g) Providing management consultant services (e.g. efficient work and control methods, data processing, problems or organisation);
- (h) Conducting inspections and investigations, and calling for reports, as necessary.

7. In respect of other State services or bodies financed mainly by Government, the Commission has the functions in (f) and (g) above on request or, in the case of dependent bodies, by direction of the Prime Minister. Also it may join the head of any such service or body in investigating its organisation or methods.

8. The Commission must submit an annual report to the Minister for tabling in Parliament.

9. The Commission is empowered to delegate to its members or "any other person". It has heavily delegated its powers on a multi-level basis.

10. The Commission has the authority of a "Commission of Inquiry" to "summon witnesses and receive evidence".

11. All appointments to "the Public Service" are made by the Commission, always "to maintain and develop an efficient career service" but never unless the Commission is "satisfied that the appointment is necessary and that the person appointed has clearly more merit for the position to be filled than any officer who is qualified and available for the position".

12. Likewise all appointments of officers to vacancies are made by the Commission after advertisement in the "Public Service Official Circular", printed weekly (formerly a supplement to the "Gazette"). The Commission may, however, fill any vacancy (except those of Permanent Heads and their first deputies) without advertising.

13. The Act requires that "the merit of an officer for promotion shall be determined by -

- (a) Work experience and competence shown in performance of duties previously carried out by him; and
- (b) Personal qualities, characteristics, and attributes relevant to the position to be filled; and
- (c) Relevant educational or other qualifications".

Where two applicants are adjudged equal in merit, "regard shall be given to the length of continuous permanent service of each officer". Seniority, as such, thus has no direct bearing on the appointment unless the candidates are inseparable on merit, but it does, of course exert an indirect influence as an ingredient of "work experience" - see (a) above.

14. The Act contains a "Code of Conduct" dealing with private employment, conviction for offences and what might be termed "Public Service offences". Nine such offences are defined and any charge not couched in the wording of these offences is usually held to be invalid. There is a statutory distinction made between "major" and "minor" offences. If the Permanent Head regards an offence as "minor" he may, after acquainting the officer of the allegation and requiring him to furnish an explanation, and on being satisfied that the offence is proved, caution or reprimand or order a sum not exceeding ten pounds to be deducted from salary. In effect, offences deserving of more severe penalties such as transfer, down-grading or dismissal, are the ones that are treated as "major" offences to be

dealt with by the Commission. The Commission directs the Permanent Head to lay a formal charge and allow a reasonable time (e.g. 14 days) for the offender to admit or deny, and give a written explanation. If the Commission then considers the charge should be investigated it deposes a member of the Commission or one of its staff or some outsider (often a retired Magistrate) to conduct an inquiry and submit a report together with the evidence. The Commission then adjudicates and, in appropriate cases, imposes a penalty. Five types of penalty are prescribed by the Act and cannot be varied or exceeded.

15. Public servants have a right of appeal against non-promotion and non-appointment, against classification and grading, and against any decision or penalty on a disciplinary charge, also against transfer out of New Zealand and, in some circumstances, against transfer from one locality to another.

16. An independent Public Service Appeal Board is established by the Act, consisting of a Stipendiary Magistrate "or other person" as Chairman, an officer or retired officer as "official member" nominated by the Commission and two officers or retired officers as "service members" nominated by the Public Service Association. Only one of the two service members may sit at the same time.

17. Because the appointments of Permanent Heads and their first deputies are exempt from appeal, a special procedure is prescribed. The Commission has a different composition when making these appointments, viz: the Chairman of the "normal" Commission and one other of its Members together with two Permanent Heads appointed by the Minister from a panel of eight elected every two years at a meeting of all Permanent Heads. One of the two "shall be so appointed after consultation" with the Association.

18. Under a separate statute there is created a Government Service Tribunal of three members - one being the Government member, one the service member and the other the Chairman (a Judge of the Arbitration Court or a Magistrate). The principal function of the Tribunal is to adjudicate on appeals by a "service organisation" against "determinations" of the Commission in prescribing salary scales and conditions for "occupational classes".

19. This note is included by special request to facilitate further study if that is desired.

STATE SERVICES ACT, 1962 (New Zealand)

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THE STATE SERVICES COMMISSION

3. State Services Commission
4. Removal from office
5. Vacation of office
6. Superannuation rights of Commissioners
7. Meetings of the Commission
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10. Functions and powers of the Commission
11. Functions of Commission in respect of branches of the State Services and other bodies.
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14. Delegation of powers
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PART III

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22. The Public Service
23. Revocations
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31. Appointment of officers of other branches of State Services to Public Service
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39. Failure to comply with a direction to transfer
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51. Allowances for adult and married employees
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53. Private employment
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57. Minor offences
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THE PUBLIC SERVICES REGULATIONS, 1964
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17. Special cases of female eligibility
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20. Leave in anticipation of retiring leave
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67. Commission's responsibilities and powers for Government office accommodation
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- 71. Retirement policy
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SIONS FOR PRISONS SERVICE


- 73. Retirement policy
- 74. Retirement of prison officers who are medically unfit


PART XIV


MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

- 75. Revocation and saving Schedule

TRAINING DIVISION OF MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND RACE RELATIONS








+ PUBLIC CORPORATION

THE GOVERNMENT OF GUYANA
NOVEMBER, 1966



PEAL

RT

IRTS

